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 Executive Summary 
 Chapter 17 explores possible transformational pathways of the future global energy system with the overarching 
aim of assessing the technological feasibility as well as the economic implications of meeting a range of sustainability 
objectives simultaneously. As such, it aims at the integration across objectives, and thus goes beyond earlier 
assessments of the future energy system that have mostly focused on either specific topics or single objectives. 
Specifically, the chapter assesses technical measures, policies, and related costs and benefits for meeting the objectives 
that were identified in  Chapters 2 to  6 , including:
 providing almost universal access to affordable clean cooking and electricity for the poor  • 1 ; 
 limiting air pollution and health damages from energy use;  •
 improving energy security throughout the world; and  •
 limiting climate change.  •
 The assessment of future energy pathways in this chapter shows that it is technically possible to achieve improved 
energy access, air quality, and energy security simultaneously while avoiding dangerous climate change. In fact, a 
number of alternative combinations of resources, technologies, and policies are found capable of attaining these 
objectives. From a large ensemble of possible transformations, three distinct groups of pathways (GEA-Supply, 
GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efficiency) have been identified and analyzed. Within each group, one pathway has been selected 
as “illustrative” in order to represent alternative evolutions of the energy system toward sustainable development. 
The pathway groups, together with the illustrative cases, depict salient branching points for policy implementation and 
highlight different degrees of freedom and different routes to the sustainability objectives. The characteristics of the 
pathways thus differ significantly from each other, depending on the choices made about technologies, infrastructures, 
behaviors, and lifestyles, as well as on future priorities with respect to the portfolio of supply- and demand-side policies. 
These choices, in turn, have broad implications for issues of technological availability and scale-up, institutional and 
capacity requirements, and financing needs. 
 The analysis in this chapter shows that achieving all the objectives simultaneously remains an extremely ambitious 
task. Although a successful transformation is found to be technically possible, it will require the rapid introduction of 
policies and fundamental political changes toward concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate global concerns, such 
as climate change, into local and national policy priorities (such as health and pollution, energy access, and energy 
security). An integrated policy design will thus be necessary in order to identify cost-effective “win-win” solutions that 
can deliver on multiple objectives simultaneously. 
 The transition can be achieved from different levels of energy demand as well as through alternative combinations of 
energy resources. An in-depth modeling sensitivity analysis shows, however, that efficiency improvements throughout 
the energy system are the most important options to achieve the energy transformation toward a more sustainable 
future. Under assumptions of high energy efficiency (the GEA-Efficiency pathways), it is feasible to achieve the 
transformation under any of the analyzed supply-side portfolio restrictions. This includes in particular the feasibility 
of the transformation in absence of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture and storage in combination with the phase-out 
of nuclear as well as cases without bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or without relying on carbon sink 
management. Under the contrary assumption of high energy demand (the GEA-Supply pathways), however, the rapid 
and simultaneous growth of many advanced technologies is required. For instance, with high energy demand the 
sustainability targets remain out of reach if the supply of intermittent renewables or carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
is restricted, thus making these two “options” in effect mandatory in the absence of important improvements on the 
demand side. Assuming a nuclear phaseout, on the other hand, was found compatible with the transformation also at 
high energy demand. 
 1  The target is “almost universal access” because reaching the remotest rural populations is exceedingly expensive. 
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 Despite the flexibility and choices available to direct the energy system transformation, a large number of robust and 
nondiscretionary components of an energy transition would need to begin being implemented now. These are referred 
to in the chapter as necessary conditions, summarizing the commonalities across all pathways to achieve the objectives. 
They include the following:
 Future improvements of at least the historical rate of change in the energy intensity of the economy, to reduce  •
the risk that the sustainability objectives become unreachable. Further improvements in energy intensity, entailing 
aggressive efforts to improve end-use efficiency, increase the flexibility of supply and the overall cost-effectiveness 
of the energy system transformation. 
 A broad portfolio of supply-side options, focusing on low-carbon energy from non-combustible renewables,  •
bioenergy, nuclear energy, and CCS, achieving low-carbon shares in primary energy of at least 60–80% by 2050. 
These include: 
 strong growth in renewable energy beginning immediately and reaching 165–650 exajoules (EJ) of primary  –
energy by 2050; 
 an increasing requirement for storage technologies to support system integration of intermittent wind and solar  –
energy; 
 growth in bioenergy in the medium term to 80–140 EJ by 2050 (including extensive use of agricultural residues  –
and second-generation bioenergy to mitigate adverse impacts on land use and food production); 
 nuclear energy plays an important role in the supply-side portfolio in some transition pathways, but the  –
assessment of pathways with “restricted” portfolios suggests that it is also feasible to phase out nuclear and still 
meet the sustainability targets; and 
 fossil CCS as an optional bridging or transitional technology in the medium term, and increasing the contribution  –
of biomass with CCS in the long term, unless energy demand is high, in which case cumulative storage of up to 
250 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO 2 ) by 2050 would be needed in order to limit global average temperature 
change to below 2°C. 
 Aggressive decarbonization in the electricity sector, reaching low-carbon shares of 75% to almost 100% by 2050;  •
phase-out of conventional coal power (i.e., without CCS); natural gas power could act as a bridging or transitional 
technology in the short to medium term. 
 Enhancements of the transportation sector through electrification or the introduction of hydrogen vehicles to  •
improve end-use efficiency, increase the flexibility of supply, and improve the overall cost-effectiveness of the energy 
system transformation. 
 A peak in oil use in the transportation sector by 2030, followed by a phase-out over the medium term; a strong  •
growth of liquid biofuels in the short to medium term, after which the mix of liquid and gaseous fuels depends on 
transportation system choices and technological breakthroughs. 
 Availability of energy resources (fossil and non-fossil) does not limit deployment on an aggregated global scale but  •
may pose important constraints regionally, particularly in Asia, where energy demand is expected to grow rapidly. 
 The analysis of the GEA pathways shows, similarly to earlier assessments, that the transformation of the energy system 
would require dedicated efforts to increase global energy-related investments to between US$1.7 trillion and US$2.2 
trillion annually, compared with about US$1.3 trillion in annual investment today. Out of this total, about US$300 to 
US$550 billion of efficiency-related investments are required on the demand-side of the pathways. This includes only the 
efficiency-increasing part of the investment to improve energy intensity beyond historical improvement rates. The full 
demand-side investments into all energy components of appliances might thus be significantly higher. Total investments 
into energy supply and efficiency-related investments at the demand-side correspond in sum to a small fraction 
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(about 2%) of global gross domestic product (GDP). Future transitions with a focus on energy efficiency achieve the 
targets at more modest cost and thus represent the lower bound of the investment range. 
 Meeting the sustainability objectives will require the further tightening of present and planned legislation and the 
introduction of new policies:
  • Universal access to electricity and clean cooking requires the rapid shift from the use of traditional biomass to 
cleaner fuels and/or clean cooking technologies. This is feasible over the next 20 years, provided that sufficient 
financial resources are made available for investments on the order of US$36 billion to US$41 billion/year (half of it 
in Africa). 
  • Pollution control measures across all sectors need to be tightened beyond those in present and planned legislation 
so that the majority of the world population is meeting the World Health Organization (WHO) air quality guideline 
(annual PM2.5 (particulate matter less than 2.5 μg in size) concentration < 10 μg/m 3 by 2030), while remaining 
populations are staying well within the WHO Tier I-III levels (15–35 μg/m 3 by 2030). Estimated global costs to meet 
the air pollution target are about US$200 billion to US$350 billion/year to 2030 (about 10–20% of energy costs). 
This estimate accounts for ancillary benefits of stringent climate change mitigation policies that reduce overall 
pollution control costs by about 50–65%. 
  • Limiting global temperature change to less than 2°C over preindustrial levels (with a probability of > 50%) is 
achieved through rapid reductions of global CO 2 emissions from the energy sector, which peak around 2020 and 
decline thereafter to 30–70% below 2000 emissions levels in 2050, reaching finally almost zero or even negative 
CO 2 emissions in the second half of the century. 
  • Enhanced energy security for regions can be achieved by increasing the use of domestic energy sources and by 
increasing the diversity and resilience of energy systems. A focus on energy efficiency improvement and renewable 
deployment increases the share of domestic (national or regional) supply in primary energy by a factor of 2 and thus 
significantly decreases import dependency. At the same time, the share of oil in global energy trade is reduced from 
the present 75% to under 40% and no other fuel assumes a similarly dominant position in the future. 
 Achieving society’s near-term pollution reduction and health objectives is greatly furthered by climate change 
mitigation, and similarly, stringent climate policy can help further the energy security goals of individual countries. 
The simultaneous achievement of climate change mitigation, energy security, and air pollution control comes thus at 
a significantly reduced total energy cost when the multiple economic benefits of each are properly accounted for. This 
concerns:
 the added costs of future air pollution control measures at the global level, which can be cut significantly (by up to  •
US$500 billion annually to 2030) in the case of stringent climate policy; 
 energy security costs, which can be substantially decreased under increasingly stringent levels of decarbonization,  •
approaching almost zero for very stringent climate policies and translating to an annual cost savings of about 
US$130 billion annually in 2030; and 
 subsidies of carbon-intensive oil products and coal amount at present to about US$132 billion to  •
US$240 billion/year. Rapid decarbonization of the energy system reduces the need for these subsidies by about 
US$70 billion to US$130 billion/year by 2050. 
 The transformation toward the sustainability objectives offers multiple benefits that cannot be assigned monetary 
values at a detailed level, but are nevertheless important to account for. The following are some important nonpecuniary 
benefits of the transformation:
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 Universal access to electricity and clean cooking increases the productivity of the poorest people and thus  •
 contributes to overall well-being and more equitable economic growth. In addition, such access results in significant 
health  benefits of more than 24 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) saved in 2030. 
 Stringent pollution control policies to meet the WHO air quality guidelines for the majority of the world population  •
result in health benefits on the order of 20 million DALYs saved in 2030. 
 Limiting climate change to less than 2°C compared with preindustrial times reduces the risks of a number of  •
different types of climate impacts, summarized by five main reasons for concern: the risk to unique or threatened 
systems; the risk of more frequent episodes of extreme weather; an inequitable distribution of impacts (given that 
some regions, countries, and populations may face greater harm from climate change); large aggregate damages 
(assessing comprehensive measures of impacts through efforts to aggregate into a single metric, such as monetary 
damages); and the risk of large-scale discontinuities (e.g., tipping points associated with very large impacts, such as 
the deglaciation of the West Antarctic or the Greenland ice sheet). 
 Rapid decarbonization and thus stronger reliance on efficiency improvements and low-carbon energy (e.g.,  •
 renewables) may create new job opportunities, thus providing additional economic benefits. 
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 17.1  Introduction 
 17.1.1  Scenarios and Energy Transformations 
 Chapter 17 represents an integrative module of the Global Energy 
Assessment (GEA). It builds on Clusters I and II of this report to shed 
light on the question of how future energy systems can address mul-
tiple challenges and sustainability goals, ranging from issues of energy 
access to climate change mitigation. Specifically, the analysis of inte-
grative future energy pathways presented in this chapter aims at illus-
trating how the energy system components, technologies, and resources 
described in Cluster II can be combined to address the challenges and 
realize the sustainability goals identified in Cluster I. The resulting energy 
transitions achieve multiple goals simultaneously and include various 
combinations of policy measures and instruments as well as lifestyle 
and value changes. The results of this scenario analysis thus prepare the 
ground for Cluster IV, which assesses policy packages and institutional 
and governance changes for realizing the different sustainable futures. 
 The two main objectives of developing the transformational pathways 
are, first, to provide a quantitative and qualitative framework for the 
identification of policies and measures for a transition toward an energy 
system that supports sustainable development, and second, to facilitate 
the integration of diverse energy issues and consistency across the dif-
ferent chapters of the GEA. 
 The existing literature contains a large number of scenarios, follow-
ing different traditions in scenario design, development process and 
objectives. Broadly, one can distinguish between scenarios along “quali-
tative versus quantitative” lines or along “normative versus descrip-
tive” lines. Whereas quantitative scenarios provide detailed numerical 
information about underlying processes and dynamics, qualitative 
scenarios aim at a textual and narrative description of how the future 
might unfold, thus providing an overarching story (see, e.g., Schwartz, 
 1991 ). A few scenario exercises have combined the two traditions and 
developed quantitative scenarios with so-called underlying storylines 
(among the first of which were those in the IPCC (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) (Nakicenovic and Swart,  2000 ) and the scenarios developed by 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter and Pingali,  2005 ). 
Descriptive scenarios usually aim at exploring a wide scenario space 
and thus improving our understanding of future uncertainties (given the 
variation of underlying assumptions about driving forces). Prominent 
examples include the IPCC reference greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
scenarios, such as the IS92 (Leggett et al.,  1992 ; Pepper et al.,  1992 ) 
and the SRES. Normative scenarios, by contrast, explore the underlying 
dynamics of change in order to achieve specific desirable outcomes or 
targets, usually assuming the deployment of a certain set of measures 
or policies. Consequently, normative scenarios usually do not aim at 
exploring the whole uncertainty space of possible future developments, 
but rather focus on the main characteristics of the transition that are 
considered necessary to achieve specific objectives. 
 Although various combinations of the above scenario designs are pos-
sible, a descriptive or a qualitative scenario design would not be suf-
ficient to address the main aim of the GEA scenario analysis, which is 
to identify specific measures and policies that would enable the trans-
formation of the energy system. Instead the GEA adopts a combination 
of a normative and a quantitative scenario approach, whereby specific 
targets for various energy objectives are defined and formal modeling 
approaches are used to quantify how, over what time frame, and at 
what costs those objectives can be achieved. 
 The GEA energy transition pathways presented in this chapter are 
designed to describe transformative changes toward a more sustainable 
future. A specific feature of these pathways is that they simultaneously 
achieve normative goals related to all major energy challenges, including 
the environmental impacts of energy conversion and use, energy secu-
rity, and how to provide access to clean and affordable energy services 
for growing populations and higher standards of living (particularly for 
the world’s poorest 3–4 billion people). Emphasis is given to the identi-
fication of potential synergies, or in other words, of integrated solutions 
and “win-win” strategies in addressing multiple energy objectives at 
the same time. One possible way of understanding the GEA pathways 
is to regard them as alternative interpretations of one overarching GEA 
scenario in which the energy system is transformed under normative, 
sustainable goals. The pathways highlight different degrees of freedom 
and routes to these goals. 
 17.1.2  Roadmap of the Chapter 
 The chapter is structured as follows ( Figure 17.1 ). First, the GEA scen-
ario logic and taxonomy are introduced, followed by assumptions about 
the main sustainability objectives and targets as defined by various 
 chapters of Cluster I of the report. Next, the main characteristics of 
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the energy transformation, including demand-side efficiency enhance-
ments, supply-side transitions, technology deployment, and investment 
needs are analyzed. In the first instance, a wide range of possible trans-
formation pathways and associated uncertainties are identified and 
explored. From the resulting ensemble of pathways, three illustrative 
cases are selected to represent salient differences in choices of how to 
meet the sustainability objectives. After addressing the issue of how the 
transition can be achieved, the chapter moves to the individual object-
ives and elaborates on what can be improved through which measures. 
Specific attention is given to identifying cost-effective policy portfolios 
for addressing energy access, environment (climate and pollution), and 
energy security objectives. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of 
how multiple sustainability indicators can be reached simultaneously. 
 Box 17.1 sets out the key terms to be explained and used throughout 
the chapter. 
 GEA scenario  An overarching storyline of energy system transformation to meet normative sustainability objectives 
 Pathways  Qualitative and quantitative descriptions of demand- and supply-side energy system transformations 
falling within the overarching GEA scenario 
 Pathway groups  Groups of pathways distinguished by their level of energy demand and used as an organizing framework 
for the modeling of speciﬁ c supply-side pathways 
 GEA-Efﬁ ciency  Pathway emphasizing demand-side and efﬁ ciency improvements 
 GEA-Supply  Pathway emphasizing the supply-side transformation at relatively high energy demand 
 GEA-Mix  Pathway emphasizing regional diversity at an intermediate level of demand between GEA-Efﬁ ciency and 
GEA-Supply 
 Illustrative pathway  A single pathway selected from one of the three pathway groups to illustrate in more depth the similarities 
and differences between pathways and to explore further implications 
 Branching points 
 Counterfactual 
 Substantive alternatives or “choices” causing a divergence of pathways and contrasting characteristics: 
 level of demand (low, intermediate, or high) 
 transportation system transformation (conventional or advanced) 
 portfolio of supply-side options (full or restricted) 
 Hypothetical no-policy baseline describing the evolution of the energy system in absence of any 
transformational policies for the demand- or supply-side of the energy system 
 Box 17.1 |  Deﬁ nitions of Key Terms Used in  Chapter 17 
 17.2  GEA Scenario Logic 
 17.2.1  Scenario Taxonomy 
 The GEA comprises essentially a single normative scenario of the sus-
tainability transition. Within this single scenario, alternative path-
ways are developed that describe transformations toward normative 
objectives related to the environmental impacts of energy conversion 
and use, energy security, and energy access. All pathways fulfill these 
objectives by reaching specific and clear targets. For example, they all 
limit the future global mean temperature increase to not more than 2°C 
above preindustrial levels, and they all lead to almost universal access 
to clean energy services throughout the world by 2030. Another fea-
ture common to all pathways is that all economic and demographic 
changes within them are consistent with the GEA’s aspirational goals 
with respect to sustainable development. 
 Achieving all these goals simultaneously is an enormous challenge that 
requires substantial effort and fundamental change in the energy sys-
tem. Although the direction of change in the GEA is clearly defined by 
the sustainability objectives, the specific characteristics of the transi-
tion pathways may differ significantly and will depend on choices about 
technologies, infrastructures, behaviors, and lifestyles, as well as future 
priorities with respect to the portfolio of supply- and demand-side poli-
cies. These choices, in turn, have broad implications for issues of techno-
logical availability and scale-up, institutional and capacity requirements, 
and financing needs. 
 A fundamental assumption underlying the pathways is that the coord-
ination required to reach the multiple objectives simultaneously can be 
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achieved. The pathways thus illustrate the extent of coordination that is 
necessary and the benefits of policy integration across local and global 
concerns. By doing so, they inform decision making about the impacts of 
successful policy implementation. They do not, however, aim at develop-
ing recommendations of how the favorable political environment that 
is also necessary for successful policy coordination and implementation 
should be achieved (see  Chapters 22 and  24 ). 
 The main aim of the GEA pathways is thus to provide a better understand-
ing of what combination of measures, over which time frames and at 
what costs, is needed to deliver the necessary solutions. Although some 
combination of both supply- and demand-side measures is needed to 
transform the energy system, emphasis on one side or the other consti-
tutes an important point of divergence between different policy choices 
that may drive the energy system in alternative directions. Thus, a critical 
factor is to what extent demand-side efficiency measures, together with 
lifestyle and behavioral changes, can reduce the amount of energy used 
for mobility, housing, and industrial services, and thus help fulfill the 
GEA’s aspirational goals across virtually the whole range of sustainabil-
ity objectives. If energy demand is low, any of a number of alternative 
supply-side configurations might be able to fulfill the goals. By contrast, 
a lower emphasis on reducing energy demand will require a much more 
rapid expansion of a broader portfolio of supply-side options. Hence, the 
successful implementation of demand-side policies increases the flex-
ibility of supply-side options, and, vice versa, more rapid transformation 
of the supply side increases flexibility on the demand side. 
 Figure 17.2 illustrates this concept, which is the logical basis of the over-
arching GEA scenario and of the different GEA pathways. Three GEA 
pathway groups, labeled GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply, are 
constructed to represent different emphases in terms of demand-side 
and supply-side changes. Each group varies in particular with respect 
to assumptions about the comprehensiveness of demand-side policies 
to enhance efficiency, leading to pathways of comparatively low energy 
demand (GEA-Efficiency), intermediate demand (GEA-Mix), and high 
demand (GEA-Supply). Within each group, a range of alternative path-
ways for the supply-side transformation are explored. These include a 
large diversity of supply portfolios in the GEA-Efficiency group of path-
ways, exploring, for example, the implications of the transformation 
with limited contributions of either nuclear, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), or renewable technologies. In contrast, the GEA-Supply pathways 
involve much less flexibility with respect to supply-side measures, as 
most options need to expand pervasively and successfully, given the 
assumed high level of demand. By the same token, the GEA-Supply path-
ways show the most flexibility on the demand side of the energy system, 
requiring, for example, a much less pervasive introduction of efficiency 
measures to reduce energy demand for services. The pathways thus 
explore not only alternative combinations of supply- and demand-side 
policy portfolios, but also different choices with respect to overall strat-
egy and level of implementation. In this context, the GEA-Mix pathways 
explore the degrees of freedom offered by more diverse energy systems, 
from resource extraction to services delivered to end users. The emphasis 
of GEA-Mix is on the diversity of the energy supply mix, to enhance the 
system’s resilience against innovation failures or technology shocks. This 
emphasis also implies that the GEA-Mix group of pathways is not neces-
sarily intermediate between the other two groups in terms of other sali-
ent scenario characteristics (e.g., the required policy portfolio, 2 costs, fuel 
choices, or deployment of individual technologies). 
 17.2.2  Branching Points and the GEA Pathways 
 Many alternative GEA pathways fulfill the normative objectives set out 
for the global energy system. Moving from these objectives to a specific 
pathway entails three critical choices or “branching points.” The first 
branching point involves a choice among alternative levels of energy 
demand and efficiency improvements, leading to distinct pathway 
groups of low, high, and intermediate demand (GEA-Efficiency, GEA-
Supply, and GEA-Mix, respectively). 
 Another branching point explores alternative transformations on the 
supply side with the main aim of testing the flexibility of different supply-
side configurations to fulfill the GEA sustainability objectives, given the 
levels of energy demand resulting from the choice at the first branching 
point. One aim was specifically to use the GEA Integrated Assessment 
Models to explore whether any of the supply options were mandatory. 
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 Figure 17.2 |  Schematic illustration of the GEA pathways. The different pathways 
(GEA-Supply, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efﬁ ciency) explore alternative combinations of efﬁ -
ciency improvements and supply-side transformations to achieve ambitious targets 
for sustainable development. The ambitiousness of the targets deﬁ nes the feasibil-
ity frontier for the combinations of supply and efﬁ ciency measures. High levels of 
efﬁ ciency improvements, as depicted by the GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways, increase the 
supply-side ﬂ exibility to reach the targets, and vice versa, the rapid transformation 
of supply increases the ﬂ exibility for the required efﬁ ciency improvements to limit 
energy demand. 
 2  The emphasis on policy in GEA-Mix is on developing and maintaining a diversity of 
demand- and supply-side options through a diversity of policy choices. 
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To do this, constraints were set on the portfolio of supply-side options by 
prohibiting or limiting the availability of specific technologies, including 
nuclear, CCS, biomass, and other renewables. 
 A third branching point, whose importance was revealed by this supply-
side analysis, concerns changes in the transportation system. A “conven-
tional” transportation system relying on liquid fuels has substantively 
different implications for supply flexibility than an “advanced” system 
dominated by electric or hydrogen-powered vehicles. Although any 
major transformation in an end-use sector that entails fuel switching 
will impact the energy supply, the magnitude of the impact of such a 
transformation in the transportation system alone warranted its inclu-
sion as an explicit branching point. 
 The sequencing of these branching points is important and reflects a 
central tenet of an integrated, systemic approach to efficient environ-
mental design that is equally applicable to wider technological systems 
(von Weizs ä cker et al.,  1997 ). In the context of energy systems, it is the 
demand for energy services such as mobility, heating, and industrial 
processes that drives the system. Hence, systems design should begin 
with the demand for energy services, emphasizing efficiency improve-
ments and other means of reducing demand. This “sizes” the overall 
system and forms the basis for exploring supply-side options to meet 
this demand. 
 Whereas the first branching point thus addresses the main question of 
which level of resources needs to be mobilized in order to make the 
provision of energy services more efficient as well as reduce overall 
demand for those services, the other two branching points address 
issues of technological risk and uncertainty related to potential barriers 
to the deployment of specific supply technologies, which would hinder 
their adoption at full scale. These barriers might include, for example, 
the high investment requirements of a hydrogen distribution and refuel-
ing infrastructure, system constraints on the scale-up of specific tech-
nologies (e.g., integrating large amounts of power from intermittent 
renewable energy sources into electricity grids), potential public oppos-
ition (e.g., to the widespread deployment of CCS or nuclear power), and 
other specific risks of individual technologies (e.g., proliferation in the 
case of nuclear). 
 The branching points also depict irreversibilities, “lock-ins,” and path 
dependencies within the system, reflecting the fact that once techno-
logical change is initiated in a particular direction, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to change its course. A prominent historical example of 
lock-in is the success of the internal combustion engine; in the same 
way, the two branches for the transportation sector – toward either 
electric or hydrogen-powered vehicles or clean liquid fuels – depict two 
alternative and not easily reversible directions of technological change 
for the future. 
 These branching points generate a wide range of alternative GEA 
pathways exploring different interactions between possible energy 
demand- and supply-side changes; these are summarized in  Table 17.1 
and illustrated in  Figure 17.3 . The first branching point, as already noted, 
leads to three pathway groups of low, high, and intermediate demand 
(GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Supply, and GEA-Mix, respectively). The other two 
branching points, relating to the transportation system and supply-
side flexibility, in reality do not occur in a neat sequence, but rather 
are elaborated through an iterative process of pathway modeling and 
analysis. However, it is convenient to present them sequentially so that 
the pathways can be more easily understood; doing so in no way affects 
the underlying scenario logic. Thus, the second branching point, relat-
ing to the transportation system, gives rise to two scenarios, labeled 
Conventional Transportation and Advanced Transportation, in each of 
the three pathway groups. Conventional Transportation refers to the 
continuation of a predominantly liquid-based transportation system, 
whereas Advanced Transportation requires either fundamental changes 
in infrastructures (in the case of high penetration of electric vehicles) or 
major breakthroughs in transportation technology (e.g., in hydrogen fuel 
cells). The third branching point, relating to supply-side flexibility, then 
generates 10 alternative pathways in each of these six scenarios, giving 
a total of 60 alternative GEA pathways. Of these, 19 were rejected as 
they failed to fulfill the GEA objectives. That is, no feasible solution could 
be found within these pathways that would meet the “stringent” sus-
tainability objectives described in  Section 17.7 . The issue of feasibility is 
discussed further in  Section 17.3 and summarized in  Section 17.3.6 . 
 17.2.3  Energy Goals and Targets of the Sustainability 
Transition 
 There is a large body of literature on different types of objectives for 
sustainable development that addresses the environmental and social, 
 Table 17.1 |  Branching points and GEA pathways. 
 Branching point 1: 
 What is the level of energy 
demand? 
 Branching point 2: 
 What are the 
dominant 
transportation fuels 
and technologies? 
 Branching point 3: 
 How diverse is the 
portfolio of supply-side 
options? 
 GEA-Efﬁ ciency (low demand) 
 GEA-Supply (high demand) 
 GEA-Mix (intermediate 
demand) 
 Conventional (liquid 
fuels) 
 Advanced (electricity, 
hydrogen) 
 Full portfolio (all options) 
 Restricted portfolio 
(excludes or limits 
particular options): 1 
 No CCS 
 No BioCCS 
 No sinks 
 No nuclear 
 No nuclear and no CCS 
 Limited renewables 
 Limited biomass 
 Limited biomass and 
renewables 
 Limited biomass, no 
BioCCS, no sinks 
 1  For further details and rationales of speciﬁ c restrictions, see  Table 17.9 and  Section 
17.3.3.5 . 
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as well as the economic, dimensions of sustainability (Hirschberg 
et al.,  2007 ; Vera and Langlois,  2007 ). This section does not intend to be 
comprehensive with respect to all these dimensions but instead focuses 
on the main energy challenges, and thus on selected objectives that 
are directly or indirectly affected by energy use. The targets identified 
here thus refer only to the necessary changes in local and global energy 
systems; much more is required in other sectors of societies for overall 
sustainability to be realized. 
 The definition of the targets builds upon the assessment of the objec-
tives presented in the chapters of Cluster I of this report. Their selection 
has, to the extent possible, been guided by agreements and aspirations 
expressed by the international community or by United Nations actions 
and resolutions. 
 The targets are of central importance, since they define the ambitious-
ness and the magnitude and pace of the required transformation. The 
targets are thus major drivers of the pathways, defining the policy 
stringency and portfolio of measures to respond to the energy chal-
lenges (see  Sections 17.3 to  17.7 ). The model-based assessment in this 
chapter focuses predominantly on the technological feasibility, required 
policies, and associated costs and benefits of reaching the targets. The 
political feasibility of the assessed pathways will depend, in addition, on 
whether international and regional agreements for the implementation 
of the policies are put in place (see  Chapters 22 and 26). 
 Table 17.2 summarizes the main target levels. These are used in the 
analysis of pathways to sustainability as the main boundary conditions 
or formal constraints in the integrated assessment modeling frame-
works MESSAGE and IMAGE (see  Box 17.2 ). The targets are defined in 
quantitative terms and prescribe a specific time schedule for meeting 
certain goals. They cover goals for all four principal energy challenges: 
energy access, air pollution and health, climate change, and energy 
security. In addition to these goals, the GEA also adopted adequate 
energy services to support economic growth as a normative goal (see 
 Chapter 6 ). 
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 Figure 17.3 |  Schematic illustration of the GEA pathways and the three branching points. The scenario setup features alternative choices for the combination of demand-side 
efﬁ ciency improvements and supply-side transformations, describing alternative policy emphases that would enable the transformation of the energy system. The pie charts 
represent primary energy portfolios of feasible transformation pathways under different branching point assumptions. 
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 Box 17.2 |  Scenario Development Process 
 The GEA scenarios were developed in parallel by two integrated assessment modeling frameworks and through an iterative and 
participatory process so as to achieve integration across various chapters of the GEA.  Figure 17.4 illustrates the scenario development 
process, showing the ﬂ ow of information from individual chapters to the scenario development team and the iterations across various 
knowledge clusters. 
 Important inputs to the GEA scenarios include quantitative technoeconomic information such as technology costs, energy resources, 
and potentials provided by other GEA clusters. In addition, a series of workshops and a scenario questionnaire were prepared by the 
GEA writing team and external experts to solicit input for deﬁ ning the main characteristics of the GEA scenario taxonomy and the set of 
objectives for a sustainable energy system with speciﬁ c targets and timelines. These inputs are used by two modeling frameworks for the 
development of the GEA pathways: 
 Table 17.2 |  Targets for the four main energy challenges and key characteristics of the corresponding transition pathways. In addition to these targets, the GEA also adopted 
adequate energy services to support economic growth as a normative goal (see  Chapter 6 ). 
Objective/Goal Target and timeline Pathway characteristics Further details
Improve energy access  Almost universal access to electricity and clean 
cooking fuels by 2030 (see also  Chapters 2 
and  19 ) 
 Diffusion of clean and efﬁ cient cooking fuels and 
appliances. 
 Extension of both high-voltage electricity grids 
and decentralized microgrids. 
 Increased ﬁ nancial assistance from industrialized 
countries to support clean energy infrastructure. 
Section 17.4
Reduce air pollution to 
improve human health
 Achieve global compliance with WHO air 
quality guidelines (annual PM2.5 concentration 
< 10 μg/m3) for the majority of the world 
population, and the remaining populations 
staying well within the WHO Tier I-III levels 
(15–35 μg/m3) by 2030 (see also  Chapters 3 
and  4 ) 
 Tightening of air pollution legislation across all 
energy sectors (e.g., vehicles, shipping, power 
generation, industrial processes). 
 Decarbonization to support pollutant emissions 
controls. 
 Fuel switching from traditional biomass to modern 
energy forms for cooking in developing countries. 
Section 17.5.2, 17.7
Avoid dangerous climate 
change
 Limit global average temperature change to 
2°C above preindustrial levels with a likelihood 
> 50% (see also  Chapter 3 ) 
 Widespread diffusion of zero- and low-carbon 
energy supply technologies, with substantial 
reductions in energy intensity. 
 Global energy-related CO 2 emissions peak by 
2020, are reduced to 30–70% of 2000 levels by 
2050, and approach almost zero or negative levels 
in the very long term. 
 Globally comprehensive mitigation efforts 
covering all major emitters .
 Financial transfers from industrialized countries to 
support decarbonization .
Section 17.5.1, 17.7
Improve energy security  Limit energy trade; increase diversity and 
resilience of energy supply (both by 2050; see 
also  Chapter 5 ) 
 Increase in domestic energy supply options (e.g., 
renewables to provide 30–75% of primary energy 
by 2050), and reduction of the share of oil in 
global energy trade from the present 75% to 
under 40% (and no other fuel assumes a similarly 
dominant position). 
 Increase in diversity of energy supply as well as all 
endues sectors and regions by 2050. 
 Infrastructure expansion and upgrades to support 
interconnections and backup, including increased 
capacity reserves, stockpiles, and energy storage 
technologies. 
 Section 
 17.6, 17.7 
 Note: For further details see  Section 17.3 . 
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 MESSAGE (Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact) is a systems engineering optimization 
model used for medium- to long-term energy system planning, energy policy analysis, and scenario development (Messner and 
Strubegger,  1995 ; Riahi et al.,  2007 ). The model provides a framework for representing an energy system with all its interdependencies 
from resource extraction, imports and exports, conversion, transport, and distribution to the provision of energy end-use services such 
as light, space heating and cooling, industrial production processes, and transportation. The framework covers all GHG-emitting sectors, 
including agriculture, forestry, energy, and industrial sources, for a full basket of greenhouse gases and other radiatively active gases: 
CO 2 , methane, nitrous oxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, black carbon and organic 
carbon, tetraﬂ uoromethane, hexaﬂ uoroethane, various hydroﬂ uorocarbons (HFC125, HFC134a, HFC143a, HFC227ea, HFC245ca), and 
sulfur hexaﬂ uoride. MESSAGE is used in conjunction with MAGICC (Model for Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change) version 5.3 
(Wigley and Raper,  2001 ) for calculating internally consistent scenarios for atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing, annual-mean 
global surface air temperature, and global-mean sea level implications.
 IMAGE is an integrated assessment modeling framework consisting of a set of linked and integrated models (Bouwman et al.,  2006 ). 
Together the framework describes important elements in the long-term dynamics of global environmental change, such as air pollution, 
climate change, and land use change. Important subcomponents of the model are the global energy model TIMER, the land use and land 
cover submodels of IMAGE, the detailed description of the carbon cycle, and the MAGICC 6.0 (Meinshausen et al.,  2009 ) model that 
is included as the climate model within IMAGE. The model focuses on several dynamic relationships within the energy system, such as 
inertia, learning-by-doing, depletion, and trade among the different regions. Technological choices are made on the basis of relative costs 
(using multinomial logit equations). The land cover submodels in the earth system simulate the change in land use and land cover at a 
resolution of 0.5  × 0.5 degrees (driven by demands for food, timber and biofuels, and changes in climate). The earth system also includes 
a natural vegetation model to compute changes in vegetation in response to climate change feedbacks from changes in temperature, 
precipitation, and atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. 
 Both models use a set of harmonized assumptions about future drivers of change (including targets) to generate the GEA pathways. 
Many of these drivers are speciﬁ ed externally to the modeling frameworks and were provided by other chapters of the GEA report 
( Table 17.3 ). The pathways thus also aim to integrate information (e.g., on resources, technologies, costs) provided elsewhere in the GEA. 
 Although the models were applied to develop the three illustrative pathways within each of the pathways groups, the assessment relies 
on the strengths of the individual models with respect to speciﬁ c sensitivity analysis. For instance, both models explored the sensitivity 
of the results with respect to energy access; however, the assessment mostly builds upon simulations from IMAGE for detailed land use 
projections and mainly uses the MESSAGE model to explore supply-side ﬂ exibility and to calculate pollutant emissions. The atmospheric 
chemistry and dispersion modeling for the assessment of health impacts from air pollution were conducted with the TM5 model hosted 
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 Figure 17.4 |  The GEA scenario development process. 
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at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (Dentener et al.,  2006 ; Stevenson,  2006 ; Kinne et al.,  2006 ; Textor et al.,  2007 ; 
Bergamaschi et al.,  2007 ). As with any model-based assessment, any speciﬁ c conclusions are conditional on the applied methods and 
assumptions. 
 Detailed scenario data for the individual GEA pathways are publicly available in the GEA database at www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/
ene/geadb. The GEA database provides interactive features for data visualization and a user interface for the download of scenario 
information in different formats. 
 Table 17.3 |  Model structure and assumptions used to generate GEA pathways. 
Examples of externally specified or 
harmonized variables across models
Constraints on model outputs or 
“boundary conditions” for least-cost 
model solutions
Examples of internally generated or “endogenous” 
model outcomes
Population growth Energy access target Diffusion of supply-side technology options and their shares in primary 
energyReference economic growth Environmental impact targets
Reference energy intensity improvements Energy security targets Demand-side portfolios and fuel consumption
Resource availability and costs Price-induced changes in energy demand
Technology availability and costs Changes in land use and land cover
Exposure to pollutant emissions
Energy system investments
Costs of alternative policy packages for energy access, environment, and 
security
Costs of emissions reductions
Carbon price
 Because the GEA objectives are strongly normative, the targets are all 
designed to be ambitious. The elaborated GEA pathways suggest that 
all the targets can be reached, if appropriate policies are introduced and 
energy investments are scaled up considerably.  Table 17.2 lists some gen-
eral characteristics of the GEA pathways as influenced by each of the 
objectives. 
 The target of ensuring  almost universal access to electricity and clean 
cooking by 2030 3 is driven by the current reliance of a large fraction of 
the population in developing countries on traditional biomass to sat-
isfy basic energy needs. Their lack of access to electricity and to afford-
able and clean fuels for cooking has vast impacts on human health, 
productivity, and land conservation.  Section 17.4 presents a compre-
hensive analysis of the combinations of policies that can achieve the 
GEA goal of universal access by 2030. Specific focus is given to micro-
credits or grants to finance appliances as well as subsidies to improve 
the affordability of clean fuels for cooking. In addition, the same sec-
tion assesses the need for infrastructure investments for transmissions 
and distribution networks to connect the rural poor to the grid (see 
also  Chapters 2 and  19 ). 
 The target of  reducing air pollution in compliance with WHO (World 
Health Organization) air quality guidelines 4  by 2030 is explored in depth 
in  Section 17.5.2 through a bottom-up, technology-based assessment 
of main measures across main pollutant emissions sources and sectors. 
Many countries around the world have adopted antipollution legislation 
and have specific plans for further implementation of legislation in the 
short term. As the analysis in  Section 17.5.2 indicates, however, current 
legislative plans in the aggregate are not sufficient to achieve the GEA 
target. Hence, a major focus of that section is on identifying specific 
policy levers for individual sectors and regions, and the associated costs, 
to deliver further improvements consistent with the overall objective 
(see also  Chapter 4 ). 
 3  The target is “almost universal access” because reaching the remotest rural populations 
is exceedingly expensive. 
 4  The WHO air quality guidelines are given for an annual PM2.5 concentration 
< 10 μg/m 3 . In the GEA pathways the majority of the population meets this guide-
line by 2030, while the remaining populations stay well within the WHO Tier I-III 
levels of 15–35 μg/m 3 . 
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 With respect to climate change, the GEA adopts the target of  limiting 
global average temperature change to 2 ° C above preindustrial levels 
with a likelihood of more than 50% . 5 This target is consistent with 
various scientific assessments of the increasing risk of climate-related 
impacts above that threshold (Smith et al.,  2009 ) as well as with EU 
and UN policy recommendations (European Commission,  2007 ; United 
Nations Conference of the Parties,  2009 ). Such a global target calls 
for globally comprehensive and stringent GHG emissions reductions. 
 Section 17.5.1 analyzes the required emissions pathways, measures 
to reduce emissions, costs, and equity implications of the transition 
(see also  Chapter 3 ). 
 Last but not least, the GEA objective of improving energy security is 
achieved partly as a convenient co-benefit of decarbonization, which 
is illustrated in the GEA transition through two related objectives on 
 limiting energy trade across major importing regions and  increasing 
the diversity and resilience of energy supply . Although many different 
types of energy security indicators are summarized in the literature (e.g., 
Jansen et al.,  2004 ; Scheepers et al.,  2007 ; Kruyt et al.,  2009 ; Sovacool, 
 2009 ; Sovacool and Brown,  2010 ), the GEA uses a relatively simple dual 
taxonomy to define security: sovereignty of the energy system based 
on the degree of energy trade, and resilience based on the degree of 
diversity of types of energy sources. The sovereignty dimension is incor-
porated by limiting energy trade as a fraction of total primary energy 
at a regional scale (discussed in  Section 17.7 ). Although the resilience 
dimension is not a direct limitation in the GEA pathways, the analysis 
in  Section 17.6 shows that diversity increases in all energy subsystems 
(total primary energy supply, fuel supply for end uses, and regional 
mixes).  Section 17.6 elaborates on these indicators and on the differ-
ent strategies to improve energy security and their implications for the 
transition (see also  Chapter 5 ). 
 Without policies to enable the sustainability transformation, the energy 
system would continue its heavy reliance on fossil fuels. This is illus-
trated by the hypothetical no-policy baseline (counterfactual) of the 
GEA, which describes the evolution of the energy system in absence of 
any transformational policies to meet the GEA objectives. In the GEA 
counterfactual fossil fuels more than double their contribution by 2050 
(reaching about 900 EJ). As a consequence greenhouse gas emissions 
would continue to grow at present rates for many decades to come, 
leading to an average global mean temperature change of about 5°C in 
the long term. Increasing use of fossil fuels would also increase import 
dependency and worsen energy security, particularly in resource poor 
regions in Asia. Lack of incentives to strengthen policies to control the 
emissions of air pollutants would result in an increase of outdoor air-
pollution induced health impacts from 23 million disability-adjusted 
life years (DALYs) lost globally in 2005 to more than 33–40 million by 
2030. In addition, the lack of financing for clean cooking fuels and elec-
tricity for the poor would leave the energy access problem unresolved, 
leading to health impacts from household fuel pollution of about 40 
million DALYs by 2030. 
 Changing the energy system to support sustainable development 
requires thus dedicated policies so that all the GEA goals are met con-
currently. Hence, a major focus of the assessment is to explore inte-
grated and holistic solutions that take into account potential trade-offs 
and help to identify  synergies from achieving all the different objectives 
simultaneously. These are discussed in detail in  Section 17.7 . 
 17.3  The GEA Energy Transition Pathways 
 This section describes the main underlying dynamics and transforma-
tional changes featured on both the demand and the supply side of 
the energy system. The pathways are described initially in a disaggre-
gated way, separating out macro drivers, demand-side improvements, 
and supply-side transformations. Then the pathways are reintegrated 
using three illustrative pathways to provide comprehensive storylines 
of what the energy system transformation might look like if the over-
arching GEA scenario is to be fulfilled. Once these “what” questions 
are answered, the chapter turns to questions of “how.” The section 
that follows sketches out an answer to the question of how such a 
transformation might come about, pointing the way to more detailed 
analysis later in this chapter as well as in the remainder of this report. 
 This part of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 17.3.1 describes 
the main socioeconomic and demographic trends common to all the GEA 
pathways.  Section 17.3.2 covers changes in energy intensity and final 
energy demand and draws together evidence from other parts of the GEA 
on the potential for efficiency improvements in different end-use sectors. 
Based on this demand-side analysis, three groups of pathways are set up 
corresponding to low, high, and intermediate levels of demand: these are 
the GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Supply, and GEA-Mix pathways, respectively. 
 Section 17.3.3 turns to the supply side of the energy system. The lowest-
cost portfolio of supply-side transformations (assuming the full availabil-
ity of all advanced future technologies on a large scale) is described, 
followed by an analysis of the importance of fuel and technology trans-
formations in the transportation sector. This leads into a broader analysis 
of flexibility in supply-side portfolios and the potential for specific supply-
side options to be either limited or omitted completely.  Section 17.3.4 
integrates the analysis of macro drivers, efficiency improvements, and 
supply transformations to present the GEA pathways in an integrated 
form. Initially, three illustrative pathways are explored in depth to estab-
lish key characteristics, similarities, and differences. Then the full diversity 
of pathways is compared and contrasted, with particular emphasis on 
regional-level analysis and on the implications for land and food supply, 
 5  The likelihood of 50% refers to physical climate change uncertainties, including cli-
mate sensitivity, aerosol forcing, and ocean diffusivity. It thus depicts the chances 
that a speciﬁ c GHG pathway would stay below the 2°C temperature target. The like-
lihood does not imply any probability of the political implementation of the targets, 
nor does it correspond to the likelihood of speciﬁ c technologies becoming available 
in the future. 
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given bioenergy’s potential contribution to the transformation.  Section 
17.3.5 is concerned with how the pathways might be implemented. Two 
critical issues are addressed: costs and investments, and policies. Because 
the overarching GEA scenario is strongly normative, all the pathways 
analyzed within this scenario require strong interventions to induce and 
direct the energy system transformation. 
 17.3.1  Economic Growth and Demographic Change 
 The GEA pathways share a common median demographic projection 
whereby the global population increases from almost 7 billion today to 
about 9 billion by the 2050s before declining toward the end of the cen-
tury (UN DESA,  2009 ).  Figure 17.5 illustrates this population projection 
in the context of the full range of global demographic developments 
from a very low to an improbably high number of people by 2100. The 
median development path is a challenging one, as the global population 
will be aging rapidly through the century and concentrating ever more 
in urban areas. 
 The GEA pathways also share a median economic development path, 
expressed in terms of world GDP that allows for significant develop-
ment in the 50 or so poorest countries in the world, while at the same 
time reflecting increased resource productivity and demand growth in 
the richest countries, dampened by changing consumption patterns 
and lifestyles. This GDP development path builds on the updated IPCC 
B2 scenario projection by Riahi et al., ( 2007 ); for details see also the 
GEA database at www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb. Main changes 
include updates of short-term trends and revisions of regional projec-
tions consistent with the sustainability objectives of the GEA. The eco-
nomic projection used in all the GEA pathways is illustrated in  Figure 
17.6 , which also shows the full range of economic trajectories for the 
global energy scenarios in the literature (Nakicenovic et al.,  2006 ). 
 The socioeconomic development pathway is chosen to be consistent 
with global aspirations toward a sustainable future while also attaining 
this goal with a high degree of confidence. Global real per capita income 
in the GEA pathways grows at an annual average rate of 2% over the 
next 50 years, but with significant differences in the pace of develop-
ment across regions. Today’s developing and emerging economies con-
tinue to grow at a relatively rapid pace, with their combined economic 
output surpassing that of the industrialized world by around 2040 (see 
inset in  Figure 17.6 ). This pathway is also consistent with other cen-
tral projections in the literature (Nakicenovic et al.,  2006 ) and hence 
provides a good reference point for placing the GEA energy pathways 
within a comparative context. 
 17.3.2  Energy Demand and Services 
 The adequate provision of energy services is a prerequisite for human 
well-being and productivity, and ultimately it is the demand for these 
services that drives the energy system and its continuing expansion. 
Increasing affluence has historically been one of the major drivers of 
energy demand, and both the quantity and the quality of energy ser-
vices determine in turn the magnitude of environmental and social 
impacts associated with the energy system. It is these impacts that 
are addressed by the normative objectives enshrined in the overarch-
ing GEA scenario. 
 Energy services are typically provided by end-use technologies, which 
convert energy from a particular form (biomass, petroleum, natural gas, 
electricity, and so forth) into services useful to a final consumer (heating 
and cooking, mobility, industrial processing, entertainment, and others). 
Consequently, end-use technologies and the efficiency with which they 
convert energy into useful services are inseparably connected with the 
levels and types of energy services demand. As a result, one can identify 
three broad and interrelated approaches to tackling demand-side chal-
lenges in the energy system:
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 Figure 17.5 |  Global population projections. The line indicates the median GEA devel-
opment pathway and the fan indicates the range of population projections from the 
literature (Nakicenovic et al.,  2006 ). The insert shows the median projections and 
ranges for the industrialized and developing regions separately. 
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GEA development pathway and the fan indicates the range of economic projections 
from the literature (Nakicenovic et al.,  2006 ). The insert shows the median projections 
and ranges for the industrialized and developing regions separately. 
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  • improve technological efficiency , e.g., increase vehicle fuel efficiency; 
  • change the structure of energy services demand , e.g., substitute 
physical mobility with “virtual” mobility enabled by electronic com-
munications; and 
  • reduce the level of energy services demand , e.g., reduce travel needs 
by living closer to work or amenities. 
 Although all three of these approaches are explored in the GEA path-
ways as means of reducing final demand for energy, the emphasis 
throughout this section is on efficiency improvements. As a means for 
potentially decoupling energy demand from economic growth, energy 
efficiency represents a central lever for policy to target. Moreover, effi-
ciency contributes to all the sustainability objectives. The degree to 
which efficiency improvements can limit energy demand growth is – by 
design – one of the main distinguishing characteristics of the GEA path-
ways. It should be noted, however, that efficiency improvements can be 
offset by both rebound effects and scale effects (Greening et al.,  2000 ; 
Birol and Keppler,  2000 ; Hanley et al.,  2009 ). Rebound effects describe 
an increase in demand for energy services as improvements in efficiency 
lower their effective cost. These effects can be direct (the savings from 
greater efficiency are spent on the same energy service), indirect (the 
savings are spent on a different energy service), or economy-wide (the 
savings contribute to economic and income growth, which increases 
demand). Rebound effects can be mitigated by price and other policies, 
which are discussed further in  Section 17.3.5 . Scale effects describe an 
increase in demand for energy services due to rising population or to 
rising economic output. Both rebound and scale effects make it impor-
tant to consider the other approaches to demand-side transformation 
described above. Hence, both the structure and the level of energy serv-
ices demand are also important parts of the GEA pathways described 
in this section. 
 The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, the headline trends 
in each group of pathways are discussed, covering the efficiency of the 
economy as a whole as well as on a per capita basis. Second, the GEA-
Efficiency group of pathways is explored in more depth, sector by sec-
tor, drawing on material from the corresponding chapters of this report. 
Third, similarities and differences in the structure of energy demand 
(e.g., its distribution between end-use sectors) are considered. 
 17.3.2.1  Energy Intensity Improvements 
 Energy intensity is energy used per unit of output, typically expressed 
in megajoules per US dollar (MJ/US$) of GDP or value added. Energy 
intensity metrics are widely used to represent the overall energy prod-
uctivity of an economy or sector. The final energy intensity of the glo-
bal economy has fallen historically at a rate of about 1.2%/year since 
the early 1970s. However, some regions have experienced substantially 
more rapid reductions over certain periods. For example, China’s energy 
intensity declined at a rate of about 4%/year between 1990 and 2000 
(followed by a slower decline in the subsequent period). The causes of 
the energy intensity declines are many. They include, first, technological 
improvements in individual energy end-use appliances and technologies 
combined with substitution among fuels, such as the replacement of 
fuelwood with electricity or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking. 
They also include changing patterns of energy end use; urbanization, 
which is characterized by generally higher system efficiencies: changes 
in the structure of the economy, including shifts toward higher shares of 
the less energy-intensive services sector; and finally, changing lifestyles, 
which affect both the type and the level of energy services demanded. 
Although not every such change has resulted in declining energy inten-
sities in the past, taken together the overall trend is persistent and per-
vasive (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). 
 Energy intensity improvements can continue for a long time to come. 
Despite the energy efficiency and intensity improvements that have 
already been implemented to date, the efficiency of the energy system 
remains far from the theoretical potential. Although the full realization 
of this potential may never be possible, many estimates indicate that 
energy intensity reductions of a factor of 10 or more may be possible 
in the very long run (see Nakicenovic et al.,  1993 ; Gilli et al.,  1995 ; 
Nakicenovic et al.,  1996 ). 
 The degree of energy intensity improvement is a crucial uncertainty for 
the future. All three groups of GEA pathways depict energy intensity 
futures that are driven by policies to improve energy efficiency, lead-
ing to global energy intensity improvement rates at or above historical 
experience. This is partly a result of the increasing importance of some 
low-income regions with relatively high rates of intensity improvement, 
but it is also partially due to the assumed move away from inefficient 
traditional fuels in the developing world. Energy intensity improvements 
thus vary significantly at the regional level, with some regions also 
developing more slowly than the historical rate, particularly in the GEA-
Supply and -Mix pathways. The resulting global average reduction in 
energy intensity varies across the GEA pathways between about 1.5% 
and 2.2% annually to 2050. The lower end of the range is slightly faster 
than the historical experience, whereas the higher end is roughly double 
that and corresponds to a reduction in energy intensity of 60% by 2050. 
Cumulatively, these intensity improvements lead to substantial differ-
ences in per capita energy demand across the three pathway groups 
(see  Figure 17.7 ). 
 Studies have shown that it is possible to improve energy intensity 
radically through a combination of behavioral changes and the rapid 
introduction of stringent efficiency regulations, technology standards, 
and environmental externality pricing, which mitigates rebound effects 
(see also  Chapters 8 ,  9 , and  10 ). The group of GEA-Efficiency pathways 
depicts such a development with a radical departure from historical 
trends. This group of pathways thus deliberately explores the conse-
quences of demand-side interventions that lead to substantial declines 
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in per capita energy use in the industrialized world of about 45% in 
2050 (from 130 GJ per capita in 2005 to about 75 GJ by 2050). Energy 
intensity rates in the developing world under the GEA-Efficiency path-
ways decline at 3.1%/year between now and 2050, and then slow down 
corresponding to an average of 2.4%/year over the course of the cen-
tury. These rates are also considerably higher than historical experience. 
Given expected economic growth in the developing world, however, 
per capita energy demand continues to increase over the course of the 
century, although at a considerably slower pace than in the other GEA 
pathways groups (0.75%/year in the GEA-Efficiency pathways compared 
with 1.3%/year in the GEA-Supply pathways to 2050).The magnitude 
and pace of these efficiency improvements in the GEA-Efficiency path-
ways will undoubtedly require concerted and dedicated demand-side 
policies and measures. These are discussed in general terms through the 
remainder of this section and in more detail in  Section 17.3.5 . 
 As noted, the GEA-Efficiency pathways group depicts the upper bound of 
potential efficiency improvements and thus the lower bound of energy 
demand in the GEA pathways. The GEA-Supply pathways group depicts 
the opposite, that is, the lower bound of potential efficiency improve-
ments giving rise to an upper bound of energy demand across all GEA 
pathways. The GEA-Supply pathways thus place much less emphasis on 
efficiency and other demand-side measures, focusing instead on supply-
side transformations, which are discussed further in  Section 17.3.3 . In the 
GEA-Supply pathways, the long-term improvement rate in global energy 
intensity over the course of the century is slightly above the historical 
record of 1.2%/year. Over the medium term to 2050, however, both 
developing and industrialized regions experience intensity improvements 
about 40% higher than in the past (1.4%/year and 2.6%/year compared 
with 1%/year and 1.7%/year in the past, respectively). As a result, per 
capita energy use in the industrialized world stays at roughly 2005 levels, 
while per capita demand in the developing world catches up, increasing 
by almost a factor of 2 in the long term ( Figure 17.7 ). The GEA-Mix path-
ways group is characterized by intermediate efficiency improvements, 
giving rise to energy intensities both economy-wide and per capita that 
lie between the aggressive GEA-Efficiency pathways and the less pre-
scriptive demand-side trends of the GEA-Supply pathways. 
 17.3.2.2  Sectoral Measures to Improve Energy Efﬁ ciency 
 Introduction 
 Increasing affluence typically results in additional demand for energy. 
However, per capita energy use today varies widely even between coun-
tries at comparable income levels (see  Table 17.4 ). The reasons include 
differences in the type and amount of energy services demanded, in the 
efficiency of end-use technologies, and in the way these services and these 
technologies form part of broader structural patterns of behavior and 
lifestyle. 
 The use of energy for mobility provides a prominent example of these 
differences in energy use across countries. The average North American 
consumes about 54 GJ annually traveling by car, compared with about 
half of this amount in the other member countries of the Organisation 
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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Three main factors, 
in addition to the slightly higher per capita income in North America, 
explain the difference: the lower fuel economy of the typical individual 
vehicle (3 MJ/km in North America versus 2.6 MJ/km in the other OECD 
countries), longer distances traveled (as a result of both preferences and 
structural characteristics of urban form and land area), and more individ-
ualized use of cars (average occupancy is about 1.3 passengers/vehicle 
in North America compared with up to 1.5 passengers/vehicle in Eastern 
Europe, for example). This illustrates well the combined effect of effi-
ciency and of behavior and lifestyles (levels and types of energy service 
demanded) on fuel consumption (see also  Chapter 9 ). 
 Similar differences in per capita energy use can be found between other 
regions of the world as well as for other sectors, such as residential and 
industry. Large-scale improvements in the energy intensity of an econ-
omy therefore require a portfolio of measures that stimulate the adop-
tion of highly efficient end-use technologies, complemented by policies 
to promote changes in energy services demand through behavioral and 
lifestyle shifts. In addition, structural changes in the economy play an 
important role. 
 The overarching finding from the sectoral analysis is that the rapid 
energy intensity improvements depicted by the GEA-Efficiency group of 
pathways are feasible with currently available technologies. The neces-
sary magnitude of change, however, requires a fundamental shift in the 
way energy is used across all major sectors of the economy. The follow-
ing sections summarize the nature of these shifts and the policies that 
might drive them in the GEA-Efficiency pathways. 
 The Residential and Commercial Sector in the 
GEA-Efﬁ ciency Pathways 
 In the residential sector, economic growth is expected to further increase 
the floor areas of dwellings by increasing living standards, particularly 
in developing countries. This will result in additional energy demand for 
space heating and cooling. As noted in  Chapter 10 , however, the poten-
tial for efficiency improvements in the use of energy for this purpose is 
vast. In the GEA-Efficiency group of pathways, a large fraction of this 
potential is successfully tapped. Policies to improve thermal insulation 
as well as retrofits to advanced building types (passive house standards 
or lower) lead to improvements in energy use per unit of floor area by a 
factor of 4 in the industrialized world, from about 400–900 MJ/m 2 down 
to 100–230 MJ/m 2 by 2050 ( Table 17.5 ). Improvement rates are similar 
in the developing world, on the order of a factor of 2 to 3. 
 The potential efficiency gains from buildings in terms of energy use 
avoided are among the highest across all end-use sectors. Achieving 
these gains requires the rapid introduction of strict building codes and 
retrofit standards for almost the complete global building stock. The rate 
of retrofit would need to increase to about 3% annually to 2050, about 
three times the historical rate. 
 In the GEA-Efficiency pathways, demand for energy from centralized 
sources and grids is further reduced by the adoption of technologies 
that enable space heating and cooling with net zero use of centralized 
energy. These include solar water heating, solar heating, air-source or 
ground-source heat pumps powered by solar photovoltaics, and bio-
mass-based heating. Combined with efficiency improvements to build-
ing shells, these technologies would significantly reduce the need for 
centralized solutions for thermal comfort; centralized energy infrastruc-
ture would largely provide the additional energy required for lighting, 
cooking, and appliances. 
 Per capita electricity use in the residential and commercial sector is 
expected to grow significantly because of rising incomes and the adop-
tion of modern household appliances and other electric devices. This 
trend is particularly pronounced in the developing world. Despite high 
efficiency standards, electricity use in the developing world increases in 
the GEA-Efficiency pathways group by a factor of 3 to 8 by 2050 ( Table 
17.5 ). The increase is more modest in the lower-income countries of the 
industrialized world, whereas in the higher-income countries of North 
America and Western Europe, per capita electricity use peaks and then 
declines toward 2050 to levels below that of 2005. Although overall 
demand for electricity continues to increase in the residential sector, 
 Table 17.4 |  Final energy use and income per capita for Industrialized and Developing Regions, 2005 Actual and 2050 under GEA-Efﬁ ciency and GEA-Supply. 
2050
2005
Industrialized 1 Developing 2 
Industrialized 1 Developing 2 GEA-Efficiency GEA-Supply GEA-Efficiency GEA-Supply
GDP per capita 
(2005 US$ at market 
exchange rates)
3487–40,050 671–4905 24,446–52,535 24,446–52,535 6029–19,829 6029–19,829
 Total ﬁ nal energy 
 (GJ per capita) 
73–219 7–46 62–98 104–156 28–50 32–71
 1  Aggregated ranges of ﬁ ve GEA regions representing the industrialized world: North America, Western Europe, Paciﬁ c OECD, Eastern Europe, and Former Soviet Union. For full 
regional deﬁ nitions see the electronic appendix to this chapter. 
 2  Aggregated ranges of six GEA regions representing the developing world: Centrally Planned Asia and China, South Asia, Paciﬁ c Asia, Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Latin America. For regional deﬁ nitions see the electronic appendix to this chapter. 
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efficiency improvements significantly slow this growth. As a result, per 
capita consumption across all income groups is about 25–50% lower 
in the GEA-Efficiency pathways group than it would be without a con-
certed emphasis on the demand-side transformation. 
 The Transportation Sector in the GEA-Efﬁ ciency Pathways 
 The slow growth of energy demand in the transportation sector in the 
GEA-Efficiency pathways results in part from efficiency improvements in 
the vehicle fleet, but also from structural shifts toward public transport 
(including rail and bus) and limits to car ownership, with implications for 
behavior and lifestyle (see also  Chapter 9 ). In the GEA-Efficiency path-
ways group, about half of the overall improvement in energy intensity 
by 2050 comes about through technical efficiency improvements across 
all modes of passenger transportation. The compound global effect of 
these efficiency gains reduces fuel consumption from about 1.7 MJ/km 
in 2005 to 1.3 MJ/km by 2050. Gains are largest for vehicles, with 
some significant differences across world regions (the range is from 1.9 
to 0.9 MJ/km). The other half of the overall intensity improvement is 
achieved by reducing demand for mobility as an energy service (e.g., 
by substituting travel with teleconferencing) and shifting demand for 
mobility to public transportation (e.g., trains and buses). Large differ-
ences in modal split across countries already exist world-wide. Although 
demand is thus significantly lower in relative terms in the GEA-Efficiency 
pathways than in the GEA-Supply pathways, in absolute terms mobility 
continues to increase. 
 In the industrialized world, the proportion of total mobility (expressed 
in passenger-kilometers) provided by cars declines from about 60% in 
 Table 17.6 |  Energy service indicators for the transportation sector in Industrialized and Developing Regions, 2005 Actual and 2050 under GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways. 
2005, actual 2050, GEA-Efficiency
Industrialized 1 Developing Industrialized Developing
GDP per capita (2005 US$ at market exchange rates) 3487–40,050 671–4905 24,446–52,535 6029–19,829
Passenger-kilometers per capita 2 14,293 2499 15,925 3892
Car
Bus and train
Aviation
Other 3 
8778
2855
2274
386
404
1461
198
437
6539
3334
5579
473
1009
1368
795
720
No. of light-duty vehicles per capita 0.46 0.03 0.52 0.11
Fuel use for mobility (GJ per capita) 30.8 2.4 24.0 4.6
Freight-kilometers per capita (thousands) 8219 1059 15,969 2774
Truck
Rail
4544
3675
606
453
6925
9044
1370
1404
Fuel use for freight (GJ per capita) 13.0 2.4 12.4 2.8
 1  Industrialized and developing regions are deﬁ ned as in  Table 17.4 . 
 2  Estimates from  Chapter 9 . Because of differences between the regional deﬁ nitions used in that chapter and those used for the GEA scenarios, transport indicators are given as 
regional averages of the whole developing and industrialized world only. 
 3  Includes two- and three-wheeled vehicles. 
 Table 17.5 |  Energy service indicators for the residential and commercial sector in Industrialized and Developing Regions, 2005 Actual and 2050 under GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways. 
2005, actual 2050, GEA-Efficiency
Industrialized 1 Developing Industrialized Developing
GDP per capita (2005 US$ at market exchange rates) 3487–40,050 671–4905 24,446–52,535 6029–19,829
Floor area (m 2 per capita) 2 26–55 9–32 48–58 19–52
Share of buildings with advanced technology (%)
Single-family
Multifamily
Commercial and public
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
74–86
74–79
81–92
75–83
82–91
85–96
Heating demand (MJ/m 2 )
Single-family
Multifamily
Commercial and public
443–875
443–781
475–914
112–241
112–277
173–371
101–230
104–198
101–166
50–79
47–68
54–97
Residential and commercial electricity demand (GJ per capita) 3 11–45 1–6 22–33 8–15
 1  Industrialized and developing regions are deﬁ ned as in  Table 17.4 . 
 2  Includes public and commercial buildings based on the bottom-up analysis in  Chapter 10 . 
 3  Includes electric cooling and heating as well as lighting and appliances. 
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2005 to 40% in the GEA-Efficiency pathways ( Table 17.6 ). Trends are 
different in the developing world, where a large fraction of the popu-
lation already relies on public transportation. Increasing affluence will 
make cars more affordable and thus increase reliance on individual 
mobility. As a result, car ownership in the developing world is expected 
to increase by almost a factor of 5 even in the GEA-Efficiency pathways 
(from 2 to 11 cars per 100 people by 2050). Although this is a consid-
erable increase, the expected growth in the absence of any policies to 
support public transportation and limit car ownership would be some 
30% higher still. Also, despite this large increase, transportation by bus 
and train in 2050 in the GEA-Efficiency pathways covers a much larger 
fraction of total passenger transport demand in the developing world 
than in the industrialized world (35% versus 20%; see  Table 17.6 ). 
 In addition to individual mobility, freight transport continues to be a 
strong driver of energy demand in the transportation sector. An impor-
tant feature of the GEA-Efficiency pathways group is therefore the switch 
toward higher shares of railway transportation ( Table 17.6 ) combined 
with improvement in the overall efficiency of freight transportation by 
about a factor of 2 by 2050, from 1.3 MJ/t-km (tonne-kilometers) on aver-
age in 2005 down to 0.7 MJ/t-km in 2050. In the industrialized world this 
leads to relatively constant per capita energy use for freight transporta-
tion despite the near doubling of transport volume from 8,200 t-km per 
capita to about 16,000 t-km per capita by 2050. Although efficiency gains 
are of a similar order of magnitude in the developing world, increases in 
freight demand more than offset those gains, leading to an increase in per 
capita energy use for freight by about 20% to 2050. In absolute terms, 
however, by 2050 energy demand for this purpose in developing countries 
remains considerably below that of today’s industrialized countries. 
 The Industry Sector in the GEA-Efﬁ ciency Pathways 
 In the GEA-Efficiency pathways, energy efficiency in the industrial  sector 
improves by about 1.5%/year, resulting in an overall demand of about 
200 EJ in 2050. This is around 20% below what it would be in the 
absence of a concerted approach to demand-side transformation, and it 
equates to a 50% reduction in the overall energy intensity of industrial 
production (see  Table 17.7 for related data in per capita terms). 
 The demand-side emphasis of the GEA-Efficiency pathways features a 
number of different measures in the industrial sector to improve energy 
efficiency, promote structural change, and optimize industrial systems 
design to reduce energy demand. These measures can be broadly split 
into the following categories:
 widespread adoption of best available technology for new investments;  •
 retrofit of existing plants to improve energy efficiency;  •
 optimization of energy and material flows through systems design, qual- •
ity improvements, lifecycle product design, and enhanced recycling; and 
 further electrification and a switch to renewable energy.  •
 The adoption of best available technology for industrial processes can 
yield an efficiency improvement of around 15% (IEA,  2007 ; Saygin 
et al.,  2010 ). More systemic approaches to optimizing the use of com-
bined heat and power, pumps, fans, compressed air and steam systems, 
and so on can yield another 15% (IEA,  2007 ; Price and McKane,  2009 ). 
Further reductions in energy intensity in the industrial sector can be 
achieved through the optimization of material flows and the wide-
spread adoption of new high-efficiency technologies currently at niche 
scales (WBCSD/IEA,  2009 ). Moreover, a switch to 25% renewable energy 
throughout the manufacturing industry yields a 10% “efficiency” gain 
through electrification and reduced used of fossil resources, although 
this is balanced by a similar loss from widespread adoption of CCS 
(see  Chapter 8 ). The efficiency potentials of the five most energy inten-
sive industrial subsectors (iron and steel making, chemicals and pet-
rochemicals, cement making, pulp and paper, and aluminum), which 
account for about two-thirds of industrial energy use, are discussed in 
more detail in the online electronic appendix to this chapter, as well as 
in  Chapter 8 . 
 Energy Efﬁ ciency by Sector in the GEA-Supply Pathways 
 The sectoral analysis above provides some specific detail as to how 
the fundamental demand-side transformation represented by the 
GEA-Efficiency pathways can be achieved. Central to this effort is 
the rapid and pervasive introduction of energy efficiency measures 
throughout the world. However, technical measures alone will not 
be sufficient. They need to be complemented by measures to both 
shift and limit the underlying demand for energy services, build insti-
tutional capacity (see  Chapter 25 ), remove market and nonmarket 
barriers to increased energy efficiency (see  Chapters 22 and 26), and 
mobilize the substantial investment needed (see  Chapter 6 ). These 
policy and investment needs are discussed further in  Section 17.3.5 
 Table 17.7 |  Energy service indicators for the industry sector in Industrialized and 
Developing Regions, 2005 Actual and 2050 under GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways. 
2005, actual 2050, GEA-Efficiency
Industrialized 1 Developing Industrialized Developing
GDP per capita 
(2005 US$ 
at market 
exchange rates)
3486–40,054 671–4905 24,446–52,535 5661–19,829
Final energy 
intensity (MJ/
dollar of GDP)
1.2–10.7 3.0–9.8 0.7–1.3 0.9–2.5
Final energy (GJ 
per capita)
26–65 3–17 33–46 15–26
Process heat 
(all thermal)
Feedstock
Other 
(nonthermal, 
e.g., electric)
15–28
6–23
4–15
2–11
0.3–6
1–4
12–17
6–14
12–16
8–13
1–7
5–9
 1  Industrialized and developing regions are deﬁ ned as in  Table 17.4 . 
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but are emphasized here as an integral and essential feature of the 
GEA-Efficiency group of pathways. 
 The GEA-Supply pathways, in contrast, represent the extent of potential 
demand-side transformation without this concerted policy and invest-
ment emphasis, and without many of the specific efficiency measures 
described in the sectoral analysis above. However, the GEA-Supply 
pathways group is not simply a business-as-usual continuation of his-
torical trends. All the GEA-Supply pathways fulfill the sustainability 
objectives of the overarching GEA scenario set out in  Section 17.2.3 . 
As noted, these pathways are implemented through the achievement 
of highly ambitious targets relating to energy access, environmental 
impacts, and energy security. Reaching these targets requires a raft of 
policy and other initiatives, discussed in detail in  Sections 17.4 – 17.7 of 
this chapter, that lead to a transformation of the global energy system. 
Whereas the GEA-Efficiency pathways emphasize the transformative 
potential on the demand side, the GEA-Supply pathways concentrate 
on supply-side measures. However, the latter also impact energy 
demand, albeit indirectly. To take one simple example, a carbon tax 
implemented to reduce the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation 
might indirectly raise the cost of final energy and so reduce demand. 
The more general point is that the level of energy demand and energy 
intensity improvements in the GEA-Supply pathways shown in  Figure 
17.7 falls well below the upper bound of demand projections found 
in the scenario literature to represent business as usual. Compared 
with, for example, the extensive scenario database of the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) (Fisher et al.,  2007 ), energy intensity 
improvement rates in the GEA-Supply pathways correspond roughly to 
an intermediate demand projection close to the median of the scen-
ario distribution by 2050. Compared with the upper 90th percentile of 
the full scenario set reviewed in the IPCC AR4, the GEA-Supply path-
ways achieve more than double the intensity improvements by 2050 
(1.5%/year compared with 0.6%/year in the scenarios reviewed by 
the IPCC). 
 Table 17.8 summarizes indicators of per capita energy use for the GEA-
Efficiency and GEA-Supply groups of pathways in all end-use sectors: 
residential and commercial, transportation, and industrial. Projections 
for 2050 are compared with efficiencies of energy use as of 2005. The 
table combines information from the detailed bottom-up technology 
assessments of each sector in  Chapters 8 – 10 with information from the 
global GEA pathways discussed in this chapter. 
 In the residential and commercial sector, floor area as an underlying 
determinant of energy services demand is the same in both pathway 
groups. However, the penetration of advanced buildings combining 
major efficiency improvements with decentralized energy technologies 
is minimal in the GEA-Supply pathways. Resulting heat demand per unit 
of floor space is consequently a factor of 2 to 3 higher, with per cap-
ita consumption around double that in the GEA-Efficiency pathways in 
both industrialized and developing countries. 
 In the transportation sector, total passenger demand for mobility is 
around 20–30% higher in the GEA-Supply pathways, because the 
measures described above to limit and shift services demand in the 
context of the GEA-Efficiency pathways are not implemented. Car 
ownership is also around a factor of 7 higher than current levels, com-
pared with the factor of 5 increase in the GEA-Efficiency pathways. 
Although levels of car ownership increase proportionally more in 
developing countries, they remain at far higher absolute levels in the 
industrialized world. Meanwhile, although overall demand for freight 
mobility is similar, the GEA-Supply pathways have a higher propor-
tion of freight moving by road than rail, the opposite of the case in 
the GEA-Efficiency pathways. Together with lower efficiency gains in 
the vehicle fleet, this results in 15–20% higher per capita fuel use. 
Demand for aviation is assumed to be the same in both the GEA-
Supply and the GEA-Efficiency pathways. 
 In the industrial sector, the absence of major new efficiency policies in 
the GEA-Supply pathways results in energy demand more than dou-
bling, to 260 EJ, in 2050 compared with 210 EJ in the GEA-Efficiency 
pathways. Energy intensity does improve, by about 1%/year, but this 
is lower than the 1.5%/year improvements achievable from the con-
certed demand-side transformation that occurs in the GEA-Efficiency 
pathways. 
 These large differences in efficiency improvements between the GEA-
Supply and the GEA-Efficiency groups of pathways have major implica-
tions for the required transformation of the supply side of the energy 
system. The higher level of demand in the GEA-Supply pathways means 
fewer degrees of freedom in terms of supply options. This interdepend-
ency between the demand- and the supply-side features of the path-
ways is discussed in detail in  Section 17.3.4 . 
 17.3.2.3  The Structure of Final Energy Demand 
 Despite the large differences in efficiency improvements between the 
GEA-Efficiency and the GEA-Supply groups of pathways described in 
the previous section, certain structural characteristics of final energy 
use are remarkably consistent across all GEA pathways, including the 
group of GEA-Mix pathways. These relate to the provision of energy 
services using higher-quality forms of energy. All GEA pathways depict 
a demand-side transformation toward ever more flexible, more conven-
ient, and cleaner forms of energy at the point of final use (see also 
Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ).  Figure 17.8 presents the same findings graphi-
cally by distinguishing the share of final energy provided by solid, liquid, 
and grid-based or on-site-generated forms of energy. The low variation 
across the three groups of GEA pathways is shown by the limited extent 
of cross-hatching or overlap. 
 A pervasive characteristic of all the GEA pathways is the continuing 
shift from energy used in its original, often solid form, exemplified by 
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the traditional direct uses of coal and biomass, to more sophisticated 
systems of energy conversion and delivery. All the GEA pathways 
include the phase-out of traditional biomass in the residential and 
commercial sector by 2030, due to dedicated energy access policies in 
the developing world (see  Section 17.4 ). In addition, stringent climate 
policies (see  Section 17.5.1 ) lead to the phase-out of the direct use 
of coal in both the industrial and the residential sectors by 2050. The 
share of solid fuel shown in  Figure 17.8 after 2050 is predominantly 
biomass in the industrial sector, as a substitute for coal in industrial 
processes where carbonaceous fuels are required (e.g., iron and ore 
reduction processes). 6 
 A second major transformation is the increasing degree to which energy 
is delivered by dedicated transport infrastructures, such as pipelines and 
networks. This enables similar end-use patterns across regions, as end 
 Table 17.8 |  Energy services indicators inIndustrialized and Developing Regions, 2005 Actual and 2050 under GEA-Efﬁ ciency and GEA-Supply pathways. 
2050
2005
Industrialized Developing
Industrialized 1 Developing GEA-Efficiency GEA-Supply GEA-Efficiency GEA-Supply
 GDP per capita (2005 US$ at market 
exchange rates) 
3487–40,050 671–4905 24,446–52,535 24,446–52,535 6029–19,829 6029–19,829
 Total ﬁ nal energy (GJ per capita) 73–219 7–46 62–98 104–156 28–50 32–71
 Residential and commercial 
Floor area (m 2 per capita) 2 26–55 9–32 48–58 48–58 19–52 19–52
Share of buildings with advanced 
technology (%)
Single-family
Multifamily
Commercial and public
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
74–86
74–79
81–92
0–0
0–1
0–3
75–83
82–91
85–96
0–0
0–0
0–0
Heating demand (MJ/m 2 )
Single-family
Multifamily
Commercial and public
443–875
443–781
475–914
112–241
112–277
173–371
101–230
104–198
101–166
324–619
266–518
288–475
50–79
47–68
54–97
90–187
90–209
205–230
Electricity demand (GJ per capita) 3 11–45 1–6 22–33 35–46 8–15 10–20
 Transportation 
Passenger-kilometers per capita 4 14,293 2499 15,925 20,302 3892 4632
Car
Bus and train
axiatim
other
8778
2855
2274
386
404
1461
198
437
6539
3334
5579
473
11,045
3205
5579
473
1009
1368
795
720
1775
1342
795
720
No. of light-duty vehicles per capita 0.46 0.03 0.52 0.64 0.11 0.14
Fuel use for mobility (GJ per capita) 30.8 2.4 24.0 33.3 4.6 5.9
Freight-kilometers per capita 8219 1059 15,969 16,209 2774 2856
Truck
Rail
4544
3675
606
453
6925
9044
9032
7177
1370
1404
1786
1070
Fuel use for freight (GJ per capita) 13.0 2.4 12.4 14.3 2.8 3.3
 Industry 
Final energy (GJ per capita) 26–65 3–17 33–46 42–63 15–26 17–33
Process heat (all thermal)
Feedstock
Other (nonthermal, e.g., electric)
15–28
6–23
4–15
2–11
0.3–6
1–4
12–17
6–14
12–16
16–24
9–20
17–19
8–13
1–7
5–9
9–16
1–11
5–12
 1  Industrialized and developing regions are deﬁ ned as in  Table 17.4 . 
 2  Includes public and commercial buildings. Based on the bottom-up analysis in  Chapter 10 . 
 3  Includes electric cooling and heating as well as lighting and appliances. 
 4  Estimates from  Chapter 9 . Because of differences between the regional deﬁ nitions used in that chapter and those used for the GEA scenarios, transport indicators are given as 
regional averages of the whole developing and industrialized world only. 
 6  In addition, the possibility of direct reduction with hydrogen is considered by the 
pathways as a long-term option for the substitution of coal in these processes. 
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uses can be linked to fundamentally different and potentially distant 
primary energy supplies (see  Section 17.3.3 for more details). An add-
itional and related transformation, represented particularly in the GEA-
Efficiency pathways, is the increasing development of on-site generation 
of both heat and electricity by renewable energy technologies. 
 These transformations in the use of final energy also involve changes 
in the economic structures that underpin the pathways. Continued 
industrialization of the developing world and increasing demand for 
industrial goods as incomes rise, result in comparatively larger shares 
of industrial energy demand in the future. This trend is most pronounced 
in the GEA-Efficiency group of pathways because aggressive efficiency 
programs in the residential and transportation sectors limit their shares 
of final energy demand, as shown in  Figure 17.9 . 
 In sum, all the GEA pathways share some key features in terms of the 
structure of final energy demand: a shift away from traditional solid 
forms of energy; an increase in modern, cleaner, grid-delivered and on-
site-generated forms of energy; and a rising share of industrial sector 
energy use as incomes rise. There is, however, one major point of diffe-
rence among the GEA pathways. This relates to the nature of transform-
ation in the transportation sector. The environmental and energy security 
objectives of the overarching GEA scenario necessitate a lower reliance 
on oil in all GEA pathways. By 2050, oil use in the transportation sector 
is reduced by 35–50% from 2005 levels. However, the substitution away 
from oil branches into alternative transportation systems, as described 
in  Section 17.2.1 . Broadly speaking, these alternatives can be described 
as “conventional” and “advanced” transportation. 
 A future conventional transportation system would rely predominantly 
on liquid fuels (including some oil), biofuels, liquefied natural gas, and 
potentially the direct use of biogas and natural gas. This represents the 
least discontinuity from current trends in terms of both end-use tech-
nologies and fuel supply and distribution infrastructure. In contrast, an 
advanced transportation system involves a more fundamental trans-
formation, requiring largely new infrastructure systems in the case of 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, or new uses for existing infrastructure in the 
case of plug-in hybrids or fully electric vehicles. 
 Both these alternatives are feasible within all three of the GEA pathway 
groups. Their outcome is essentially one of choice and direction rather than 
necessity. This is why they are explicitly included as a branching point in 
the scenario taxonomy. The importance of this branching point stems from 
the magnitude of the implications on both the demand and the supply 
sides. On the demand side, for example, vehicle technologies would follow 
very different innovation and development paths, either reducing the costs 
and improving the reliability of fuel cells in the hydrogen-based Advanced 
Transportation system, or improving the flexibility of engines to use both 
biofuels and fossil-derived liquids in the Conventional Transportation sys-
tem. However, the impacts of the transportation branching point are felt 
particularly strongly on the supply side, as they potentially reduce the 
flexibility of supply-side portfolios given the GEA sustainability objectives. 
Similarly, any changes on the supply side can have major implications for 
the choice of demand-side technologies. These interdependencies are dis-
cussed further in the next section, which turns to consider the supply side 
of the energy system transformations represented in the GEA pathways. 
 17.3.3  Energy Supply 
 17.3.3.1  Introduction 
 The level of energy demand determines the flexibility of supply-side 
portfolios. This is particularly the case given the ambitiousness of the 
 Figure 17.8 |  World ﬁ nal energy shares of solid fuels, liquid fuels, and grids and on-site 
generation. Overlapping hatched areas indicate variations across the GEA-Efﬁ ciency 
and the GEA-Supply pathways. The GEA-Mix pathways lie in between the two others. 
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 Figure 17.9 |  Shares of ﬁ nal energy by sector in the three pathway groups in indus-
trialized and developing countries. 
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GEA sustainability objectives and the energy transition required to 
reach the associated targets. Across all the GEA pathways, energy access 
objectives constrain the use of traditional fuels in developing countries; 
energy security objectives limit the amount of energy trade and foster 
the increasing diversity of energy supply; climate change objectives con-
strain the use of carbon-intensive energy forms in electricity generation; 
and so on. Within these already tight constraints, low energy demand 
allows a greater number of viable options for energy supply, whereas 
high energy demand reduces the choices available and makes it more 
difficult to limit or omit specific supply options. Similarly, the future fuel 
needs of the transportation sector have a further impact on the extent 
to which supply-side portfolios can be varied in response to political, 
resource, land, or other requirements. 
 Having established and analyzed the different levels of demand in the 
GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Supply, and GEA-Mix groups of pathways, this sec-
tion explores variability in the corresponding supply-side transforma-
tions, including transmission and distribution infrastructure. 7 The aim is 
twofold: to enrich the storylines represented by the GEA pathways in 
fulfilling the sustainability objectives, and to identify both the necessi-
ties and the choices available on the supply side of the energy system if 
these sustainability objectives are to be met. 
 This section is organized using the branching point approach set out in 
 Section 17.2.2 . First, the principal options on the supply side are set out, 
covering both energy forms and relevant technologies. Second, the viable 
portfolios of supply-side options across the GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Supply, 
and GEA-Mix groups of pathways are assessed, given the different levels of 
energy demand in each group – the first branching point. Third, the effect 
of alternative transportation system transformations, either Conventional 
or Advanced, is explored in terms of supply-side portfolio flexibility – the 
second branching point. Fourth, the potential for further limiting or omit-
ting specific options from the supply-side portfolio is assessed through 
an extensive sensitivity analysis – the third branching point. Through this 
process, the three groups of GEA pathways become first 6 and then 60, 
although ultimately they are reduced to the 41 that are feasible. The feasi-
bility analysis indicates how important certain supply-side options are for a 
the energy transition. However, the results should not be mistaken for pre-
dictions. Rather, they can be interpreted as an assessment of the necessary 
technological changes, exploring the “option values” of different technol-
ogy clusters that might, for example, guide future investment decisions. 
 17.3.3.2  Supply-Side Options and Portfolios 
 There is a large portfolio of options on the supply side to provide the 
energy needed to meet the demand for energy services. These options 
comprise different forms of energy and their attendant conversion 
technologies: crude oil converted into petroleum products by refineries 
to provide transportation fuel and thus mobility, for example, or wind 
energy converted into electricity by wind turbines to provide lighting. 
Throughout this section, supply-side options are distinguished in terms 
of both the primary energy form (e.g., bioenergy, coal, solar energy) 
and the conversion or processing technology (e.g., biomass-to-liquids, 
biomass power generation, coal power generation with CCS, solar 
photovoltaic). Each option also has implications for the transmission 
and distribution infrastructure: rigs, pipelines, and filling stations in the 
case of the energy conversion chain from crude oil to mobility; electri-
city grids and transformer stations in the case of conversion from wind 
energy to lighting. These, too, will be considered here. 
 In scenario studies (as well as historically), there are also a wide range 
of factors that shape and constrain the shares of final energy provided 
by different supply-side options. The clearest determining factors relate 
to cost, efficiency, and other performance attributes. Availability, based 
on the underlying resource potential, is another factor, although a 
detailed assessment of the bioenergy and other renewable, fossil, and 
uranium resources in the context of the GEA pathways show that none 
of these supply-side options face an absolute resource constraint at the 
global level (see  Box 17.3 and the electronic appendix to this chapter 
on resource potentials). At the regional level, however, some resource 
categories could become scarce. 
 In the context of sustainability assessments like the GEA, other factors 
also come into play, including environmental impacts (e.g., air pollution, 
GHG emissions), social impacts (e.g., electrification and clean cooking), 
and geopolitical considerations (e.g., energy security). The supply-side 
options used in all the GEA pathways must allow the GEA sustainability 
objectives to be fulfilled within the timelines and to the extent set out 
by their associated targets (see  Section 17.2.3 ). This means that cer-
tain supply-side options are preferred over other options in the energy 
transition toward its objectives. For instance, technologies like bioen-
ergy and other renewable energy sources, nuclear energy, and CCS have 
the potential to help meet the climate target. CCS can also be used in 
combination with bioenergy (BioCCS) to produce net negative carbon 
dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions (see  Chapter 11 ,  Section 11.3 for more details 
about the technology). This is another potentially important option in 
the context of climate stabilization objectives. 
 An alternative option to reduce CO 2 emissions is carbon sink enhance-
ment through afforestation. As both BioCCS and carbon sinks can sig-
nificantly affect the magnitude and timing of emissions reductions on 
the energy supply side, both are included in this analysis. 
 Cost, performance, resource availability, and sustainability criteria are 
not the only factors influencing the projected success of these supply-
side options. Some options require advanced technological knowledge, 
which is not universally available (and which has contributed to his-
torical differences in primary energy supply patterns at the country or 
regional level). Other options face barriers to a rapid scaling up (Wilson, 
 7  The supply-side ﬂ exibility analysis relies primarily on the MESSAGE modeling 
framework, but the ﬁ ndings have been checked for consistency with the pathways 
 generated with the IMAGE model. 
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 2009 ). Integrating high proportions (e.g., 20% or more) of intermittent 
energy sources such as wind or solar in electricity grids is an example. 
Still other options face issues of public acceptance. Nuclear energy in 
some countries is an obvious example, but some forms of renewable 
energy, such as large-scale hydropower, bioenergy, on-shore wind, and 
CCS, are others. Some options, such as nuclear, entail also other societal 
risks due to accidents or proliferation of fissile material for weapons use. 
The overall conclusion of the GEA assessment on nuclear is thus that 
until the proliferation potential is better controlled and safer reactor 
designs are available, countries (especially those considering building 
their first nuclear power plants) should consider other climate-friendly 
power supply options first (for a further discussion, see  Chapter 14 ). 
Finally, the requirements of some supply-side options in terms of new 
physical infrastructure and distribution systems are highly capital inten-
sive but face initially low overall demand, and thus are often unattract-
ive to both private investors and resource-limited public investors. 
 In light of all these potential issues, the approach taken here begins by 
elaborating the broadest possible decision space, or range of possibilities, 
in terms of supply-side portfolios in each of the three GEA pathway groups 
(GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply). First, the full range of supply-
side options is considered, subject to cost, performance, and system inte-
gration constraints but always respecting the overarching need to comply 
with the GEA targets. As noted earlier, the level of demand has a signifi-
cant impact on supply-side flexibility: the greater efficiency improvements 
and reductions in energy services demand of the GEA-Efficiency group of 
pathways leave more options open on the supply side. Next, this max-
imal decision space is reduced in stepwise fashion. The impacts of major 
changes in the transportation system on this unrestricted supply portfolio 
are explored. Finally, the impacts of specific restrictions or omissions of 
particular supply-side options are considered, to reflect the sensitivities 
or concerns surrounding their widespread deployment. These restricted 
supply portfolios, as well as the transportation analysis, provide a broad 
sensitivity analysis around the unrestricted supply portfolio, illustrating 
which options are “musts” and which others are choices. 
 17.3.3.3  Supply-Side Options under Different Levels of Demand 
 Figure 17.10 summarizes the result of the unrestricted supply port-
folio analysis for the three levels of energy demand represented in the 
GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply pathway groups. It compares 
the primary energy supply mix in 2030 and 2050 under each of the 
three groups with that in 2005. 8 Each future primary energy supply 
mix depicted can be interpreted as the least-cost portfolio subject to 
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 Figure 17.10 |  Composition of global primary energy supply in 2005, 2030, and 2050 across pathway groups under an unrestricted supply portfolio and Conventional 
Transportation setup. 
 8  A well-recognized problem with reporting primary energy supply is how to include 
noncombustible energy forms (e.g., nonbiomass renewables and nuclear energy). 
Here the substitution method is used to back-calculate primary energy by assigning 
a 35% efﬁ ciency for electricity generation from noncombustible sources and an 85% 
efﬁ ciency for heat generation (see  Chapter 1 for details). 
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the cost and performance characteristics of the different supply-side 
options and the need to fulfill the GEA objectives with respect to access, 
 environment, and security. 
 The most striking difference across pathway groups is in the total demand 
provided by the energy system. In terms of supply-side options, the figure 
also shows the breadth of the supply portfolio needed to meet the GEA 
sustainability objectives: most if not all options contribute across all three 
pathway groups. Nuclear energy makes a greater proportional contribu-
tion in the GEA-Supply pathways group than in the other groups, which 
has less flexibility in terms of portfolio restrictions. 9 Conversely, as will be 
explored further below, the GEA-Efficiency pathways group can tolerate 
the restriction or even omission of various individual supply-side options. 
 An equally important difference across pathway groups is the varying 
degree of urgency for change on the supply side in the medium term. 
With the ambitious effort on the demand side in the GEA-Efficiency path-
way, the change from current supply-side structures can be less rapid. 
In 2030, with the exception of wind and solar (which grow considerably 
in absolute terms), the primary energy supply mix in the GEA-Efficiency 
pathway is only modestly different from that of today. In contrast, the 
GEA-Mix and, in particular, the GEA-Supply pathways require more radi-
cal changes in energy supply. This includes a more rapid scaling up of all 
renewable supply options, and CCS, which by 2030 needs to remove up 
to 10% of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the GEA-Supply 
pathways, increasing to about 50% by 2050. The same is true for nuclear 
energy, which in the GEA-Efficiency pathway (with an unrestricted sup-
ply portfolio) continues to contribute about the same amount of energy 
as today or less through 2050, whereas in the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply 
pathways a two- to fivefold increase up to 2050 is observed. For path-
ways with a nuclear phase-out see  sections 17.3.3.5 and  17.3.4 . 
 17.3.3.4  Supply-Side Options under Different Transportation 
Systems 
 As noted in  Section 17.3.2 , the structure of the transportation sector 
decisively influences the feasibility of supply-side portfolios. Therefore, 
the analysis below distinguishes between two sets of assumptions about 
the transportation sector transition, labeled Advanced Transportation 
and Conventional Transportation. The Advanced Transportation setup 
is characterized by a transition to electricity or hydrogen, or both, as 
main transportation fuels in the medium to long term. By 2050 these 
two fuels would have to deliver between roughly 20% and more than 
60% of the transportation sector’s final energy, depending strongly on 
overall transportation demand. This implies a massive buildup of new 
infrastructure over the coming decades. Whereas such a transition could 
proceed more gradually in the case of electrification, the transition to 
hydrogen is more challenging, because bulky investments in a new 
distribution infrastructure would need to be made. On the other hand, 
hydrogen would be more compatible with the existing refueling infra-
structure and business model, which might have to change significantly 
in a largely electrified transport sector (Andersen et al.,  2009 ). In con-
trast, the Conventional Transportation story would stay mostly within 
current modes of operation, largely relying on liquid fuels and, in some 
regions, on gas. Still, a growing share of electricity would also be needed 
in this conventional world, reflecting a combination of a modal shift 
toward public transportation and some electrification of at least short-
distance individual transport. 
 Two different interpretations of the Advanced Transportation setup are 
realized in the GEA scenario analysis: an electric route and a hydrogen 
route. These have in common that numerous additional energy sources 
(e.g., nonbiomass renewable energy, nuclear energy) become available 
to the transportation sector on a large scale. 10 The electric route leads to 
a substitution process, dominated by electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids 
in combination with biofuels. The alternative route, hydrogen, explores 
a transition toward a long-term transportation sector that is dominated 
by hydrogen fuel cell vehicles after 2050. In contrast, the Conventional 
Transportation setup tends to follow a regionally more diversified path, 
depicting the coevolution of a wide portfolio of fuels and technologies 
with similar shares, including hybrid vehicles, flexible cars using biofuels 
in conjunction with fossil liquids from natural gas (in combination with 
CCS to reduce carbon emissions), and direct use of biogas and natural gas. 
These alternative transportation sector configurations also have import-
ant implications for the required technological innovation and improve-
ments in vehicle engines. R&D and deployment incentives are needed 
in the Advanced Transportation setup to reduce costs and improve the 
reliability of either fuel cells or the next generation of batteries. The tran-
sition under the Conventional Transportation setup relies more heavily on 
advanced and more flexible designs of internal combustion engines. 
 As illustrated by  Figure 17.11 , the differences between the alternative 
transportation sector assumptions tend to play out more severely in the 
GEA-Mix and particularly the GEA-Supply groups of pathways, simply 
because demand is significantly higher by 2030 and still higher by 2050. 
Total primary energy supply is lower in an Advanced Transportation world 
than in a Conventional Transportation world, because the well-to-wheel 
efficiency of the electric and hydrogen routes is generally higher than that 
of the liquid route (van Vliet et al.,  2010 ;  2011 ). A more subtle difference 
concerns the higher uptake of the available bioenergy potential under the 
Conventional Transportation option by 2030 across the three groups of 
 9  The main reasons for the high nuclear contribution in the GEA-Supply pathways 
is the high demand of energy, which reduces the ﬂ exibility of supply (see  Section 
17.3.3.5 ) and thus results in comparatively higher prices for energy. The higher 
energy prices, in turn, increase the demand for more costly energy options, such as 
nuclear. Different phase-out pathways for nuclear, however, show that the transform-
ation toward the sustainability objectives are in principle technically possible also in 
the GEA-Supply pathways ( Section 17.3.3.5 ). 
 10  The Advanced Transportation sector in the GEA-Supply pathways relies largely on 
hydrogen, whereas in the GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways the electric route is chosen. The 
GEA-Mix pathways rely to a greater extent on electricity in their MESSAGE interpret-
ation and more on hydrogen in the IMAGE interpretation. 
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pathways. The different final energy patterns of the two transportation sec-
tor configurations are shown in  Figure 17.12 for the GEA-Mix pathway. 
 Given the ambitious goals of the energy transition, this difference in 
the transportation sector has profound implications for the supply-side 
choices, particularly for the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply groups of path-
ways. The Advanced Transportation setup generally opens additional 
supply routes for transportation fuels such as electricity and hydrogen 
from non-biomass renewables or nuclear energy, whereas Conventional 
Transportation offers fewer routes, to a large extent relying on fossil 
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fuels and bioenergy and leading to reduced flexibility on the supply 
side. The limited potential of sustainable bioenergy is the main deter-
minant of the reduced number of feasible transition pathways under 
the Conventional Transportation assumption (see  Section 17.3.4.3 for 
details), because bioenergy is one of the few remaining ways to reduce 
GHG emissions in the transportation sector and in selected other parts 
of the energy system (e.g., bioenergy feedstocks for nonenergy use; see 
Dornburg and Faaij,  2005 ). 
 17.3.3.5  Supply-Side Options under Different Portfolio 
Restrictions 
 Portfolio Restrictions as a Sensitivity Analysis 
 The analysis presented here relies on a set of “restricted portfolio” 
pathways in which selected supply-side options are either limited or 
excluded completely, in order to focus on overall questions of feasibil-
ity and on economic and resource implications. These pathways should 
therefore be interpreted as sensitivity analyses around the central 
case of the full or “unrestricted” portfolio for each of the three GEA 
pathway groups. 11 An important assumption underlying this restricted 
portfolio analysis is that the level of energy demand in each group of 
pathways is fixed. 12 
 In total, nine different restricted supply portfolios are explored for each 
of the six possible combinations of GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-
Supply pathway groups and two transportation system transformations 
(Conventional and Advanced). Together with the unrestricted portfolios, 
this results in 60 different possible pathways (3 levels of demand  × 2 
transportation systems  × 10 supply portfolios). 
 Issues, concerns, and potential constraints facing different supply-side 
options were the basis for the choice of restricted portfolios analyzed. 
Six supply-side options were either limited or excluded, either in isola-
tion or in combination with other options. 13 These options and the cor-
responding restricted portfolio pathways are shown in  Table 17.9 . Also 
presented are summaries of the rationales for including these particular 
restricted portfolios. 
 Table 17.9 |  Overview of restricted supply portfolios. 
Supply-side 
option
Main rationales 
for restriction
Restricted 
portfolio 
pathways
Description
CO 2 capture 
and storage 
(CCS)
 Storage availability 
 Social acceptability 
 Infrastructure 
requirements 
 Environmental risks 
No CCS 1 CCS excluded
Bioenergy with 
CCS (BioCCS)
See entries for CCS 
and bioenergy
No BioCCS 1 Bioenergy used only for 
co-ﬁ ring in fossil CCS 
facilities (no dedicated 
BioCCS facilities)
Carbon sinks 
(afforestation)
 Resource availability 
 Land use impacts 
 Political acceptability 
No sinks No additional 
afforestation beyond 
baseline assumption 
of no net global 
deforestation from 2070 
onward
Bioenergy  Resource availability 
 Land use impacts 
 Food security risks 
 Environmental risks 
Limited 
bioenergy
Bioenergy potential 
reduced to 50% of 
central estimate 
to reﬂ ect potential 
implementation issues 
for sustainable bioenergy
Nuclear energy  Environmental risks 
 Social acceptability 
 Proliferation risk 
No nuclear 1 No new nuclear power 
plants built after 2020, 
leading to full phase-out 
after 2060 (assuming 
40-year plant lifetime)
Renewable 
energy
Systems integration Limited 
renewables
Intermittent renewables 
(wind, solar) restricted to 
20% of ﬁ nal electricity 
consumption
Combinations 2 
 Limited bioenergy + Limited renewables 
 No nuclear 1 + No CCS 1 
 No BioCCS 1 + No sinks + Limited bioenergy 
 1  Option was fully excluded from the portfolio; for other options the restriction was 
implemented in terms of limited potentials. 
 2  See individual options for rationales and descriptions. 
 11  Similar analyses, mostly in the context of climate change mitigation, have been 
done in the ADAM (Edenhofer et al.,  2010b ) and RECIPE (Edenhofer et al.,  2010b ) 
modeling comparison studies and in several individual publications (Krey and Riahi, 
 2009 ). 
 12  Generally, excluding options from the supply portfolio leads to increased prices of 
energy services, because more expensive supply options have to be utilized. In this 
situation, standard economic theory suggests a price-induced demand response, 
which in this analysis is not considered, because by design the supply-side ﬂ exibility 
is investigated given a ﬁ xed level of demand for energy services. 
 13  An additional potential option would have been to limit the availability of unconven-
tional fossil resources. This has not been implemented, however, since the stringent 
climate target allows unconventional resources no signiﬁ cant role in the pathways 
(even if no restriction is assumed). 
 The results of the portfolio analyses are shown in  Figure 17.13 for the 
3  × 2  × 10 matrix of pathways. The 19 blank columns, each marked with 
an X, show those pathways that were not feasible given the portfolio 
restrictions.  
 A headline conclusion of the portfolio analysis is that the low level 
of energy demand in the GEA-Efficiency group of pathways makes it 
possible to reach the sustainability objectives in the absence of both 
nuclear energy and CCS. For the intermediate and high levels of energy 
demand under the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply pathways, respectively, 
excluding either nuclear or CCS is typically possible, but in the high-
demand case this requires transforming the transportation system 
away from liquid fuels. In the context of climate change mitigation, 
only a limited number of studies (e.g., Krewitt et al.,  2009 ; Teske et 
al.,  2010 ; Delucchi and Jacobson,  2011 ; F ø yn et al.,  2011 ; Jacobson 
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 Box 17.3 |  Resource Potentials 
 Integrated Assessment Models like IMAGE and MESSAGE typically do not consider the full technical potential of energy resources but 
include additional criteria, such as sustainability or economic criteria, which are not fully captured within the models but which lead to 
a signiﬁ cant reduction of the technical potential. For the GEA pathways, the ranges of these deployment potentials are summarized in 
 Table 17.10 . The resource assumptions for all sources are within the ranges of resource uncertainties assessed in  Chapter 7 (see also the 
electronic appendix to this chapter for more details). 
and Delucchi,  2011 ) have looked at ambitious climate stabilization 
scenarios that exclude nuclear and CCS completely from the supply-
side portfolio, thus relying exclusively on a combination of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. 
 Another important insight from the portfolio analysis is that the low 
energy demand in the GEA-Efficiency pathways also enables an energy 
transition with limited contributions from bioenergy, without BioCCS 
and without relying on carbon sink management. All of these land use-
related supply options have potentially adverse impacts and are contro-
versial in the literature (see Section 17.3.4.7 and the electronic appendix 
to this chapter). 
 Table 17.10 |  Fossil fuel resources and renewable energy potentials. 
GEA pathways: Chapter 7
Energy source reserves and resources (ZJ) 1 Reserves (ZJ) Resources (ZJ)
 Fossil fuels 
Coal
Conventional oil
Unconventional oil
Conventional gas
Unconventional gas
259 – 376
9.8– 11.1
8.9 – 23.0
11.6 –16.8
23.0– 96.4
17.3 –21.0
4.0 –7.6
3.8– 5.6
5.0 –7.1
20.1 – 67.1
291 –435
4.2 –6.2
11.3– 14.9 2 
7.2 –8.9
40.2 – 122
Deployment potential in 2050 (EJ/year) Technical potential (EJ/year)
 Renewables 
Bioenergy
Hydro
Wind
Solar photovoltaic
CSP
Geothermal
145–170
18.7–28
170–344
1650–1741
990 3 
23 4 
160–270
50–60
1250–2250
62,000–280,000
810–1400
 Notes: The deployment potentials for noncombustible renewable energy sources in the pathways are speciﬁ ed in terms of the electricity or heat that can be produced 
by speciﬁ c technologies (secondary energy perspective). By contrast, technical potentials from  Chapter 7 refer to the ﬂ ow of energy that could become available as 
inputs for technology conversion (e.g., the technical potential for wind is given as the kinetic energy available for wind power generation, whereas the deployment 
potential as reported in this chapter gives the electricity that can be generated by wind turbines). In addition to the renewable energy potentials stated in this table, 
technology diffusion and systems integration constraints may apply in the pathways and prevent the potentials from being fully utilized. Note that elsewhere in 
 Chapter 17 the substitution method is used to report primary energy from non-combustible sources and therefore primary energy numbers can exceed those reported 
as deployment potential in this table. 
 1  One zettajoule (ZJ) equals 1000 EJ, or 10 21 joules. 
 2  Estimates for unconventional oil that are not separated into reserves and resources reach signiﬁ cantly higher values than reported in this summary from  Chapter 7 
(see  Table 7.8a/b ). 
 3  The potential is from MESSAGE as the IMAGE modeling framework does not include CSP. 
 4  Geothermal energy is exogenously determined in the IMAGE scenarios; therefore no deployment potential can be speciﬁ ed. 
 Furthermore, how the transportation sector is configured has profound 
implications for supply-side flexibility. Under the Advanced Transportation 
setup, the GEA-Supply group of pathways is still feasible if either BioCCS, 
carbon sink enhancement, nuclear energy, full bioenergy supply, or the 
large-scale deployment of other renewable energy is not considered an 
option. Under the Conventional Transportation setup, only nuclear energy 
can be excluded to keep the GEA sustainability targets within reach. 
 The situation is somewhat improved in the GEA-Mix group of pathways, 
where the Conventional Transportation setup still allows for the same 
choices as the Advanced Transportation setup under high energy demand. 
CCS turns out to be a crucial technology under these conditions, because 
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in the absence of a major transition to electricity or hydrogen, or both, bio-
fuels are the only alternative available to decarbonize the sector. As in the 
GEA-Supply groups of pathways, the limited sustainable bioenergy poten-
tial is a constraining factor, and CCS is important to remove the carbon 
from bioenergy feedstocks that does not end up in the liquid biofuel itself. 
 In contrast, the strong focus on energy efficiency, to some extent com-
bined with lifestyle changes (transportation demand is most affected; 
see  Section 17.3.2 on energy demand), in the GEA-Efficiency group of 
pathways allows the greatest flexibility on the supply side, essentially 
independent of the transportation sector assumptions – at least for the 
portfolio of options examined within this analysis. 
 Restrictions on CO 2 Capture and Storage 
 Background to Restrictions  – Although CCS has not been deployed in 
energy applications beyond the demonstration level, the scenario lit-
erature indicates that it could play an important role as a bridge or 
transitional technology under stringent climate targets (Edenhofer et 
al.,  2009 ; Krey and Riahi,  2009 ; Luderer et al.,  2009 ; Edenhofer et al., 
 2010a ). 14 However, the use of CCS raises various issues. First, the deploy-
ment potential is limited by storage capacity at both the global and the 
regional scale (see  Section 17.3.4.4 on regional analysis). Second, even 
relatively low leakage rates (e.g., between 0.1% and 1%) can comprom-
ise CCS as a climate stabilization option (van der Zwaan and Smekens, 
 2009 ). Third, upstream emissions from fossil fuel extraction (including of 
non-CO 2 gases) reduce the comparative effectiveness of fossil CCS as a 
low-carbon supply-side option. Fourth, in contrast to other low-carbon 
options, CCS is a single-purpose technology with limited or no ancil-
lary benefits, and it imposes an energy penalty, thus increasing resource 
consumption (see also  Section 17.7 on multiple benefits). 
 Results of Restrictions  –  Figure 17.13 shows the importance of CCS as a 
transitional supply-side option. For all pathways with high levels of energy 
demand (the GEA-Supply pathways group), including those with Advanced 
Transportation, the No CCS restricted supply portfolio is not feasible. The 
No CCS restriction is feasible for the GEA-Mix pathways group (with inter-
mediate levels of energy demand), but only if the transportation system 
does move away from the currently dominant liquid fuels. 
 In other words, the supply-side analysis shows that CCS is a necessary 
supply option if the level of demand and the associated energy intensity 
improvements remain on current trajectories, and if the transportation 
sector remains more or less compatible with existing infrastructures and 
business models. These infrastructures can continue to serve a large frac-
tion of energy demand, and the required decarbonization of the energy 
system is accomplished using CCS in an “end of the pipe” mode. 
 Restrictions on BioCCS and Sinks (Negative GHG Emissions Options) 
 Background to Restrictions  – Supply-side options that can produce con-
siderable amounts of net negative GHG emissions include carbon sink 
enhancement and BioCCS (bioenergy in combination with CCS). Capture 
of CO 2 from the atmosphere (CO 2 air capture, artificial trees) is another 
option but is not addressed here (for details see, e.g., Baciocchi et al., 
 2006 ; Keith et al.,  2006 ; Zeman,  2007 ). Although the current emphasis 
with CCS is on fossil fuel conversion technologies, large-scale biomass co-
firing (practiced today in coal-fired power plants typically at the level of 
a few percent; see, e.g., De and Assadi,  2009 ) could become an attractive 
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Figure 17.13 | Composition of global primary energy supply in 2005 and 2050 for the 
three pathway groups under alternative transportation sector assumptions and sup-
ply portfolios. See Table 17.9 for details of the restricted supply portfolios. Xs indicate 
infeasible pathways. Pathways marked with an asterisk are bordering on infeasibility, 
with carbon prices slightly higher than deﬁ ned in the note below. Energy savings are 
calculated by comparison with a hypothetical case with energy intensity improve-
ments compatible with historical trends and no additional climate and energy policies 
(see also Section 17.3.2.1).
Note: Feasibility is technically deﬁ ned here as the inability of the supply side to deliver 
the (ﬁ xed) useful energy demand. As uncertainties grow over time, modest undersup-
ply of service demands of up to 5% beyond 2050 is still interpreted as feasible. As in 
other studies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2009), this concept is operationalized by declaring 
pathways with carbon prices higher than US$1000/tCO2 in 2012 (as a result of so-
called demand backstop penetration) infeasible. This relaxation may lead to limited 
comparability of economic indicators (e.g., energy-related investments) across the 
restricted portfolio pathways after 2050.
 14  CCS can also become economically feasible in non-intervention scenarios, because 
of the beneﬁ ts of the captured CO 2 for use in enhanced oil and gas recovery, for 
example. However, the potential for these applications is limited, and therefore CCS 
deployment in baseline scenarios is typically constrained to a relatively low level 
compared with climate stabilization scenarios. 
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supply-side option, helping to reduce residual emissions from coal CCS 
toward zero without having to increase the capture rate to 100%, which 
currently appears to be economically unattractive. Once infrastructure has 
been built to transport CO 2 from its place of origin (e.g., a power plant or 
cement production plant) to a suitable storage location, the building of 
smaller-scale BioCCS plants may also become an option. 
 Results of Restrictions  – As can be seen from  Figure 17.13 , the No BioCCS 
and No Sinks restricted portfolio pathways produce fairly similar primary 
energy supply mixes by 2050, in particular within the GEA-Efficiency and 
GEA-Mix pathways groups. In both cases, cumulative negative carbon 
fluxes are similar. In contrast to BioCCS and atmospheric CO 2 capture, 
carbon sink enhancement is a supply option that is available immedi-
ately, but large annual reductions in carbon emissions result only with 
relatively long lag times. Although their deployment occurs at scale only 
after 2050, the availability of net negative GHG emissions options is 
crucial for near-term targets, as they reduce the need for immediate 
GHG mitigation while still allowing the 2°C climate stabilization target 
to be reached by 2100. 15 So, in contrast to the other supply-side options 
considered here, these negative net emissions options affect the supply 
portfolio throughout the time period of the analysis. 
 The No BioCCS and No Sinks restrictions require a more aggressive deploy-
ment of other low-carbon options in the first half of the century, in particu-
lar nuclear energy and renewables ( Figure 17.13 ). In combination, however, 
with the additional restriction of Limited Bioenergy, this can only be achieved 
at low levels of energy demand (the GEA-Efficiency pathways). 
 Restrictions on Bioenergy 
 Background to Restrictions  – Bioenergy could play an important role in 
future energy systems and can contribute to multiple objectives, such as 
increased energy security (e.g., Brazilian ethanol program; (Goldemberg, 
 2007 )) and GHG mitigation. Biofuels in the transportation sector represent 
a relatively low cost alternative to fossil fuels that (unlike hydrogen, for 
example) also requires less additional infrastructure. Even in scenarios 
that aim to limit bioenergy use, it might still be attractive to use biofuels 
for specific transport modes (e.g., air traffic, shipping, or long-distance 
freight (LBST,  2008 ). In the power sector, bioenergy also represents a rela-
tively low-cost option to reduce GHG emissions. Unlike other renewable 
energies, it does not pose intermittency challenges. In ambitious climate 
stabilization scenarios, bioenergy is particularly attractive because of 
the possible combination with CCS (see  Section 17.3.3.5 ). Despite these 
potential benefits, however, if bioenergy production is not implemented 
in a sustainable way, multiple adverse effects can occur, including compe-
tition with food production, net increases in GHG emissions from defor-
estation, and biodiversity losses (Rajagopal and Zilberman,  2007 ; Wise 
et al.,  2009 ); see also the electronic appendix to this chapter). Estimates 
of bioenergy available in 2050 range as high as approximately 360 EJ, a 
sevenfold increase over current use (Dornburg et al.,  2010 ). Under stricter 
sustainability criteria and less favorable assumptions about water scar-
city and yield improvements, however, the estimated potential can be as 
low as 60–70 EJ in 2050 (van Vuuren et al.,  2010 ). 
 Results of Restrictions  – Limiting bioenergy in the supply portfolio 
is feasible in all but the GEA-Supply (high demand) pathways group 
with Conventional Transportation (see  Figure 17.13 ). Limited bioenergy 
implies about 80 EJ/year of sustainable bioenergy, including agricultural 
residues, by 2050, and less than 125 EJ/year by 2100. The 2050 level 
would mean less than a doubling of total bioenergy use compared with 
today, taking into account a substitution of traditional biomass for clean 
forms of bioenergy as required by energy access objectives. 
 Restrictions on Nuclear Energy 
 Background to Restrictions  – Although nuclear energy can potentially 
contribute to energy security objectives (by reducing the imported share 
of primary energy) as well as to climate stabilization and air pollution 
objectives, it is a controversial supply-side option for various reasons, 
including the unresolved problem of long-term waste disposal, the risk of 
catastrophic accidents and the associated liabilities, and the possible prolif-
eration of weapons-grade fissile material (see also the electronic appendix 
to this chapter). An additional concern at present is the imbalance of R&D 
portfolios in favor of nuclear energy, leading to a diversion of government 
resources from other important options. Compared with actual nuclear gen-
eration capacity, R&D spending is, for instance, among the highest levels 
of government support across all supply-side options (Grubler and Riahi, 
 2010 ). The overall conclusion of the GEA assessment on nuclear is thus that 
until the proliferation potential is better controlled and safer reactor designs 
are available, countries (especially those considering building their first 
nuclear power plants) should consider other climate-friendly power supply 
options first. For a further discussion of risks and concerns, see  Chapter 14 . 16 
The extent to which nuclear energy can contribute to the GEA objectives 
is, given the risks and concerns described above, thus very uncertain at the 
global scale, and even more so at the regional or country level. 
 Results of Restrictions  – The No Nuclear restricted portfolio pathway is 
feasible under all levels of demand and transportation system alterna-
tives. Although  Figure 17.13 shows a continued contribution of nuclear 
energy to the supply mix in 2050 in these pathways, after 2060 this has 
largely been reduced to zero as the last plants built in 2020 under the 
No Nuclear restrictions are retired. Most importantly, nuclear energy 
can in general be seen as a choice rather than a necessity. In other 
words, alternatives can substitute nuclear energy at a global scale with-
out endangering a successful energy transition, which also implies that 
 15  The potential for future BioCCS to allow a postponement of more costly supply-side 
options (in present value terms) comes at a price in the form of a reduced likelihood 
of staying below a certain temperature threshold (see  Section 17.5.1 on climate 
change for details). 
 16  It should be noted that following historical experience (see Grubler,  2010 ), all path-
ways assume that the cost of nuclear power is at best stable or even increasing fur-
ther over time. In response to addressing proliferation risks, the analysis is restricted 
to light water reactors, i.e., a plutonium fuel cycle including fast breeder reactors is 
not considered to be an option, which can have implications for uranium resource 
availability at some point (see electronic appendix to this chapter). 
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different attitudes toward nuclear energy at the national or the regional 
level can be facilitated. Hence, the phaseout of nuclear is even possible 
under the relatively high energy demand projection of the GEA-Supply 
group of pathways (see  Figure 17.13 and  Figure 17.14 ). The phase-out of 
nuclear might lead, however, to somewhat higher costs (see, e.g., invest-
ment needs of restricted portfolios in  Section 17.3.5 , and IEA,  2010 ). 
 Restrictions on Other Renewable Energy 
 Background to Restrictions – Like demand reductions, renewable energy 
can contribute to all the energy system objectives, including energy 
access (by decentralizing supply), climate stabilization, and energy 
security (by reducing energy imports and diversifying supply). Although 
the global renewable energy resource base (technical potential) vastly 
exceeds projected future primary energy use (see  Box 17.3 ), harvesting 
renewable resources may be limited by factors including land compe-
tition and systems integration. The latter issue is discussed further in 
 Chapter 15 ,  Section 15.8 and in a number of wind energy integration 
studies, which conclude that penetrations of wind-generated electri-
city of up to – and, in a limited number of cases, exceeding – 20% are 
technically feasible, but not without challenges (see, e.g., Gross et al., 
 2007 ; Smith et al.,  2007 ; Holttinen et al.,  2009 ; Milligan et al.,  2009 ). 
In addition, institutional challenges to the expansion of transmission, 
including cost allocation and siting, can be substantial (Benjamin,  2007 ; 
Vajjhala and Fischbeck,  2007 ; Swider et al.,  2008 ). In interpreting the 
results of this restriction, it needs to be taken into account that 20% 
of electricity from wind and solar would be a substantial increase from 
today’s level, which essentially only Denmark has reached. 
 Results of Restrictions  – The Limited Renewables portfolio restriction 
reduces the contribution of wind and solar to electricity generation, and 
thus to the primary energy supply mix ( Figure 17.13 ). The effect is some-
what less pronounced for solar energy, because solar thermal (e.g., solar 
rooftop collectors) and concentrating solar power (CSP) with thermal 
storage at the power plant level are affected less or not at all by systems 
integration issues. Restrictions on wind are intermediate in their impact, 
whereas the reduction of output is strongest for solar photovoltaic, as 
the curtailment of electricity generation from this source at peak hours 
(around noon) can occur at a relatively low installed capacity compared 
with the system’s overall size. 17 
 A related and counterbalancing effect of the pathways that assume lim-
ited potential of intermittent renewables is that dispatchable renewables 
(hydro, geothermal, and bioenergy) and other low-carbon electricity gen-
eration sources (nuclear and fossil CCS) are deployed to a larger extent. 18 
 17.3.4  The GEA Pathways: Energy System 
Transformations 
 17.3.4.1  Introduction 
 The pathways analysis presented in the previous sections focused on 
several different dimensions of a successful energy transformation 
toward a more sustainable future. These dimensions correspond to the 
branching points of the scenario design process described in  Section 
17.2.2 . This analysis led to a total of 60 pathways, of which 41 were 
feasible alternative representations of an energy transition that fulfills 
the GEA objectives. The approach taken here is to use a selection of 
three illustrative GEA pathways, interpreted by two different modeling 
frameworks – IMAGE and MESSAGE – to integrate the demand-side 
analysis of  Section 17.3.2 with the supply-side analysis of  Section 
17.3.3 . Narrowing the task down to these three pathways clarifies the 
important points of similarity and difference within the broader range 
of 41 pathways. Having firmly established the characteristics of these 
three illustrative pathways, the section turns in more detail to questions 
of supply-side flexibility and to regionally disaggregated findings. 
 17.3.4.2  Three Illustrative GEA Pathways 
 The three illustrative GEA pathways were selected to combine specific 
choices at the different branching points. They are  not intended to be 
central cases, most likely cases, or even representative cases. Rather, 
their intent is to illustrate the types of options available throughout the 
energy system and to explore critical choices in terms of the magnitude 
and direction of policies, investments, and broader efforts to transform 
the energy system. 19 
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 Figure 17.14 |  Development of primary energy in the GEA-Supply pathway with a 
nuclear phaseout shortly after 2050. 
 17  The lower penetration of intermittent renewables in the Limited Renewables portfolio 
pathways also leads to reduced demand for technologies to address load manage-
ment issues (such as backup generation capacities, hydrogen electrolyzers, pumped 
hydro, or compressed air storage). 
 18  There appear to be no insurmountable technical barriers to high penetration rates 
of renewables if ancillary changes to system management and infrastructure are 
implemented appropriately (see, e.g., the high penetration rates of renewables in the 
GEA pathways with unrestricted renewables). 
 19  The overarching criterion for the selection of illustrative cases is that they reﬂ ect the 
main characteristics of each of the groups of GEA pathways (Efﬁ ciency, Mix, Supply). 
In addition, the selection of illustrative cases is guided by the ranges of different 
energy options in the peer-reviewed scenario literature (eg the recent assessment by 
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 The main distinguishing dimensions of the three illustrative GEA path-
ways are as follows:
  • Demand versus supply focus. While the assessment shows that a 
combination of supply- and demand-side measures is needed to 
transform the energy system, emphasis on either side is an impor-
tant point of divergence between different policy choices. A critical 
factor is thus the extent to which changes in demand for energy 
services, together with demand-side efficiency measures, can reduce 
the amount of energy to provide mobility, housing, and industrial 
services and thus help meet the goals across virtually the whole 
range of sustainability objectives. This dimension is one of the main 
distinguishing characteristics, and it motivates the naming of the 
three illustrative pathways. 
  • Global dominance of certain energy options versus regional and 
technological diversity. Once technological change is initiated in a 
particular direction, it becomes increasingly difficult to change its 
course. Whether the transformation of the future energy system fol-
lows a globally more uniform or a diverse path has thus important 
implications, given irreversibility, “lock-in,” and path dependency of 
the system. GEA-Efficiency and GEA-Supply depict worlds with glo-
bal dominance of certain demand/supply options, while GEA-Mix is 
characterized by higher levels of regional diversity. 
  • Incremental versus radical new solutions. Given the ambitious sus-
tainability objectives, transformational changes need to be introduced 
very rapidly across all GEA pathways. For instance, all pathways fea-
ture decreasing shares of presently dominant fossil fuels. The pathways 
differ, however, with respect to the emergence of new solutions. Some 
rely more heavily on today’s advanced options and infrastructures 
(such as biofuels in GEA-Mix), while others depict futures with radic-
ally new solutions (such as hydrogen in GEA-Supply). 
 In terms of the supply mix that provides for overall levels of energy 
demand across the three illustrative pathways,  Figure 17.15 shows the 
ongoing transition from primarily fossil fuels, which have dominated 
since the late 19th century (see Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ) to the low-
carbon options – nuclear energy, renewable energies, and fossil energy 
with CCS – of the second half of the 21st century. 20 The two alterna-
tive interpretations of these illustrative transition pathways have been 
harmonized to a great extent. They start from identical socio-economic 
assumptions, but the development of final energy is very close as 
a result of largely harmonized service demand levels (see  Box 17.2 ). 
However, despite sharing many characteristics, there are three dimen-
sions in which the interpretations are quite different, and this allows for 
important insights: 
 The counterfactuals (or business-as-usual scenarios) underlying these  •
successful transition pathways are considerably different, which mate-
rializes in different levels of energy savings across the MESSAGE and 
IMAGE interpretation (as shown in  Figure 17.15 ). While the MESSAGE 
counterfactual is more optimistic about the future availability of hydro-
carbons and, consequently, many sectors will continue to rely on this 
option, the IMAGE counterfactual features a transition to coal and 
nuclear energy becoming the dominant primary energy sources and 
inducing a shift to synthetic fuels in, for example, the transport sector. 
Both share, however, similar characteristics when it comes to environ-
mental problems, as well as an inability to successfully address energy 
access and security issues. This illustrates that a successful transition 
can be achieved from very different starting points. 
 While the demand-side changes, in particular the role of energy effi- •
ciency, have been largely harmonized, the supply-side portfolios are 
different across the two interpretations of the illustrative GEA path-
ways. The MESSAGE interpretations rely to a much greater extent on 
renewable energy, while in IMAGE, fossil CCS tends to be of greater 
importance, particularly over the second half of the century. 21 The 
role of nuclear energy is very similar in the GEA-Efficiency and GEA-
Supply pathways in both frameworks while in the GEA-Mix pathway, 
MESSAGE foresees a significantly larger role for nuclear after 2050 
than IMAGE. 
 the IPCC (2011)). Each of the illustrative cases represents a distinctly different path-
way, and together they illustrate the different types of transformations that were 
explored in more detail through sensitivity analysis of the wider set of 41 feasible 
pathways. (1) The group of GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways is characterized by the highest 
degree of “supply-side ﬂ exibility”. This is illustrated by sensitivity cases with respect 
to supply-side technology restrictions, all of which were found technologically pos-
sible under the GEA-Efﬁ ciency conditions. To illustrate this high degree of supply-side 
ﬂ exibility and the feasibility to reach the GEA objectives under even restricted portfo-
lios, a pathway with a restriction for nuclear was selected as illustrative for the GEA-
Efﬁ ciency group of pathways. (2) The group of GEA-Mix pathways is intermediate 
with respect to many pathway characteristics (eg, energy demand and the required 
pace for the upscaling of supply-side options). A major characteristic of the Mix path-
ways, which distinguished this group from the others, is the diversity of options that 
contribute toward reaching the GEA objectives. This diversity is most pronounced in 
the GEA-Mix pathway that assumes restrictions for the electriﬁ cation of transport, 
and thus require a variety of “conventional transport” options to satisfy the increas-
ing demand for mobility. Hence, this pathway was selected as the illustrative case 
for the group of GEA-Mix pathways. (3) The GEA sustainability goals become out of 
reach in most of the GEA-Supply sensitivity cases with restricted supply-side options. 
The GEA-Supply pathways are thus characterized by the least supply-side ﬂ exibility, 
requiring the more rapid and pervasive upscaling of supply-side options compared 
to the other groups of pathways. To illustrate the limited supply-side ﬂ exibility and 
the need of rapid upscaling of supply-side options, an unrestricted portfolio case that 
allows all options to penetrate the market was selected as the illustrative pathways 
for GEA-Supply. 
 20  The reporting convention for primary energy in the GEA follows the substitution 
method. It cannot be overemphasized that for transition pathways towards a sus-
tainable energy future that imply fundamental change in the energy system, the 
accounting method can introduce a signiﬁ cant perception bias. A more detailed dis-
cussion of this issue can be found in  Chapter 1 . 
 21  It should be noted that the representation of solar energy in the IMAGE modeling 
framework is restricted to solar photovoltaic, which leads to signiﬁ cantly lower solar 
energy contributions in the IMAGE interpretation of the GEA pathways. For other 
forms of renewable energy, the differences between the IMAGE and MESSAGE inter-
pretations are much less pronounced. 
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 Figure 17.15 |  Development of primary energy supply in the three illustrative GEA pathways in both their MESSAGE (left-hand side) and IMAGE (right-hand side) 
interpretations. 
 Notes: Energy savings were calculated compared to hypothetical cases without climate or any other energy policies – the so-called counterfactuals – and are roughly compat-
ible with historical energy intensity improvements. 
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 The level of final energy use is very similar in the respective IMAGE  •
and MESSAGE interpretations of a particular GEA pathway, but due 
to the primary energy reporting convention adopted in this report – 
the substitution method (see  Chapter 1 for details) – the resulting 
primary energy supply mix appears very different across the two 
interpretations. 
 Specific characteristics of the illustrative GEA pathways are summarized 
below, followed by a more detailed discussion of the commonalties and 
choices across all pathways in the next section. 
 The illustrative   • GEA-Efficiency pathway features a strong emphasis on 
efficiency and a heavy reliance on renewable energy, with a share of 
between 50–90% of primary energy in the long term (2100). Nuclear 
is assumed to be phased out over the lifetime of existing capacities 
to reduce the proliferation risk, and CCS provides an optional bridge 
for the medium-term transition toward a renewables-based energy 
system. The strong emphasis on efficiency reduces the growth of 
energy demand over the course of the century by about a factor 
of 2 (see comparison of the GEA-Efficiency and GEA-Supply pathways 
in  Figure 17.15 ). This corresponds to roughly doubling the energy 
intensity improvement rate over historical experience and requires 
policies in the buildings sector to improve by a factor of 4 by 2050 
(a global retrofit rate of 3%/year); in the industry sector, it requires 
the rapid adoption of best available technology, retrofitting of exist-
ing plants, enhanced recycling, and lifecycle product design; in the 
transportation sector, it requires reducing energy demand through 
both aggressive efficiency standards (in both freight and passenger 
transport) and behavioral and lifestyle changes (a switch to public 
transport and the reduction of demand for private mobility).  Table 
17.11 recalls the relative contributions of different demand-side 
transformations in the illustrative GEA-Efficiency pathway, whose 
absence in the GEA-Supply pathways explains the higher primary 
energy supply trend. Although efficiency improvements make the 
largest contributions toward the lower levels of demand in the GEA-
Efficiency pathways, these are not viable without complementary 
policies and measures (including direct and indirect energy pricing) 
to mitigate demand for energy services. 
 The illustrative   • GEA-Supply pathway has a major focus on the rapid 
upscaling of all supply-side options. The more modest emphasis 
on energy efficiency and conservation leads to energy intensity 
improvement rates slightly above historical experience. Massive 
upscaling of R&D and deployment investments leads to the emer-
gence of new infrastructures and fuels (such as hydrogen vehicles 
in the transportation sector). Fossil CCS becomes an essential build-
ing block to decarbonize fossil fuels, and new nuclear power plants 
gain a significant market share after 2030. 22 A prerequisite of the 
GEA-Supply pathway is thus that the associated proliferation risks of 
weapons-grade fissile material are addressed successfully through, 
e.g., internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. Renewable energy 
contributes significantly in the long term, with bioenergy playing a 
more important role in the developing world while wind deployment 
is occuring in about half of today’s OECD countries. The role of other 
renewable energy sources is more heterogeneous in the two differ-
ent interpretations by MESSAGE and IMAGE. 
 The illustrative   • GEA-Mix pathway is intermediate with respect to 
many scenario characteristics, such as the focus on efficiency and the 
pace of supply transformation (i.e., upscaling of advanced and clean 
supply-side technologies). The main emphasis is on diversity of the 
energy supply mix, thus enhancing system resilience against innov-
ation failures or technology shocks. Large differences in regional imple-
mentation strategies reflect local choices and resource endowments. 
Whereas the absolute level of nuclear energy deployment is differ-
ent between the MESSAGE and IMAGE interpretations, the regional 
focus of its deployment is Asia in both frameworks where more than 
two thirds of new capacity is commissioned. In the MESSAGE inter-
pretation of the pathway, this results in the co-evolution of multiple 
fuels, particularly in the transport sector where, for example, second 
generation biofuels (in Latin America, Former Soviet Union, North 
America, and Pacific OECD), liquid fossil fuels with CCS (China and 
the Middle East), and electricity (which gains importance globally, 
although the generation portfolio differs significantly across regions) 
 22  In the illustrative GEA-Supply case nuclear energy grows to the level of 1850 GWe 
installed capacity, which is above the IAEA high projection of 1228 GWe, and the 
present (May 2011) level of 366 GWe of mostly relatively aged capacities. This 
 Table 17.11 |  Approaches to reducing energy demand in the GEA-Efﬁ ciency 
pathways. 
Approach
 Relative contribution to reducing 
 energy demand 
Residential 
and 
commercial 
sector
Transport 
sector
Industrial 
sector
Improvements in 
technological efﬁ ciency
High High High
Structural changes in the 
type of energy services 
demanded
Low Medium Low
Reductions in the level of 
energy services demanded
Low Medium Low
 level of expansion might be increasingly difﬁ cult to achieve in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima accident. In the past, nuclear growth has been below the IAEA’s high pro-
jection – and, until 2000, even below its low projections. The range of nuclear in the 
GEA pathways is similar to the ranges found in other studies in the peer-reviewed 
scenario literature. For example, the IPCC Report on Renewable Energy (Fischedick 
et al,  2011 ) has assessed the recent literature on mitigation scenarios. The nuclear 
deployment of the underlying scenarios was collated by Clarke and Krey (personal 
communication, 2012). An analysis of the underlying data shows that 25% of the 
137 mitigation scenarios assessed by the IPCC Report on Renewable Energy have 
higher nuclear deployment by 2050 than the GEA-Supply pathway. The lower bound 
of the GEA is representative of other low nuclear pathways from the literature that 
explore GHG mitigation in case of a nuclear phase-out. 
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gain importance in different regions. The same interpretation of the 
pathway using the IMAGE model shows less transport fuel diversi-
fication and feeds into a hydrogen-dominated transportation sector 
much as in the GEA-Supply storyline. The IMAGE interpretation, in 
turn, shows a stronger diversification of electricity generation and 
hydrogen production, particularly in the long term. 
 17.3.4.3  Commonalities and Choices across the GEA Pathways 
 Introduction 
 Despite major differences in the levels of energy demand and in the 
nature of transportation system transformation, the three illustrative 
GEA pathways share certain supply-side characteristics. All show a 
decarbonization of the supply mix away from conventional fossil fuels, 
particularly coal. All show an ever-increasing share of energy services 
demand being met by renewable energy, particularly by the end of the 
century. All show a substitution of traditional biomass for clean forms 
of bioenergy. 
 These commonalities are pervasive features of all the transition path-
ways for the global energy system toward the sustainability objectives. 
They can be interpreted as “musts” – that is, required elements of the 
supply-side transformation if the access, environmental, and security 
objectives are to be fulfilled. 
 In other areas, the three illustrative pathways have major points of 
difference. The most obvious, and the most influential, is the level of 
energy demand, which distinguishes the pathways by design. Emphasis 
on demand-side transformation varies massively between the GEA-
Efficiency pathways and the GEA-Supply pathways at the extremes. 
Another point of difference, again by design, is the nature of transform-
ation in the transportation sector, either Conventional, with an ongoing 
reliance on liquid fuels, or Advanced, a more radical departure from his-
torical trends and existing infrastructures and technologies. 
 These points of difference are analogous to broad, systemic choices 
about how and where to direct attention, investment, and policies in 
order to transform the energy system. None of the outcomes of these 
choices precludes a transition pathway that fulfills the GEA sustainabil-
ity objectives: all are therefore feasible within these normative bounds. 
However, the interdependencies within the energy system mean that 
choices made in one part of the system have potentially major enabling 
or constraining effects elsewhere. This was most clearly demonstrated in 
the comparison of the illustrative GEA-Efficiency and GEA-Supply path-
ways as to their degree of supply-side flexibility. 
 This section moves from an analysis of the three illustrative GEA path-
ways using both IMAGE and MESSAGE to the full suite of pathways, 
including those 41 feasible pathways based on additional MESSAGE 
analysis, to establish further commonalities and choices. These are 
organized in six related sections: the first three relate to the major 
energy conversion chains of electricity generation, the “other” conver-
sion sector (mainly liquid and gaseous fuels), and the upstream sector 
that supplies fuels; the other three relate to supply-side decarboniza-
tion, looking at low-carbon energy in general and CCS and bioenergy 
in particular. 
 Commonalities and Choices: Electricity Generation 
 The commonalities in primary energy supply with respect to decarbon-
ization also hold for electricity generation. First, across all GEA pathways, 
the fossil electricity generation technologies that dominate today’s sys-
tem are on the retreat. Second, low-carbon alternatives, taken together, 
grow across the board. As a group of supply-side options, these low-
carbon alternatives include fossil CCS, nuclear power, and renewable 
electricity generation. 
 Beyond these commonalities (which are largely intuitive given the chal-
lenge of climate stabilization), electricity generation has three further 
common features across all GEA pathways. First, conventional coal 
power generation has to decrease very soon, and by 2030 should not 
supply more electricity than today. This implies that new construction of 
coal power plants without CCS must stop, and that some existing plants 
will have to be retired prematurely or, if possible, retrofitted with CCS 
(see  Chapter 12 ,  Section 12.6.3 for a discussion of CCS retrofitting). 
 Second, gas power generation, mostly in combined-cycle configurations 
but also as gas turbines for load balancing, sees considerable growth 
until around 2030 and only thereafter faces a decline. This is also a 
commonality across most GEA pathways. In other words, whereas coal 
power without CCS must phase out rapidly, gas power can be consid-
ered a short- to medium-term bridge or transitional technology until 
longer-term options become more available at scale. 
 Third, renewable power technologies show significant increases com-
pared with the role they play in electricity generation today. This is clearly 
visible in  Figure 17.16 . This finding is consistent with a recent large-scale 
analysis of renewable energy in long-term transition scenarios by Krey 
and Clarke (2011). The GEA pathways analysis did not consider scenarios 
that exclude renewables completely, but limitations of various options 
were explored. Under these constraints, relatively mature technologies 
such as hydropower and onshore wind experience strong growth to 2030 
and to 2050, with limited variability between pathway groups. Solar 
photovoltaic and CSP 23 are more variable and show stronger deployment 
after 2030, although by 2020 the average deployment shows a multifold 
increase compared with today’s levels. Biomass and geothermal electri-
city generation show much lower deployment levels on average com-
pared with these other renewable technologies. 
 Three important points relating to these common trends in renewable 
power should be noted. First, even the lower end of market volumes 
 23  Note that IMAGE does not include CSP and therefore the above statement only 
refers to the MESSAGE interpretation of the pathways. 
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shown for 2020 will require effective and stable policy frameworks, 
extending those that are increasingly observed in the current situ-
ation. Second, deployment levels vary greatly by region according to 
local resource potentials. This is discussed further in  Section 17.3.4.4 . 
Third, increasing requirements of storage technologies are character-
istic for pathways with very high deployments of intermittent sources 
(wind, solar photovoltaic, and to a lesser extent CSP).This trend is more 
pronounced in the medium and long term,, when renewable energy 
become the dominant source of energy supply in some of the regions. 
Storage can be supplemented with demand-side management and/or 
so-called smart-grids. These requirements also depend on the availabil-
ity of negative carbon options (BioCCS and carbon sinks). If negative 
emissions technologies do not become available on large scale, more 
rapid early action, including larger contributions of wind and solar 
photovoltaic are needed. The same is true if nuclear power is excluded, 
with the slack taken up by intermittent renewable sources again. Like 
the renewables themselves, storage technologies are diverse, unevenly 
distributed (e.g., pumped storage hydropower), and in some cases less 
mature, more costly, and more dependent on new infrastructures (e.g., 
hydrogen electrolyzers and fuel cells) and business models. 
 Fossil CCS provides a bridge or transitional option for the power sector. 
However, in contrast to conventional gas power generation, this is not 
common to all pathways, as the most efficient pathways do not neces-
sarily include CCS. The most attractive option to combine with CCS in 
power generation is natural gas, with its cleaner fuel supply chains, lower 
upstream GHG emissions, higher conversion efficiencies, and significantly 
lower capital intensity. However, this is not entirely consistent with cur-
rent R&D activities, which are focused on coal power generation with CCS. 
The focus on coal is, in turn, driven by the relative cost and abundance of 
the resource, as well as concerns over dependence on imported gas. The 
global preference for gas with CCS is particularly weak in coal-rich regions 
such as China. Although bioenergy with CCS plays an increasingly import-
ant role under more stringent climate stabilization targets, the deploy-
ment focus can be in either the electricity or the synthetic fuels sector, 
depending on the overall system configuration (on advanced designs of 
BioCCS technologies see also  Chapter 11 ,  Section 11.3 ). 
 The major choice in terms of supply-side flexibility to emerge from the 
pathways analysis relates to nuclear power. Nuclear energy can become 
one of the central sources of electricity generation by 2050, and it is 
among the supply-side options with the highest deployment across all 
GEA pathways. Such a development can only materialize if effective 
technological, institutional, governance, and legal frameworks are intro-
duced to avoid present risks of nuclear energy, including in particular the 
risk of proliferation. It is thus important to emphasize that in all path-
ways nuclear power can also be fully phased out after 2060, with no new 
plants built after 2020. The global “choice” of excluding nuclear power 
from the supply mix has implications for energy costs, as do any of the 
other restricted portfolio options (as, by definition, the unrestricted port-
folio has the lowest cost). This is discussed further in  Section 17.3.5 . 
 Some of the trends observed between 2030 and 2050 in  Figure 17.16 
continue into the second half of the century, namely, considerable 
growth in electricity generation from solar and wind energy as well as 
nuclear power. On the other hand, fossil fuel-generated electricity with 
CCS tends to decline again toward the end of the century, because of 
non-negligible GHG emissions in the entire fuel supply chain. 
 Commonalities and Choices: Liquid and Gaseous Fuels 
 Today the processing of liquid and gaseous fuels is a very different 
energy conversion chain than the generation of electricity from primary 
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Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development Chapter 17
1244
energy sources, as it is almost entirely dominated by oil products. Only 
about 1.3% of liquid fuel production – about 2.2 EJ out of a total of 
about 165 EJ in 2007 (IEA,  2009b ) – originates from biofuels. In addition, 
this minor biofuel contribution is regionally very heterogeneous and is 
essentially dominated by Brazil, the United States, and the European 
Union, all of which have specific biofuel policies in place. As a result, in 
the left-hand panel of  Figure 17.17 , which shows the situation by 2030, 
the contribution of oil refining is still outside the range of the figure (oil 
products contribute between 100 and 200 EJ in 2030), while all other 
technologies contribute less than 20 EJ, even in the most extreme case. 
The first major commonality, therefore, is the short-to-medium term 
dominance of oil in the production of liquid and gaseous fuels as energy 
carriers destined primarily for the transportation sector. 
 The second commonality is that in the medium term, the biofuel con-
tribution grows substantially. This occurs in regions that already have 
supportive policies in place, as well as in regions with advantageous 
conditions for biofeedstock production (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa and 
Australia/New Zealand). By 2030, the range will be somewhere between 
today’s level and approximately 20 EJ, which corresponds to almost a 
10-fold increase over 20 years. The higher end of this range is driven by 
transportation sector assumptions: the higher deployment range typic-
ally comes from scenario variations with a Conventional Transportation 
setup. Nevertheless, even in the transformation process under an 
Advanced Transportation setup, biofuels play an important transitional 
role, and in the very long term (beyond 2050), liquid biofuels may still 
have an important role in, for example, aviation and heavy freight trans-
port. Once second-generation biofuel technologies become available at 
a larger scale, sometime between 2020 and 2030, a continued diversifi-
cation of biofuel production is foreseen. 
 Unlike liquid biofuels, the potential substitution of oil products with syn-
thetic fuels from natural gas (gas-to-liquid conversion) is a choice rather 
than a common feature across all pathways. However, this depends on 
related choices made with respect to CCS. 24 Coal-to-liquid conversion, 
on the other hand, plays a less important role at the global scale even 
with CCS, except in regions with abundant coal resources. 
 In terms of gaseous fuel production, biomass gasification will be limited 
even in 2050 (depending on the choices made with respect to bioenergy 
production), although it could be readily integrated into existing nat-
ural gas infrastructures. The major choices with respect to gaseous fuels 
concern hydrogen; but again, these depend on the choices made with 
respect to Conventional versus Advanced Transportation systems and, 
within the latter, whether electricity or hydrogen is the preferred route 
(although hydrogen can also supply some industrial applications). If the 
build-up of a hydrogen-only infrastructure turns out to be too ambi-
tious, the injection of hydrogen into the gas grid is a favorable (relatively 
low-cost) option that helps reduce direct CO 2 emissions in the end-use 
sectors (Riahi and Roehrl,  2000 ; Midilli et al.,  2005 ; NATURALHY,  2010 ). 
If it is derived from fossil fuels, however, hydrogen is an attractive option 
only in combination with CCS. In the longer term its predominant source 
would be nuclear or renewable energy. In the latter case, hydrogen elec-
trolyzers would offer the opportunity to deal with the intermittency of 
wind and solar electricity and thus serve as a storage technology (Sherif 
et al.,  2005 ; Yang,  2008 ). 
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 Figure 17.17 |  Deployment of liquid and gaseous fuel production technologies in 2030 and 2050 in the GEA pathways. Boxes represent interquartile (25th-75th percentile) 
ranges, and horizontal lines within boxes represent medians of all feasible GEA pathways from MESSAGE and IMAGE. Error bars indicate the full range across all feasible 
pathways. 
 24  CCS is usually a low cost add-on for gas-to-liquid and coal-to-liquid technologies 
because one of the predominant processes, Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, produces a 
concentrated CO 2 stream that can be captured at little extra cost (see  Chapter 12 ). 
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 Commonalities and Choices: Fossil Resource Extraction 
 Currently the upstream sector is dominated by fossil fuel extraction, 
most importantly oil but increasingly natural gas and coal, which has 
seen considerable expansion over the last several years, largely driven 
by significant price increases for hydrocarbons. Compared with these 
three groups of fossil fuels, renewable energy sources, such as purpose-
grown bioenergy as well as agricultural residues and byproducts from 
other uses of biomass feedstock (e.g., in paper and pulp production), 
are small today. 
 However, it needs to be emphasized that the sustainability goals built 
into the GEA scenario, in particular the climate target, put limitations 
on the use of fossil fuels. This implies that resource limitations for fossil 
fuels are generally not a concern for the GEA pathways ( Figure 17.18 ). 
Therefore, the pathways in general show peak oil and gas behavior, 
however, not because of the assumed physical scarcity of hydrocarbons, 
but because of the limited carbon emission budgets under, for example, 
the 2°C target (see also Verbruggen and Al Marchohi,  2010 ). 
 The extraction of conventional hydrocarbons lies within a smaller range 
than that of the unconventional categories, 25 largely because they still 
play an important role during the energy transition over the coming 
decades. The largest part of the ranges in oil and gas extraction shown 
in  Figure 17.18 is due to variations in the deployment of unconventional 
resources, which tend to play a significant role only under specific condi-
tions because of their relatively more energy- and emissions-intensive 
extraction processes. Unconventional oil plays a limited role in the GEA-
Efficiency group of pathways and in the unrestricted portfolio pathways 
with the Advanced Transportation option of both the GEA-Mix and the 
GEA-Supply pathway groups, because here the transition away from oil 
to other fuels is permissible at a steadier pace (see  Section 17.3.3.3 ). In 
contrast, unconventional gas extraction is most relevant in the GEA-Mix 
and GEA-Supply groups of pathways under the No Nuclear and Limited 
Renewables pathways, where CCS is elevated in importance compared 
with the unrestricted supply portfolio. 
 Coal extraction declines significantly over the next couple of decades 
across almost all transition pathways. However, after 2030, when CCS 
could become available at a larger scale, two distinct developments are 
possible, leading to a very wide range of possible levels of coal extrac-
tion by 2050. If CCS is excluded as a supply-side option, which is a 
possibility under the GEA-Mix and GEA-Efficiency groups of pathways, 
then coal extraction has to almost completely disappear by the middle 
of the century. On the other hand, if CCS can be successfully deployed at 
scale, a revival of coal extraction, reaching current levels and even going 
beyond, is an option. The absolute level depends on overall demand: in 
general, coal extraction is highest in the GEA-Supply group of pathways, 
followed by the GEA-Mix and the GEA-Efficiency groups. 
 Commonalities and Choices: Low-Carbon Energy Shares 
 Figure 17.19 shows low-carbon energy shares for total primary energy 
supply, electricity generation, and final energy demand (overall and in 
the transportation sector) in 2020, 2030, and 2050 for the different 
energy demand levels of the three GEA pathway groups. At the primary 
energy level and in electricity generation, nuclear energy, renewables, 
and fossil with CCS are counted as low-carbon energy. At the final 
energy level, fuels without direct CO 2 emissions (i.e., electricity, district 
heat, and hydrogen) as well as solid biomass and biofuels are counted 
as low-carbon energy. 26 
 One important finding shown clearly by  Figure 17.19 is that the low-
carbon energy share is consistently lowest in the GEA-Efficiency group 
of pathways. From a climate perspective, what matters is not the share 
of GHG-emitting fuels but the absolute amount of emissions. Therefore, 
at a lower level of total energy demand, the share of GHG-emitting fuels 
can obviously be higher (see  Section 17.5.1 on climate change). 
 A consequence is that the required speed of decarbonization is very 
ambitious under the GEA-Supply pathways with high energy demand; 
up to a doubling of the low-carbon energy share is needed within the 
decade to 2020. In the GEA-Efficiency pathways, a less aggressive 
decarbonization of global primary energy supply is permissible. Across 
all pathways, 60–90% of primary energy supply has to come from low-
carbon sources by 2050. 27 
 By far the most complete decarbonization has to be achieved in elec-
tricity generation; the threshold is in the range of 40–60% globally by 
2020, starting from today’s share of around 35%, largely due to nuclear 
and hydropower. By 2050 almost full decarbonization of electricity gener-
ation (80–100%) is required. This implies the need for a continued expan-
sion of renewable electricity generation and of nuclear power, or a rapid 
commercial deployment of CCS, or both (see the discussion in  Section 
17.3.4.3 ). Financing for these mostly very capital intensive technologies 
( Section 17.3.5 ) and technology transfer mechanisms to enable deploy-
ment in developing countries ( Section 17.5.1.4 ) are major challenges. 
 At the final energy level, the transition appears less challenging, at least in 
the short term. However, traditional biomass is included as a low-carbon 
energy source, accounting for some 30 EJ or about 10% of final energy 
 25  The deﬁ nition of conventional and unconventional hydrocarbon resources used here 
follows Rogner ( 1997 ). For a comprehensive discussion of the difﬁ culties in the distinc-
tion of conventional and unconventional hydrocarbons see  Chapter 7 ,  Section 7.2 . 
 26  Note that the latter deﬁ nition implies the assumption that the generation of electricity, 
heat, and hydrogen is decarbonized to a large extent, although in a transition period 
(in particular 2020–2030) signiﬁ cant carbon emissions in the conversion sector may be 
implied. In addition, it is noted that biomass and liquid biofuels cause direct CO 2 emis-
sions, but if derived from sustainably grown biomass their lifecycle carbon emissions 
can become close to zero or even negative (in combination with CCS). 
 27  These values are comparable with those from a study conducted by O’Neill et al. 
( 2010b ) that systematically analyzes mid-century targets for keeping long-term cli-
mate stabilization options open. O’Neill et al. ( 2010b ) identify low-carbon primary 
energy shares above about 65% by 2050 to achieve a similar probability (>60% 
based on uniform prior climate sensitivity probability density function by Forest et 
al. ( 2002 )); see  Section 17.5.1 on climate change for details on staying below 2°C 
warming by 2100 compared with preindustrial levels. 
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use in 2005. The energy access objective requires that traditional biomass 
be replaced with cleaner energy forms; in this light, the decarbonization 
challenge with respect to final energy demand becomes clearer. 
 In the transportation sector, the threshold level of a less than 10% low-
carbon energy share to be reached by 2020 appears relatively modest 
compared with the low-carbon fuel shares in the other sectors, although 
it has to be kept in mind that the starting point is close to zero at pre-
sent. Also, this required development is opposite to the historically 
observed downward trend in the share of public and rail-bound freight 
transport (see  Chapter 18 ,  Section 18.6.3 ). By 2050, low-carbon energy 
shares in transport have to reach a range of 35–75%, depending on the 
demand level. 
 Commonalities and Choices: CO 2 Capture and Storage 
 In those pathways that do not exclude CCS as an option, considerable 
amounts of CO 2 would need to be stored between 2020 and 2030, quickly 
rising to 2050, by which time cumulative storage needs to be no less than 
55 GtCO 2 and closer to 250 GtCO 2 . The bulk of this would come from fossil 
CCS (see above); bioenergy in combination with CCS takes off only around 
2040 but increases its contribution in the latter half of the century. 
 By mid-century, cumulative CO 2 storage is strongly determined by the 
demand level, with relatively little overlap across the high, intermediate, 
and low demand levels that are assumed in the GEA-Supply, GEA-Mix, 
and GEA-Efficiency pathway groups, respectively ( Figure 17.20 ). This 
observation accords well with the fact that under low demand, the need 
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for CCS is even independent of the transportation sector setup; that is, 
CCS is a choice, not a “must.” 
 The above figure for global CO 2 storage by 2100 is compatible with the 
best estimate of 2000 GtCO 2 storage capacity, as presented in the IPCC 
Special Report on CCS (IPCC,  2005 ), although a few cases come close 
to this estimate: the GEA-Supply and GEA-Mix pathways with limited 
renewable energy and those without nuclear energy and the IMAGE 
interpretations of these two pathways that generally rely to a greater 
extent on CCS than their MESSAGE counterparts. In these cases, the 
demands placed on CCS would rely on the more optimistic storage esti-
mates – including saline aquifers, in particular – to materialize, which 
is supported by more recent studies (see  Chapter 13 ,  Section 13.4.3 on 
CO 2 storage estimates). The high levels of storage and the continued 
growth toward the end of the century are mostly due to bioenergy with 
CCS; fossil CCS is generally a bridge technology for application within 
the medium term, although in the absence of other mitigation options it 
may have to serve throughout the entire century. 28 
 Commonalities and Choices: Bioenergy and Land 
 The range of bioenergy used in the GEA pathways reaches up to almost 
150 EJ by 2050 and 225 EJ by 2100 (in the IMAGE and MESSAGE mod-
els). A considerable part of this energy is assumed to be supplied from 
residues, thus conforming to sustainability criteria.  Figure 17.21 shows 
the use of bioenergy in the three illustrative GEA pathways, set within 
the broader context of bioenergy estimates from a range of modeling 
studies exploring increasingly stringent climate change stabilization tar-
gets. As is immediately evident, all three illustrative pathways show a 
similarly high use of bioenergy on the order of 150 EJ in 2050, rising to 
around 225 EJ in 2100 unless bioenergy use is further restricted. 
 The main commonality, therefore, with respect to bioenergy is its increas-
ing role in the global energy system. Most studies using energy scenarios 
under stringent climate policy targets show that it is attractive to use 
bioenergy as a feedstock to create biofuels, electric power, or hydrogen, 
possibly in combination with CCS. Bioenergy might also be attractive as 
a feedstock for the production of materials. The impacts of this increased 
bioenergy production depend on several factors. First and foremost, first-
generation bioenergy production routes may lead to extensive land use 
(either directly or indirectly) and are therefore likely to have negative 
impacts on biodiversity and food security. These impacts are expected to 
be considerably less for second-generation biofuels and electricity gener-
ation feedstocks (Dornburg and Faaij,  2005 ). However, second-generation 
bioenergy could also lead to significant GHG emissions. In the longer term, 
biomass can also play an essential role in achieving low GHG concentra-
tion targets by making negative emissions a possibility if combined with 
CCS. Nevertheless, the potential impacts of bioenergy on other policy and 
sustainability objectives imply that additional policies and strict monitor-
ing of bioenergy and its land use implications will be necessary. 
 A key factor associated with bioenergy expansion relates to the avail-
ability of land. 29 As the GEA pathways use similar levels of bioenergy 
(see  Figure 17.21 ), the illustrative GEA-Mix pathway is used here to 
indicate relevant trends in land use and food production. 
 As shown in  Figure 17.22 , grassland use (pastures) in the GEA-Mix pathway 
is more or less stable. This is the result of two opposing trends: an increase 
in meat consumption and an intensification of animal husbandry. The use 
of cropland for food production in the GEA-Mix pathway is expected to 
increase slowly up to 2050 and then stabilize. The land use trends for food 
production in the GEA pathways are therefore within, but somewhat on 
the low side of, the range of projections in the literature, which typically 
show a 0–40% increase (see, for instance, van Vuuren et al.,  2009 ). 
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 28  Even these high levels will need to be phased out some time during the ﬁ rst half 
of the 22nd century to avoid atmospheric CO 2 concentrations falling below pre-
industrial levels, which appears to be neither desirable nor justiﬁ able based on 
the argument that dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system 
should be avoided. In addition, within this time frame storage capacity could become 
a problem even at the global level. 
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 29  The IMAGE modeling framework was used to assess the land use implications of the 
GEA pathways. 
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 The increase in modern bioenergy use in the GEA scenarios implies 
an increase in land use for bioenergy production. The exact amount 
of land used depends strongly on assumed yield increases (see the 
electronic appendix to this chapter) and the types of bioenergy that 
are used. Still, as most other studies (e.g., van Vuuren et al.,  2010 ) 
have found, bioenergy remains a relatively small category compared 
with other forms of land use. At the same time, the increase in land 
for bioenergy production in the GEA pathways is about equal to the 
total increase in agricultural land use. This implies that increases in 
global land use will lead to some further biodiversity loss and land 
scarcity. In the context of the GEA sustainability objectives, it will thus 
be particularly important that policies be put in place that can avoid a 
strongly adverse impact on crop prices (or the risk of such impacts in 
a situation of sharply rising energy prices). 
 17.3.4.4  Regional Analysis of the GEA Pathways 
 Thus far, the discussion of the GEA pathways has focused predominantly 
on the transition at the global scale, with regional issues raised in only 
a few cases. The following sections present explicit regional detail. The 
starting point of the analysis is energy demand, which starts from a 
very heterogeneous basis and is tightly linked to economic develop-
ment in the different regions. On the supply side, three different topics 
with important regional implications are highlighted: renewable energy 
deployment, bioenergy use and related land use issues, and CCS, which 
links fossil energy resources and geological CO 2 storage potential. 
 This regional analysis is limited in scope and usually remains at the 
level of illustrative examples rather than being fully comprehensive. Full 
regional detail of the quantitative GEA scenario analysis is, however, 
available in the web-based GEA scenario database at www.iiasa.ac.at/
web-apps/ene/geadb (see also  Box 17.2 on scenario development). 
 Regional Analysis of Energy Demand 
 A core concern of the GEA transition pathways is to explore strategies 
to overcome the current, extremely inequitable distribution of incomes 
and the associated lack of access to clean and efficient energy services 
worldwide, while at the same time improving the environmental per-
formance of energy end use and supply. This illustrates the compre-
hensive nature of the GEA transition pathways under the three main 
dimensions of sustainability: economic, social, and environmental. 
 This discussion illustrates some generic patterns in the regional devel-
opment of energy demand in the GEA transition pathways. In an ideal 
case, such an analysis would first of all concentrate on actual levels of 
energy services provided to people, as the ultimate driver of energy sys-
tems. However, the diversity of energy end uses and their correspond-
ingly different metrics (thermal comfort, distances traveled, industrial 
output, etc.) do not allow their aggregation into a commensurable 
uniform metric. Therefore, this section focuses on final energy demand, 
which has the advantage of being well covered by current statistics and 
available modeling and scenario methodologies. 
 Figure 17.23 summarizes per capita final energy demand as of 2005 as well 
as the situation in 2050 for the three illustrative GEA transition pathways. 
Final energy demand is disaggregated by major end-use application type: 
residential and commercial, industrial, and transportation. For the scen-
ario projections to 2050, an additional efficiency (improvement) potential 
(grey shaded areas in the bottom panel of  Figure 17.23 ) is shown, corre-
sponding to the difference in final energy use between the lowest energy 
demand scenario, that of the illustrative GEA-Efficiency pathway, and the 
more supply-side-focused illustrative GEA-Supply pathway. All three GEA 
transition pathways achieve comparable levels of energy services provi-
sion. Their different levels of final energy use do not represent a difference 
in energy demand proper, but rather a difference in the efficiency with 
which comparable levels of energy demand can be provided. These levels 
of efficiency of energy end use across pathways can be compared with 
current levels as ranging from efficient (GEA-Supply) to extremely effi-
cient (GEA-Efficiency). For greater legibility,  Figure 17.23 summarizes the 
scenarios for only six of the 11 GEA world regions. 
 The current disparities in income and energy use across low-income 
(Africa and South Asia), middle-income (Latin America), and high-
income countries (Western Europe and North America) are immediately 
apparent, as are important differences in the structure of final energy 
use (a very low industry share in Africa versus a high share in China and 
Centrally Planned Asia) and the much greater importance of transport 
energy use in North America than in Latin America. The figure also dem-
onstrates the importance of energy end-use efficiency: Western Europe 
and North America currently enjoy comparable levels of income, but 
Western Europe uses only about half as much final energy per capita. 
 The world in 2050 will look decidedly different from today when viewed 
through the lens of the GEA transition pathways. Current distinctions 
between low- and higher-income countries will be largely obsolete, as 
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even the regions with the lowest per capita incomes today (sub- Saharan 
Africa and South Asia) will have advanced to lower-middle-income lev-
els (annual per capita incomes in 2005 dollars of US$5000–10,000), 
while other developing regions (Centrally Planned Asia and China, Latin 
America and the Caribbean) will have attained middle-class incomes 
and lifestyles (US$15,000–20,000) characteristic of the affluent OECD 
countries in the 1990s. The GEA transition pathways thus describe a pat-
tern of conditional convergence in incomes. This tendency is even more 
pronounced when one considers that corresponding final energy use 
per capita remains below roughly 50 GJ per capita across all currently 
developing regions and transition pathways, because of significant 
improvements in energy end-use efficiency that combine appropri-
ate policies at the local to regional scale with globalized availability 
of energy-efficient technologies and devices. Nor will the potential for 
improvement have been exhausted even by 2050, as indicated by the 
scenario differences between the GEA-Efficiency and the GEA-Supply 
pathways. 
 Undeniably, the biggest transition challenge will face today’s high-
income OECD countries, above all in North America. The much-discussed 
“factor 4” (see von Weizs ä cker et al.,  1997 ) – a simultaneous doubling 
of income and halving of energy use – characterizes the GEA-Efficiency 
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 Figure 17.23 |  Per capita ﬁ nal energy use and income for selected world regions in 2005 (top panel) and in the illustrative GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathway in 2050 (bottom panel). 
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pathway for this region. Although challenging, such a major transition 
both is technologically feasible by 2050 (see  Section 17.3.2.1 ), consider-
ing historical rates of capital turnover, and entails significant benefits in 
terms of increasing energy security, improving local and regional envir-
onments, and avoiding damages from climate change. Compared with 
these benefits, the required adjustments in energy end-use patterns and 
lifestyles (toward more energy- efficient, more compact vehicles and 
greater use of high-quality public transit) will be either modest or non-
existent (e.g., in the case of zero-energy homes that do not compromise 
living space and comfort). 
 The biggest challenge revealed by the transition pathways faces not 
consumers, who can confidently expect expanded and improved levels 
of energy services in the future, but rather entrepreneurs and policy-
makers. They need to embrace decidedly different views from those 
widely held today, focusing on energy services provision rather than 
mistakenly viewing technology- and policy-dependent levels of pri-
mary energy use as immutable, given consumer demand. Policymakers 
must also embark on different policies that combine both carrots and 
sticks in order to include stricter building, appliance, and vehicle effi-
ciency standards and changes in relative prices through taxes, sub-
sidies, feed-in tariffs, and other measures. This would open up new 
business opportunities (e.g., for energy services companies), thereby 
creating new markets (e.g., for efficiency technologies) and leveraging 
the power of market forces to meet social concerns and public policy 
choices. 
 Regional Analysis of Renewable Energy Sources 
 Renewable energy sources play an important role in essentially all GEA 
transition pathways, as discussed at length in  Section 17.3.3 . Even 
under the Limited Bioenergy and Limited Renewables pathways (see 
 Table 17.9 ), renewable energy sources reach some 40% of total global 
primary energy supply by 2050. Regionally, however, the contribution 
of renewables varies considerably, as  Table 17.12 illustrates for 2050. 
Several reasons deserve mentioning in this context. First, the resource 
supply curves (i.e., technical potential as well as resource quality) for 
the various renewable energy sources differ significantly across regions 
(see  Box 17.3 and the electronic appendix to this chapter). Second, 
the availability of low-carbon supply-side alternatives (nuclear energy 
and fossil CCS), which ultimately determine the economic potential 
for renewable energy sources, is also strongly region dependent. Third, 
the tradability of renewable energies or of secondary energy carriers 
derived from them is very heterogeneous. Whereas liquid biofuels are 
easy to trade and can even rely on existing infrastructures, the scope 
for trading electricity (e.g., from wind, solar photovoltaic and CSP, and 
hydropower) at the global scale is much more limited, and for heat 
(e.g., solar thermal, geothermal), trade is not an option at all. This 
generally leads to higher exploitation rates of bioenergy potentials 
than of other renewables. For example, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America, with the largest sustainable bioenergy potentials, export sig-
nificant quantities of liquid biofuels starting after 2020 across almost 
all GEA pathways. 
 Table 17.12 |  Ranges of renewable energy deployments across GEA Pathways, by region, 2050 (in Exajoules unless otherwise stated). 
Region Bioenergy Hydropower Wind Solar 1 Geothermal All renewables
All renewables 
as % of total
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.8–40.5 2.0–5.5 0.0–19.6 0.5–25.5 0.0–0.3 11.4–91.4 31–94
Centrally Planned Asia 
and China
6.9–24.7 9.7–10.3 3.7–8.8 0.9–40.1 0.0–0.3 21.2–84.2 24–50
Eastern Europe 1.3–2.8 0.8–1.0 0.7–5.0 0.2–6.1 0.0–0.3 2.9–15.3 23–85
Former Soviet Union 2.9–10.1 2.7–15.8 1.4–7.4 0.3–9.7 0.0–1.0 7.4–43.9 25–93
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
10.5–22.5 10.7–17.6 3.6–12.4 0.5–21.8 0.0–1.8 25.3–76.1 40–100
Middle East and North 
Africa
1.2–5.1 0.8–1.2 1.3–8.7 0.5–15.8 0.0–0.3 3.8–31.1 17–40
North America 10.0–21.5 7.2–7.9 2.6–36.7 1.2–41.6 0.0–3.4 21–111 38–89
Paciﬁ c OECD 3.4–11.3 1.4–1.7 0.6–4.9 0.2–5.4 0.1–0.8 5.7–24 26–89
Paciﬁ c Asia 5.0–11.9 1.9–7.2 1.0–2.0 0.4–14.5 0.2–1.3 8.6–36.9 15–63
South Asia 5.2–20.8 3.5–4.3 1.1–6.7 1.0–79.0 0.0–0.2 10.7–111 21–65
Western Europe 3.9–11.0 5.7–7.6 3.0–30.2 0.7–28.9 0.1–2.1 13.4–79.8 34–83
World 78.3–139 49.9–80.1 28.5–134 7–285 0.6–11.9 164–651 28–74
 Note: Ranges include restricted supply portfolios and are calculated as primary energy supply using the substitution method. 
 1  The representation of solar energy in the IMAGE modeling framework is restricted to solar photovoltaic, which leads to signiﬁ cantly lower solar energy contributions in the IMAGE 
interpretation of the GEA pathways that typically mark the lower end of solar deployment in this table. 
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 Beyond bioenergy, the relative contribution of the other renewable 
energy sources varies considerably. In regions with advantageous wind 
conditions, such as North America and Europe, wind power becomes 
the largest or second-largest source in terms of secondary energy pro-
vided. In most other regions, by 2050 solar energy can become the 
dominant renewable energy source. 30 Hydropower continues to provide 
a sizeable share in North America, Latin America, Europe, the Former 
Soviet Union countries, Centrally Planned Asia and China, and Pacific 
Asia. Geothermal energy deployment is less pronounced globally and 
most relevant in North America, Western Europe, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Pacific Asia, in that order (see  Chapter 7 ,  Section 7.4.5 ). 
 The largest variation in deployment across GEA pathways naturally 
occurs for those renewable energy sources that are explicitly con-
strained in the restricted supply portfolio analysis: bioenergy, wind, and 
solar. For hydropower, deployment ranges tend to be narrower, with a 
few exceptions. The role of renewable energies generally varies greatly 
across regions. However, two points are worth noting. First, sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America have the highest renewables deployments by 
2050, which, even at the lower end, means that about 40% of primary 
energy supply comes from renewables; this rises to more than 90% if 
other supply options are not available. These high shares are related 
to the bioenergy potentials in these regions not being solely exploited 
for domestic use, but also being converted to liquid biofuels for export. 
Second, all of the Asian regions lie toward the lower end of the spec-
trum, with renewable shares of typically less than 50% by 2050. This is 
primarily due to those regions’ high population density and to potential 
land use and other conflicts that limit, for example, their sustainable 
bioenergy or wind energy potential. 
 Regional Analysis of Bioenergy and Land Use 
 The use of bioenergy is expected to lead to an expansion of agricultural 
land. As  Figure 17.24 (which is meant only for illustration purposes) sug-
gests, this expansion may occur in many parts of the world. In today’s 
high-income regions such as Europe, North America, and Russia, the 
GEA-Mix pathway shows a small decrease in agricultural area leading 
to land abandonment. This decrease in land use results from a stabilizing 
population, further increases in yields, and increasing food imports. The 
pathway thus shows that some land could be abandoned for agricul-
tural purposes, to be compensated for by the expansion of agricultural 
land in low-income areas. These abandoned agricultural areas are used 
in the GEA-Mix scenario for bioenergy production, which also provides 
alternative rural income. 
 Land use for production is also expected to expand in low-income 
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. 
Here, an important driver is relatively low production costs. Again, this 
opens up routes for bioenergy production.  Figure 17.24 shows import-
ant bioenergy production areas developing in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa (which also retain vast forest areas). The trends in the 
other GEA pathways are broadly comparable to those shown here and 
are therefore not discussed in detail. 
 Regional Analysis of CCS 
 As discussed in previous sections, the role of CCS is very heterogeneous 
in the electricity and liquid and gaseous fuel sectors as well as across 
the globe. Regionally, the situation depends on available alternatives 
such as nonbiomass renewable energy sources, but it depends even 
more so on the resource basis and costs of fossil fuels and bioenergy. As 
a result, the amount of CO 2 captured and stored, or shipped to appropri-
ate storage elsewhere, also varies widely.  Figure 17.25 shows regional 
cumulative CO 2 storage over the century in the three illustrative GEA 
pathways in their IMAGE and MESSAGE interpretations. 
 The regions with the highest storage volumes are those with large coal 
resources and correspondingly high utilization of coal with CCS (Centrally 
Planned Asia and China), large bioenergy potential (sub- Saharan Africa), 
a combination of the two (North America) or a lack of alternatives 
(South Asia). Regional CO 2 storage potentials reported in the literature 
(see  Chapter 13 ,  Section 13.4.3 ; IPCC,  2005 ; and Hendriks et al.,  2004 ) 
indicate that in some regions, storage beyond the best estimate may be 
needed under the higher CCS deployment levels derived in the present 
analysis. 31 Particularly difficult is the situation in South Asia, where even 
the comparatively modest need for CO 2 storage under conditions of low 
demand comes close to the higher estimate by Hendriks et al., ( 2004 ). It 
must be acknowledged that the global best estimate of Hendriks et al. 
( 2004 ), about 1660 GtCO 2 , is almost 20% lower than the best estimate 
of the IPCC Special Report on CCS (IPCC,  2005 ) published shortly after-
ward. The overview of CO 2 storage estimates presented in  Chapter 13 , 
 Section 13.4.3 indicates that uncertainties of storage estimates in saline 
aquifers – potentially the largest storage option by far, with up to more 
than 20,000 GtCO 2 at the global scale – are very large and that reliable 
estimates at the regional level are often missing. 
 17.3.5  Energy Investments 
 Having presented the main transformational changes of the GEA pathways, 
the discussion moves now to financial resources, and specifically to the 
energy investments that need to be mobilized to transform the system. 
 An important characteristic of the energy sector is its long-lived capital 
stock, with lifetimes for infrastructure and energy conversion facilities of 
 30  Note that this only holds for the MESSAGE interpretation of the GEA pathways 
because the representation of solar energy in the IMAGE modeling framework is 
restricted to solar photovoltaic, which leads to signiﬁ cantly lower solar energy con-
tributions in the IMAGE interpretation of the GEA pathways. 
 31  Because of the large uncertainties in the regional CO 2 storage potentials, no expli-
cit limitations were imposed in the scenario generation process with the MESSAGE 
model, whereas IMAGE explicitly includes limitations for CO 2 storage based. This 
section presents an ex post comparison of storage needs in the GEA pathways with 
ranges from the literature undertaken here. 
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30–60 years and sometimes longer. This longevity translates into high 
inertia in energy supply systems, which impedes rapid transformation. The 
energy investment decisions of the next several years are thus of central 
importance, since they will have long-lasting implications and will critically 
shape the direction of the energy transition path for many years to come. 
 17.3.5.1  Present Energy Investments 
 To put energy sector investment into context, it is helpful to first com-
pare current worldwide energy investment with overall economic activity. 
Following a detailed, bottom-up cost calculation for the entire energy sec-
tor, from resource extraction (e.g., coal mining, oil wells) through develop-
ment and production to delivery and transmission, as well as accounting 
for historical capacity extensions (and replacement schedules), the pre-
sent study estimates total global supply-side investment in 2010 at about 
US$960 billion. 32 This corresponds to about 2% of global GDP that, while 
a relatively small share, varies greatly among countries at different stages 
of economic development. At 3.5% of GDP on average, energy invest-
ments are a much larger part of the economy in the developing world 
than in the industrialized world, where they average 1.3% of GDP. 
 Understanding the order of magnitude of demand-side investments 
is of critical importance, particularly because the lifetimes of end-use 
technologies can be considerably shorter than those on the supply side. 
 Figure 17.24 |  Land uses in 2000 and in the illustrative GEA-Mix pathway in 2100. 
 32  The calculations of present and future investments rely on estimates from the sys-
tems engineering MESSAGE model, which includes a detailed vintage structure and 
information on the development of historical capacities. All monetary values are 
given in 2005 US dollars at market exchange rates unless stated otherwise. 
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Demand-side investments might thus play an important role in achiev-
ing pervasive and rapid improvements in the system. Following the ana-
lysis of  Chapter 24 , around US$300 billion is additionally invested in 
energy components at the service level, such as engines in cars, boil-
ers in building heating systems, and compressors, fans, and heating 
elements in large household appliances. Demand-side investments are, 
however, subject to considerable uncertainty due to a lack of reliable 
statistics and difficulties in clearly defining what constitutes a purely 
energy-related investment.  Chapter 24 thus reports a relatively wide 
range of energy component investments on the demand side of about 
US$100 billion to US$700 billion. In addition, accounting for the full cost 
of demand-side energy technologies (not only the energy components) 
would increase investment (but also uncertainty) by about an order of 
magnitude, to about US$1700 billion (with a range of US$1000 billion 
to US$3500 billion; see  Chapter 24 for more details). 
 Uncertainties are considerably smaller for total supply-side investment. 
The estimates presented here are, for instance, similar to those of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA,  2009b ). 33 There is nonetheless some 
uncertainty about investment in specific technologies, such as nuclear 
power. The estimates used for this study include about US$5 billion of 
investment into approximately 2 GW of new nuclear capacity additions 
worldwide. In addition, proportional investment in ongoing construction 
of about 43 GW capacity and investments in fuel processing and life-
time extensions are taken into account. These categories are subject to 
relatively more uncertainty, but they account for the bulk of total invest-
ment in nuclear by up to US$40 billion. 
 Figure 17.26 summarizes present investment for individual supply-side 
sectors. Investments are most capital intensive in the power sector, 
which includes generation, transmission, and distribution. This sec-
tor thus accounts for about 42% of total investment, with generation 
(US$270 billion) accounting for about the same share as transmission 
or distribution (US$260 billion). The remaining supply-side investment 
is dominated by the fossil fuels upstream sector: US$130 billion for 
natural gas, US$210 billion for oil, and US$33 billion for coal. 34 As men-
tioned above, the uncertainties are particularly large for demand-side 
investments, which account for at least 24% of total investment (if only 
energy components are considered). 
 Figure 17.25 |  Cumulative CO 2 storage by region until 2100 across the illustrative GEA pathways from MESSAGE and IMAGE. The ﬁ gure also shows prospective areas in sedi-
mentary basins where suitable saline formations, oil or gas ﬁ elds, or coal beds may be found (prosperity map from Bradshaw and Dance,  2005 ). 
 33  Unfortunately, the IEA does not report all investment categories for the base year 
but focuses rather on cumulative numbers to 2030. The present analysis thus recon-
structed the IEA base-year numbers for individual categories using activity numbers 
as proxies. Note also that the IEA investments are reported for 2008, whereas those 
reported here are for 2010. Hence, some of the difference might be due to the dif-
ferent base years. 
 34  Upstream investments include investment in extraction as well as transportation and 
distribution and upstream conversion facilities (such as LNG terminals and reﬁ ner-
ies). They exclude, however, investment for fossil fuel exploration (on the order of 
about US$50 billion). 
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 The composition of investment has been especially dynamic in the past 
few years. Renewable energy investment, in particular, grew at an unpre-
cedented rate of more than 50% annually between 2004 and 2008, reach-
ing US$83 billion in the latter year, and is presently about US$190 billion 
(of which US$160 billion goes into power generation). By comparison, 
investment in fossil power generation in 2010 was about US$110 billion. 
 17.3.5.2  Future Investment Needs for Transformational 
Change 
 Investments in energy supply and demand will be critical for achiev-
ing virtually all energy objectives.  Figure 17.27 shows the cumulative 
investment projection up to 2050 for each of the three illustrative GEA 
pathways. The figure indicates that achieving the GEA climate targets 
( Section 17.5.1 ) while also improving energy security ( Section 17.6 ) 
and access and reducing pollution ( Section 17.4 ) will require a scaling 
up of investment by almost a factor of 2 compared with today. 35 This 
 corresponds to average annual investment globally of between US$1.7 
trillion and US$2.2 trillion, or about 1.8–2.3% of global GDP. 
 In addition to the need to scale up investment, all the GEA transform-
ational pathways depict significant changes in the structure of the invest-
ment portfolio. On the supply side, the transformation of the  system 
is achieved through pronounced shifts of investment away from the 
upstream fossil fuel sector to downstream electricity generation and 
transmission. Consequently, the share of upstream fossil fuel-related 
supply-side investment in total investment decreases from 30% at pre-
sent to about 12–23% by 2050. At the same time, electricity investment 
increases its share on average from about 55% to up to 68% by 2050. 
 Among all supply-side options, the largest increase in investment needs 
is for renewable power generation, ranging from US$160 billion/year 
in pathways with restricted renewables penetration to US$800 bil-
lion/year in pathways without CCS and nuclear power (compared with 
US$160 billion/year in 2010). Another priority for future investment is 
in building electricity transmission and distribution systems with suffi-
cient operation and capacity reserves to increase reliability, as well as 
in power storage to allow the integration of intermittent renewables. 
Global average electricity grid investment (including storage) by 2050 
thus increases to about US$310 billion to US$500 billion/year across the 
GEA pathways, compared with US$260 billion in 2010. 
 As discussed in the previous section, nuclear power and CCS play a prom-
inent role in some of the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply pathways, but the 
full portfolio also includes transformations excluding these options. The 
uncertainty ranges of these options are thus relatively wide. Investment 
in CCS ranges from zero to about US$65 billion/year, and investment 
in nuclear is between US$5 billion and US$210 billion/year. As  Figure 
17.28 indicates, the higher-bound estimates correspond to pathways in 
each GEA group that assume limited potential for other technologies. 
 Investment requirements for each pathway are the result of detailed, 
bottom-up cost calculations. Each technology of the energy system is 
characterized by a set of technical and economic parameters, one of 
which is investment cost measured in US dollars per kilowatt of installed 
capacity (US$/kW). In the long term, specific investment costs are not 
static. Innovation and technological learning tend to lower such costs, 
Demand (energy 
components)
Oil
Gas
Coal
Electricity 
Transmission/Distr.
Fossil Electricity
Nuclear Renewable 
Electricity
Other conversion
Industrialized
50%
Developing
50%
Upstream
Fossil Fuels 
30%
Electricity 
42%
Eﬃciency 
> 24%
 Figure 17.26 |  Composition of energy investment in 2010. Total supply-side investment, excluding investment in fossil fuel exploration, is about US$960 billion. In addition 
>300 billion investments are made into energy components at the demand level. 
 35  Note that future demand-side investments of the pathways consider only efﬁ ciency-
related investments at the margin. Comparable global investments into efﬁ ciency 
improvements for the year 2010 are not available. Hence, for 2010 investments 
for the demand-side consider the full investments into energy components. Future 
investment needs compared to the year 2010 might thus be an underestimate. 
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and future energy sector investment requirements will depend greatly 
on the degree to which innovation and learning improve specific invest-
ment costs, efficiencies, emissions, and other performance characteristics 
(Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ; Roehrl and Riahi,  2000 ). Environmental regula-
tion and resource depletion, on the other hand, tend to increase specific 
investment costs. In the past, innovation has more than compensated 
for depletion, and often for environmental regulation as well. The extent 
to which this trend continues in the future varies across pathways. The 
ranges of specific investment costs assumed for several key energy tech-
nologies are presented in the electronic appendix to this chapter, as well 
as in the GEA database at www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb/. 
 Generally, the present analysis suggests that the transition pathways 
that focus on energy efficiency achieve the targets at more modest cost 
and thus represent the lower bound of the investment range ( Figures 
17.27 and  17.28 ). One reason for this is the multiple benefits of effi-
ciency measures (and behavioral and lifestyle changes) that limit energy 
demand and thus contribute to meeting virtually all energy objectives. 
By contrast, many supply-side measures, such as end-of-pipe pollution 
control, help improve the sustainability of the system with respect to one 
objective (local air pollution control) but do not necessarily contribute to 
others (e.g., climate change mitigation). The other reason why the effi-
ciency pathways depict more modest costs has to do with the nonlinear-
ity of the aggregate supply cost curve: the lower the demand, the less the 
need to deploy supply-side options with higher marginal costs. 
 Achieving high levels of efficiency enhancement is not, however, a free 
lunch. In the GEA-Efficiency pathways, about one-third of overall invest-
ment is efficiency related ( Figures 17.27 and  17.28 ). Efficiency invest-
ment is calculated using a top-down methodology and thus includes 
investments on the margin only. In other words, only the efficiency-
increasing part of an investment that directly contributes to improving 
energy intensity compared with a counterfactual (baseline) is accounted 
for. We thus do not consider the full demand-side investments in end-
use devices. 36 Considering the latter would increase overall investment 
considerably (see the previous section and  Chapter 24 ), but would not 
change the main conclusion with respect to the economic effectiveness 
of the efficiency measures. 37 
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 Figure 17.27 |  Cumulative energy investment over 2010–2050 for the three illustrative GEA pathways. Within the “efﬁ ciency” category, only investments dedicated to improv-
ing efﬁ ciency are considered. Total demand-side investments for all energy components and appliances would be an order of magnitude larger. 
 36  The baseline assumes the continuation of energy intensity improvement at historical rates. 
 37  Efﬁ ciency investments are calculated compared with a hypothetical case where the 
decline in the energy intensity of demand follows globally the historical trend of 
about 1%/year. For the accounting of macroeconomic feedbacks and price elasti-
city effects, the present analysis uses a macroeconomic equilibrium model (MACRO) 
linked to the systems engineering model MESSAGE from which are derived internally 
consistent energy intensity improvement rates for the alternative pathways (Messner 
and Schrattenholzer,  2000 ). Efﬁ ciency investments are then computed by assum-
ing that, in equilibrium, the marginal investment to reduce demand would equal 
the marginal investment in supply. Efﬁ ciency investments thus include only invest-
ments that have been made to enhance the efﬁ ciency of demand in order to offset 
supply-side investments. Calculated efﬁ ciency investment thus does not represent 
all demand-side investments, including, for example, the component costs of appli-
ances, which would be an order of magnitude larger (see  Chapter 24 ). 
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 As in earlier analysis of stringent climate change mitigation scenarios 
(e.g., Fisher et al.,  2007 ), the present study finds that the effect of the 
different investment patterns on the macroeconomy is relatively small. 
Compared to the counterfactual without policy interventions to achieve 
the GEA objectives, the projected loss to consumption by 2050 ranges 
from 0.6% for the GEA-Efficiency pathways to 1.4% for the GEA-Mix 
pathways and up to about 2.0% for the GEA-Supply pathways. This 
should be compared with 200% growth in overall consumption over 
the same period. 38 
 17.3.5.3  Policies to Mobilize Financial Resources 
 Although the GEA pathways reveal considerable uncertainty about 
future needs for investment in specific technology options, they clearly 
illustrate that present investment in energy is neither sufficient nor com-
patible in structure with a sustainable investment portfolio. Mobilizing 
the required financial resources for the transformation will thus be a 
major challenge. 
 Increasing investment in the energy system as depicted by the GEA 
pathways requires the careful consideration of a wide portfolio of 
policies in order to create the necessary financial incentives. The 
portfolio needs to include regulations and technology standards in 
sectors with relatively low price elasticity, in combination with exter-
nality pricing, in order to avoid rebound effects, as well as targeted 
subsidies to promote specific “no-regrets” options while address-
ing affordability. In addition, attention must be given to building 
an enabling technical, institutional, legal, and financial environment 
to complement traditional deployment policies (particularly in the 
developing world). 
 Table 17.13 identifies effective combinations of policies for specific 
technology options (see also  Chapters 22 and 26) and puts these 
in the context of the required future investment needs. In addition, 
the costs and policies for different technology options are compared 
with those for promoting energy access (see  Section 17.4 for further 
details). Different types of technologies and objectives will require 
different combinations of policy mechanisms to attract the necessary 
investment.  Table 17.13 thus distinguishes among various mecha-
nisms: “essential” policy mechanisms are those that must be included 
for a specific option to achieve the rapid energy system transform-
ation; “desired” policy mechanisms are those that would help but 
are not a necessary condition; “uncertain” policy mechanisms are 
those where the outcome will depend on the policy emphasis and 
thus might favor or disfavor a specific option; and “complement” 
policies are those that are inadequate on their own but could com-
plement other essential policies. 
 As the table illustrates, future investment needs are comparatively mod-
est for some objectives, such as access, but a variety of different policy 
mechanisms including subsidies, regulation, and capacity building need 
to be in place. Regulation and standards are also essential for almost 
all the other options; externality pricing (e.g., a carbon tax to promote 
the diffusion of renewables, CCS, or efficiency) might also be necessary 
for capital-intensive technologies to achieve rapid deployment. Capital 
requirements for energy infrastructure are among the highest of the 
options listed in  Table 17.13 . Thus, high priority needs to be given to 
future policies (including regulations) to address security and reliability 
aspects of the energy infrastructure. In addition, subsidies will need to 
ensure that customers can afford the reliability levels they value. For 
a more detailed discussion of implementation and policy issues, see 
 Chapters 22 and 26. 
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 Figure 17.28 |  Cumulative energy investment over 2010–2050 for all GEA pathways. 
Within the “efﬁ ciency” category, only dedicated investments to improve efﬁ ciency 
are considered. Total demand-side investments for all demand-side energy compo-
nents and appliances would be an order of magnitude larger. 
 38  Note that macroeconomic losses are indicative and do not, for example, include costs 
of overcoming policy barriers, effects of efﬁ ciency improvements, reduced losses 
from air pollution and climate change mitigation, and beneﬁ ts of improved energy 
security. 
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 17.3.6  Key Features of the Energy Transition 
 Fulfilling the GEA objectives is an extremely ambitious task, but it is 
technically possible. The full suite of GEA pathways, grouped accord-
ing to the aggressiveness with which energy demand can be reduced, 
show the potential role for a range of energy conversion chains, from 
primary energy sources to conversion technologies to end-use tech-
nologies. Although there are a number of choices available to direct the 
energy system transformation, there is also a large number of givens – 
nonnegotiable, nondiscretionary components of an energy transition 
 Table 17.13 |  Energy investments needed to achieve GEA sustainability objectives and illustrative policy mechanisms for mobilizing ﬁ nancial resources. 
Investment (billions of US$/year) Policy mechanisms
2010 2010–2050 Regulation, standards Externality pricing Carefully designed 
subsidies
Capacity building
Efﬁ ciency n.a. 1 290–800 2  Essential 
(elimination of less 
efﬁ cient technologies 
every few years)
 Essential 
 (cannot achieve 
dramatic efﬁ ciency gains 
without prices that 
reﬂ ect full costs) 
 Complement 
(ineffective without price 
regulation, multiple 
instruments possible) 3 
 Essential 
 (expertise needed for 
new technologies) 
Nuclear 5–40 4 15–210  Essential 
 (waste disposal 
regulation and,of 
fuel cycle, to prevent 
proliferation) 
 Uncertain 
 (GHG pricing helps 
nuclear but prices 
reﬂ ecting nuclear risks 
would hurt) 
 Uncertain 
 (has been important in 
the past, but with GHG 
pricing perhaps not 
needed) 
 Desired 
 (need to correct the loss 
of expertise of recent 
decades) 5 
Renewables 190 260–1010  Complement 
 (renewable portfolio 
standards can 
complement GHG 
pricing) 
 Essential 
 (GHG pricing is key to 
rapid development of 
renewables) 
 Complement 
 (feed-in tariff and 
tax credits for R&D 
or production can 
complement GHG 
pricing) 
 Essential 
 (expertise needed for 
new technologies) 
CCS <1 0–64  Essential 
 (CCS requirement for 
all new coal plants and 
phase-in with existing) 
 Essential 
 (GHG pricing is 
essential, but even this 
is unlikely to sufﬁ ce in 
near term) 
 Complement 
 (would help with ﬁ rst 
plants while GHG price 
is still low) 
 Desired 
 (expertise needed for 
new technologies) 5 
Infrastructure 6 260 310–500  Essential 
 (security regulation 
critical for some aspects 
of reliability) 
 Uncertain 
 (neutral effect) 
 Essential 
 (customers must pay 
for reliability levels they 
value) 
 Essential 
 (expertise needed for 
new technologies) 
Access 7 n.a. 36–41  Essential 
 (ensure standardization 
but must not hinder 
development) 
 Uncertain 
 (could reduce access by 
increasing costs of fossil 
fuel products) 
 Essential 
 (grants for grid, 
microﬁ nancing for 
appliances, subsidies for 
cooking fuels) 
 Essential 
 (create enabling 
environment: technical, 
legal, institutional, 
ﬁ nancial) 
 1  Global investments into efﬁ ciency improvements for the year 2010 are not available. Note, however, that the best-guess estimate from  Chapter 24 for investments into energy 
components of demand-side devices is by comparison about 300$ billion per year. This includes, for example, investments into the engines in cars, boilers in building heating 
systems, and compressors, fans, and heating elements in large household appliances. Uncertainty range is between US$100 billion and US$700 billion annually for investments in 
components. Accounting for the full investment costs of end-use devices would increase demand-side investments by about an order of magnitude (see  Chapter 24 for details). 
 2  Estimate includes efﬁ ciency investments at the margin only and is thus an underestimate compared with demand-side investments into energy components given for 2010 
(see note 1). 
 3  Efﬁ ciency improvements typically require a basket of ﬁ nancing tools in addition to subsidies, including, for example, low- or no-interest loans or, in general, access to capital and 
ﬁ nancing, guarantee funds, third-party ﬁ nancing, pay-as-you-save schemes, or feebates as well as information and educational instruments such as labeling, disclosure and certi-
ﬁ cation mandates and programs, training and education, and information campaigns. 
 4  Lower-bound estimate includes only traditional deployment investments in about 2 GW capacity additions in 2010. Upper-bound estimate includes, in addition, investments for 
plants under construction, fuel reprocessing, and estimated costs for capacity lifetime extensions. 
 5  Note the large range of required investments for CCS and nuclear in 2010–2050. Depending on the social and political acceptability of these options, capacity building may 
become essential for achieving the high estimate of future investments. 
 6  Overall electricity grid investments, including investments for operations and capacity reserves, back-up capacity, and power storage. 
 7  Annual costs for almost universal access by 2030 (including electricity grid connections and fuel subsidies for clean cooking fuels). 
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 Table 17.14 |  Targets for the four main energy challenges and illustrative examples of policies and investments quantiﬁ ed by the GEA pathways.In addition to these targets, 
the GEA also adopted adequate energy services to support economic growth as a normative goal (see  Chapter 6 ). 
Objective/Goal Target and timeline Pathway characteristics Examples of policies and investments Further details
Improve energy 
access
Universal access to electricity 
and clean cooking by 2030
 Diffusion of clean and efﬁ cient 
cooking appliances 
 Extension of both high-voltage 
electricity grids and decentralized 
microgrids 
 Increased ﬁ nancial assistance from 
industrialized countries to support 
clean energy infrastructure 
 Microcredits and grants for low-emission 
biomass and LPG stoves in combination 
with LPG and kerosene fuel subsidies for 
low-income populations 
 Estimated cost to provide clean cooking: 
US$17billion to US$22 billion per year 
to 2030 
 Grants for high-voltage grid extensions 
and decentralized microgrids 
 Estimated cost to provide rural grid 
connections: US$18.4 billion to US$19 
billion per year to 2030 
Section 17.4
Reduce air pollution 
and improve human 
health
Achieve global compliance with 
WHO air quality guidelines 
(PM2.5 concentration < 10 μg/m3) 
for the majority of the world 
population, and the remaining 
populations staying well within 
the WHO Tier I-III levels (15–35 
μg/m3) by 2030
 Tightening of technology standards 
across transportation and industrial 
sectors (e.g., vehicles, shipping, 
power generation, industrial 
processes) 
 Combined emissions pricing and 
quantity caps (with trading) 
 Fuel switching from traditional 
biomass to modern energy forms 
for cooking in developing countries 
 Vehicles: Euro 3–4 standards for vehicles 
in developing countries by 2030 (e.g,, 
-60% NO x , PM reductions by 2030) 
 Shipping: Revised MARPOL Annex VI and 
NO x Technical Code 2008 (-80% SO x , NO x 
reductions by 2030) 
 Industry/power: rapid desulfurization, 
de-NO x , and PM control around the world 
by 2030 
 Estimated cost to meet air pollution 
targets: US$200 billion to US$350 billion/
year in 2030 (about 12% of energy 
costs); co-beneﬁ ts of stringent climate 
mitigation policies reduce overall 
pollution control costs by about 50–65% 
 Section 17.5.2 
 Section 17.7 
Avoid dangerous 
climate change
Limit global average 
temperature change to 2°C 
above preindustrial levels with a 
likelihood >50% by 2100
 Widespread diffusion of zero- 
and low-carbon energy supply 
technologies, with substantial 
reductions in energy intensity 
Energy-related CO 2 emissions 
peak by 2020 and are reduced to 
30–70% by 2050 from 2000 levels 
 Globally comprehensive mitigation 
efforts covering all major emitters 
 Financial transfers from 
industrialized countries to support 
decarbonization 
 Combination of cap-and-trade and 
carbon taxes (with initial carbon price 
>US$30/tCO 2 , increasing over time) 
 Upscaling of investments into low-carbon 
technologies and efﬁ ciency measures to 
>US$600 billion/year to 2050 
 Additional ﬁ nancial transfers to 
developing countries of about 3–12% 
of total energy systems costs to 2050, 
depending on the domestic commitment 
of industrialized countries 
Section 17.5.1
Improve energy 
security
Limit energy trade; increase 
diversity and resilience of energy 
supply (both by 2050)
 Increase in domestic energy supply 
options (e.g., renewables to provide 
30–75% of primary energy by 
2050), and reduction of the share 
of oil in global energy trade. 
Increase in diversity of energy 
supply as well as end-use sectors 
and regions by 2050. 
 Infrastructure expansion 
and upgrades to support 
interconnections and backup, 
including increased capacity 
reserves, stockpiles, and energy 
storage technologies. 
 Public procurement strategies and 
regulations to support local supplies 
(e.g., renewable obligations) 
 Interconnection and back-up agreements 
between energy network operators 
 Stockpiling of critical energy resources 
for coordinated release during acute 
market shortages 
 Estimated cost of infrastructure upgrades 
for the electricity grid: >US$310 billion/
year by 2050, co-beneﬁ ts of stringent 
climate mitigation policies reduce overall 
security costs (import dependency and 
diversity) by more than 75%. 
 Section 17.6 
 Section 17.7 
Further details Section 17.2.3 Section 17.3.4 Section17.3.5 (overview) and Sections 
17.4–17.6 (details)
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that must begin immediately. These commonalities across all pathways 
(previously referred to as “musts” or necessities) are summarized here:
 improvements to at least the historical rate of energy intensity  •
reduction (more rapid improvements in energy intensity, and thus 
aggressive efforts to improve end-use efficiency, would increase the 
flexibility of supply as well as the overall cost-effectiveness of the 
energy system transformation); 
 a rapid shift from traditional biomass to widely accessible, clean,  •
flexible energy forms; 
 important regional constraints on availability of energy resources,  •
although such constraints do not limit deployment on an aggregated 
global scale; 
 a broad portfolio of supply-side options focusing on low-carbon  •
energy from renewables, bioenergy, nuclear, and CCS and including: 
 strong growth in renewable energy beginning immediately, and a  –
rising requirement for storage technologies to support the integra-
tion of intermittent wind and solar power into electrical grids; 
 strong bioenergy growth in the medium term, with extensive use  –
of agricultural residues and nonagricultural feedstocks (second-
generation bioenergy) to mitigate adverse impacts on land use 
and food production; 
 nuclear energy as an important part of the supply-side portfolio  –
in many transition pathways, although it is also feasible to phase 
out nuclear energy completely; and 
 CCS as an optional bridging or transitional technology in the  –
medium term unless energy demand is high, in which case CCS 
becomes necessary. 
 aggressive decarbonization in the electricity sector (especially in  –
the high-demand case), a rapid phase-out of conventional (i.e., 
without CCS) coal power, and natural gas power as a bridging or 
transitional technology in the short to medium term; 
 at least some electrification of the transportation sector, even in a  •
conventional liquid fuels-based system; 
 continued dominance of oil among liquid and gaseous fuels into  •
and beyond the medium term, strong growth in liquid biofuels in 
the medium term, and thereafter the mix of liquid and gaseous 
fuels depends on transportation system choices and technological 
breakthroughs; 
 substantial increases in investment on both the demand and the  •
supply side (including energy infrastructure); and 
 concerted and aggressive policies to support energy system trans- •
formation, including strong regulation and standards and externality 
pricing. 
 The storylines of the required energy system transformations that are 
quantified and elaborated on in the GEA pathways are far richer than 
these commonalities suggest. Nevertheless, this collation of all the 
required features of an energy system transformation describes the 
trunk off of which the many choices and possibilities branch. 
 Many of these choices are strongly influenced by one or more of the 
GEA objectives with respect to energy access, air pollution, climate 
change, and energy security. These are the subject of the second half 
of this chapter.  Table 17.14 provides a link from Sections 2 and 3 on 
the GEA pathways to Sections 4–7 on the GEA objectives. Some of the 
main characteristics of the pathways are summarized in the context of 
each objective. More detailed policy and investment requirements are 
then given to illustrate how these pathways might be driven, and are 
explored at length in Sections 4–7. 
 17.4  Access to Modern Energy Carriers and 
Cleaner Cooking 
 This section builds on issues highlighted in  Chapters 2 and  19 concern-
ing the need for and benefits of providing universal access to clean 
cooking and electricity by 2030. This section discusses possible future 
scenarios for improving access to clean cooking and electricity to meet 
household energy needs in developing countries. All GEA scenarios are 
consistent with meeting a target of almost universal access by 2030. 39 
The section starts with the GEA-Mix pathway and provides a detailed 
breakdown of specific access policies and their impacts toward reach-
ing the target for the period 2005–2030. The detailed access modeling 
presented here focuses on three key regions where lack of access is 
currently the most acute – sub-Saharan Africa, 40 South Asia, and Pacific 
Asia – and for which disaggregate data are available on energy choices 
and use in the household sector. The detailed results from these regions 
are used to inform the estimation of costs and impacts of alternative 
policies to improve access to clean cooking and electricity. The sec-
tion distinguishes between, on the one hand, access to clean fuels and 
stoves for cooking and, on the other, access to electricity for lighting and 
appliances. Electricity, even when available, is rarely used for cooking in 
most developing country households. Therefore, access to modern fuels 
is as important as access to electricity, if not more so, for meeting the 
thermal energy needs of most households. 
 39  The target is “almost universal access” because reaching the remotest rural popula-
tions is exceedingly expensive. 
 40  While Sudan is not included in the sub-Saharan Africa region in GEA, it is included 
in this region for the access analysis because Sudan has severe issues with energy 
access. 
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 17.4.1  Access to Clean Cooking 
 There is enormous diversity in the types and amounts of fuels used for 
cooking in households in developing countries. The starting point for this 
analysis is data on existing energy choices and demands to meet cook-
ing energy needs in each of the three regions considered. The estimates 
of energy choices and demand are based on bottom-up estimates using 
detailed household survey data for key nations in each of the regions 
(see Ekholm et al.,  2010 , and Pachauri et al., forthcoming, for details 
regarding data sources and methods). Most rural and low-income urban 
households in developing nations still depend predominantly on bio-
mass to meet their cooking energy needs. For the base year 2005, the 
total quantity of final energy used for cooking in households for the 
three regions depicted in  Figure 17.29 amounted to 15.8 EJ, of which 
13.6 EJ was from biomass (including charcoal). This estimate differs sub-
stantially from that of the IEA for total residential sector biomass con-
sumption: about 18.5 EJ for the same three regions in 2005. There are 
several reasons for this difference. Apart from the large uncertainties 
associated with biomass demand estimates globally, the IEA estimates 
are generally higher than most national estimates. This study bases its 
estimates of biomass demand on bottom-up estimates from national 
household surveys and corrects these for differences in biomass con-
sumption patterns across nations within regions. The resulting estimates 
are then further compared with national estimates of biomass consump-
tion, wherever available, and scaled up to derive the regional estimates 
of consumption. As can be seen from  Figure 17.29 , in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, the share of biomass (including charcoal) in total 
final cooking energy was as high as 97–98% in 2005. Among house-
holds in rural Pacific Asia, this share was about 60%. In urban centers 
of South and Pacific Asia, a larger share of kerosene and LPG is used for 
cooking. However, even in urban sub-Saharan Africa, about 87% of total 
final energy used for cooking is biomass (again including charcoal). 
 The GEA access scenarios also estimate the numbers of people depend-
ent on biomass and other solid fuels. Since this study considers the total 
population dependent on these fuels and not only the share of the popu-
lation that uses them as their primary source of cooking energy, our esti-
mates tend to be slightly higher than other global estimates from the 
United Nations Development Programme, WHO, and the IEA (IEA,  2006 ; 
UNDP and WHO,  2009 ; IEA,  2010 ). This study finds that including only 
populations that report biomass or other solid fuels to be their primary 
source of cooking energy tends to underestimate the total population 
consuming solid fuels. Often populations that use solid fuels as a supple-
mentary fuel actually consume a significant amount of these fuels and 
meet a large proportion of their total cooking energy needs from them. 
 Past efforts to model residential sector energy demand for cooking 
have been limited, particularly in developing countries. The reason is 
that empirical data for the least developed countries and regions are 
sorely lacking. Even in emerging nations, finding reliable data for the 
household sector is a huge challenge. Given the heterogeneity of fuel 
choices and demand in the household sector, data at an aggregate scale 
is insufficient for such analysis. Besides the lack of data, uncertainties 
concerning socioeconomic and demographic trends in these countries 
add to the challenge of energy demand modeling. Other difficulties with 
modeling energy demand and choices in developing countries have to 
do with the special circumstances and conditions in these nations. These 
have been discussed in detail by Pandey ( 2002 ), Pachauri ( 2007 ), and 
van Ruijven et al. ( 2008 ). 
 The GEA access scenarios for residential cooking energy employ the 
MESSAGE-Access modeling framework (see Ekholm et al.,  2010 , and 
Pachauri et al., forthcoming, for details of the model). The model has 
several novel features that capture some of the special circumstances 
prevailing in developing countries. Demand is disaggregated both by 
rural and urban region and for heterogeneous income or expenditure 
groups. Data from detailed household surveys for key nations in each 
region are used to calibrate the model. 
 Various scenarios simulating different combinations of policy packages 
are modeled within the MESSAGE-Access framework to determine their 
impact on access to cooking fuels in these regions. Although the specific 
choice of fuels and cooking technologies will certainly need to be con-
text specific, for the GEA access scenarios this study considers a final 
transition to LPG as the fuel of choice for cooking for those who have 
access to and can afford it. This should not in any way be interpreted as 
an endorsement of LPG as the best of the available choices. Clearly, other 
alternative cooking fuels, such as biogas, natural gas, and other emer-
ging sources such as ethanol gel and dimethyl ether, in combination with 
different stove technologies, might be better suited to certain regions or 
nations. In some regions, there might even be a transition to electricity 
for cooking. However, in order to quantify the costs and impacts of alter-
native policies, this study uses LPG as a proxy for all clean cooking fuels. 
 The main policies considered to encourage a more rapid transition away 
from solid fuels for cooking include fuel subsidies, to reduce the cost 
of cleaner fuels, and grants or microlending, to make access to credit 
 Figure 17.29 |  Composition of ﬁ nal energy use for cooking in rural and urban 
 households in three developing regions in 2005. 
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easier and lower households’ cost of borrowing. This makes it cheaper 
and easier for households to purchase both the fuel and the end-use 
equipment (cook stoves). Purchasing the stoves that use cleaner fuels 
often involves a capital outlay beyond the reach of poor and rural 
households, which often have irregular cash inflows. Policy packages 
that combine different levels of subsidies with microfinance options are 
also modeled. 
 17.4.1.1  Populations Dependent on Solid Fuels for Cooking 
 The GEA cooking fuel access scenarios project that the total population 
dependent on solid fuels for cooking will rise from 2.2 billion to 2.4 bil-
lion in South Asia, Pacific Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 
and 2030, in the absence of new policies to improve access. The popula-
tion dependent on solid fuels is projected to decline marginally in South 
Asia and more significantly in Pacific Asia, whereas in sub-Saharan 
Africa the numbers rise during this period. In all regions the percentage 
of the population dependent on solid fuels decreases between 2005 
and 2030. This decrease is significantly more rapid in urban centers than 
in rural regions ( Figure 17.30 ). However, in urban sub-Saharan Africa, 
population growth is projected to outstrip the decrease in the percent-
age of population dependent on solid fuels, so that the total population 
dependent on these fuels continues to rise. These projections are based 
on outputs of the MESSAGE-Access model that account for changes in 
income level and distribution, urbanization, and population growth and 
for the consequent impact of these factors on the transition in cooking 
energy choices. 
 The impact of the alternative policy packages considered on the num-
bers of people dependent on solid fuels varies across the different 
regions from slight to dramatic.  Figure 17.31 depicts the impact of the 
policies on the number of people dependent on solid fuels for each 
region and for the urban and rural sectors separately. A subsidy policy 
that reduces the price of clean fuels by 20% below existing prices in 
each region would reduce the number of people dependent on solid 
fuels in all three regions from 2.4 billion, in the case with no new 
policies, to 1.9 billion. A policy that provides cheaper microfinance 
options for upfront costs and the purchase of end-use equipment 
would also reduce that number to 1.9 billion. In estimating the effect 
of the microfinance policy, it is assumed that the interest charged on 
loans is 15%/year. This is at the low end of the range estimated by 
Robinson ( 1996 ) for interest rates on loans by microfinance institu-
tions to the poor in developing countries, and much lower than the 
internal discount rate of poor households in these nations. The sce-
narios that combine a fuel subsidy with microfinance are more effect-
ive in all regions in accelerating a shift away from solid fuels than 
either a subsidy-only policy or providing microfinance alone, as  Figure 
17.31 also shows. However, even the policy scenario that combines a 
subsidy of 50% on the existing price with microfinance leaves about 
500 million people, virtually all of them in sub-Saharan Africa, reliant 
on solid fuels in 2030. 
 17.4.1.2  Costs of Policies to Reduce Dependence on 
Solid Fuels 
 The GEA access scenarios quantify the costs of reducing dependence 
on solid fuels for several of the different policy packages considered. 
The net present value of the costs is estimated for each policy scenario 
and compared with the impact of the policy in reducing the number of 
people dependent on solid fuels to determine the relative effectiveness 
of each scheme. The cost of microfinance schemes is estimated to be 
zero for governments, as it is assumed that microfinance companies are 
able to cover the costs of their operations through the interest payments 
they receive. If however, the capital costs of new stoves are met through 
some form of public grants, these obviously represent a police cost. 
Although the objective of all access policies is to accelerate the transi-
tion away from the use of solid fuels to modern forms of liquid or gas-
eous cooking fuels, not all policies are able to achieve this equally. For 
those households that remain dependent on solid fuels, an estimate was 
made of what it would cost to provide them with improved cook stoves. 
 Chapter 19 provides information on a range of improved cook stove 
technologies developed around the globe. These vary tremendously in 
design, sophistication, cost, emissions, and performance. However, it is 
assumed that, given the rapid improvements in stove technology, future 
deployment of such stoves will meet a minimum standard in terms of 
both efficiency and emissions as defined in  Chapter 2 .  Table 17.15 pro-
vides a breakdown of costs by region and type cumulatively between 
2010 and 2030.  Figure 17.32 relates the cost per person gaining access 
per year to the number of people gaining access up until 2030, to pro-
vide an indication of the effectiveness of alternative policies in provid-
ing improved access to clean fuels. 
 The costs of policies aimed at encouraging a more rapid transition 
to the use of clean cooking fuels depend on the combination of the 
policy instruments deployed and the extent of subsidy, as shown in 
 Table 17.15 . Even a low-cost policy of providing easier access to credit 
through microfinance institutions is projected to substantially reduce 
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dependence on solid fuels among urban populations and the richer rural 
households in South Asia and Pacific Asia by 2030. However, a policy 
that promotes microfinance alone leaves about 1.4 billion people still 
dependent on solid fuels in 2030. Such a policy, if combined with a 
massive scale-up of improved cook stoves that are more efficient and 
less polluting than conventional stoves, along with better ventilation 
in cooking areas, might be a cost-effective interim solution for many 
rural households for whom a shift away from biomass may be out of 
reach in the short term. The financial requirements of such a policy are 
the lowest among the entire combination of policy scenarios assessed: 
on the order of US$1.1 billion to US$1.6 billion/year until 2030. A more 
stringent access target would require a combination of grants or micro-
finance for the purchase of stoves with a fuel subsidy and would cost 
considerably more, about US$15.8 billion to US$17.0 billion/year until 
2030. The wide range of uncertainty in the cost estimates reflects the 
high capital costs associated with the use of cleaner fuels. The lower 
range of the cost estimates assumes that the entire cost of the stoves 
is met through cheap loans provided by microfinance institutions that 
are able to recover their costs. The total spending required to meet an 
access target for clean cooking fuels and stoves would be higher if stove 
costs have to be funded through public grants. 
 Clearly, the choice of policies, the stringency of the targets, and the exact 
combination of clean fuels and end-use stove technologies promoted 
are likely to be specific to each country or region. However, the analysis 
presented here is indicative of the range of costs of different combin-
ations of policies and their effectiveness in achieving different access 
targets. What is clear from this analysis is that, although fuel subsidies 
are necessary to increase access for the poorest households and regions, 
subsidies alone are likely to be less effective in accelerating a transition 
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to the use of clean fuels for cooking than a policy that combines sub-
sidies with improved access to credit through microfinance institutions. 
Such a policy would make it easier for households to cover the capital 
costs associated with a switch to cleaner fuels. 
 Fuel subsidies are considered controversial in many nations, and many 
developing countries already have generous subsidies on kerosene and 
LPG. Although such subsidies may be justified on social grounds, they 
have often resulted in market distortions, been appropriated largely by 
richer consumers, and led to poor economic returns for energy suppliers 
and distributors. Leakages to the black market from existing subsidies to 
households for kerosene in India have been estimated to be as high as 
44% (Planning Commission,  2006 ). However, “smart” and targeted sub-
sidy schemes and lifeline tariffs for poor customers can be designed and 
have proved successful, as in the case of the Bolsa Familia program in 
Brazil, which couples assistance to low-income families for the purchase 
of LPG fuel with mandatory child school attendance. Removing subsid-
ies in a phased manner once incomes reach a level where households 
have the ability to pay can be challenging for governments, but this can 
be achieved if coupled with increased social spending in other areas. 
In other countries, such as many in sub-Saharan Africa,  low-income 
consumers face prices for modern fuels that are at times even higher 
than the competitive market prices of these fuels in Europe. This diffe-
rence in prices often arises from nonmarket factors such as weak insti-
tutions and safety and stability concerns, which urgently need to be 
addressed. For the design and implementation of more targeted subsidy 
schemes and removal of nonmarket barriers, additional enabling condi-
tions will need to be created in these nations. This will require additional 
capacity building to strengthen the administration of governance sys-
tems and local institutions.  Chapter 25 , especially, addresses the issue 
of capacity building and concludes that good governance in the energy 
sector is especially critical for attracting investments in needed infra-
structural development in the least developed and emerging nations, 
which face the greatest challenge to expanding energy access. 
 17.4.2  Access to Electricity 
 Improving access to electricity requires accelerating the pace of electri-
fication in the least developed countries and regions. Decisions about 
setting targets for grid expansion are generally made by national gov-
ernments or regional bodies. However, the literature shows that public 
or private utilities generally bear the financial responsibility for these 
programs as the executors of these decisions (Zomers,  2001 ; Kemmler, 
 2007 ; World Bank,  2008 ). In the best case, decisions about where to 
expand electrification are grounded in standards or criteria for electri-
fication. In general, such criteria support electrification in places where 
it is cheapest. Thus, utilities often select projects that require the least 
infrastructure investment relative to demand. Villages or communities 
that are closest to existing grids, that have the highest population dens-
ity, or where economic activity is greatest are generally connected to the 
grid first. Social criteria, including preferential selection of the poorest 
households or more remote rural regions, also influence the decision 
for grid expansion in some nations, but less so because these regions 
are not the logical choice from an economic perspective for electric util-
ities or developing country governments. In general, one can expect that 
electrification will proceed most rapidly where the costs are lowest. 
 In many countries, households also have to pay a connection fee and have 
to make their own decision about whether or not to get an electricity 
connection. Factors that influence whether households opt for grid con-
nection are the amount of the connection fee, whether payments can be 
spread over time, and the household’s understanding of the fees, tariffs, 
subsidies, and billing (Zomers,  2001 ; Gaunt,  2005 ; World Bank,  2008 ). 
 This section analyzes electrification using two separate model frame-
works. Within the MESSAGE-Access and IMAGE models, rural electrifica-
tion and grid infrastructure expansion are modeled in slightly different 
ways. As a starting point, both models take existing levels of electrifi-
cation by nation, or by subpopulation within a nation, to calibrate the 
base year. For the purposes of quantification, two alternative levels of 
demand are assumed for household consumption within both models, 
corresponding to different electricity service levels:
 Table 17.15 |  Cumulative ﬁ nancing required to provide access to clean cooking 
fuels and devices in developing Africa and Asia, 2010–2030 (in billions of US$). 
Policy 
intervention
Region
Fuel 
subsidy
New LPG 
stoves
Improved 
biomass 
cook 
stoves
Total, all 
three 
regions
20% fuel subsidy
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
7.54 0.43 8.98
59.6–67.2
Paciﬁ c Asia 3.47 0.75 2.93
South Asia 27.56 6.41 9.11
50% fuel subsidy
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
91.71 3.60 6.93
202.2–214.3
Paciﬁ c Asia 10.42 0.95 3.01
South Asia 81.49 7.55 8.60
Microﬁ nance only 1 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
0.00 2.19 9.66
21.6–31.2
Paciﬁ c Asia 0.00 0.87 3.05
South Asia 0.00 6.54 8.92
Microﬁ nance + 
20% fuel subsidy
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
9.04 0.89 8.72
85.0–100.0
Paciﬁ c Asia 5.35 1.28 2.43
South Asia 50.87 12.88 8.56
Microﬁ nance + 
50% fuel subsidy
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
130.67 6.52 5.20
315.2–339.4
Paciﬁ c Asia 16.72 1.71 2.60
South Asia 152.65 15.97 7.36
 1  It is assumed that no public costs are associated with microlending and that 
microﬁ nance institutions are able to recover their full costs from the interest charged. 
However, these can be considered costs if purchase of the stoves is ﬁ nanced from 
public grants. 
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 Low demand or minimal access: each household has one conven- •
tional light bulb (40W), and one out of three households has a televi-
sion set (60W); on the assumption that these are used for three hours 
a day, this amounts to approximately 65 kWh/household/year. 
 High demand or sustainable universal access: consumption is  •
assumed to be 250W for four hours per day for lighting and other 
applications, as in the Tanzanian reference study of Modi et al. 
( 2005 ), amounting to 420 kWh/household/year. 
 Electrification is defined differently in the two models. Within the IMAGE 
model, access is defined as connection to the grid. Thus, once the grid has 
been extended to reach a certain region, all households in that region 
are considered connected. The MESSAGE-Access model defines electri-
fication in terms of whether a household’s electricity demand exceeds 
an amount considered the basic minimum required to meet household 
needs: 65 kWh/year in the low-demand case and 420 kWh/year in the 
high-demand case. 
 Future rates of electrification in both models are driven by future income 
growth. However, within the IMAGE framework, in the base case a regres-
sion model is developed first by regressing national electrification levels 
on GDP per capita (in US dollars at purchasing power parity) in order to 
project what the future electrification level by region will be, based on 
future income (see the appendix for details of the methodology). Within 
the MESSAGE-Access model, future electrification in the base case is 
determined by income growth and distribution across rural and urban 
income groups. Thus, the MESSAGE-Access model incorporates a greater 
degree of heterogeneity on the demand side. By contrast, the IMAGE 
model takes into account a much finer degree of spatial resolution on the 
supply side, determining investment needs for rural electrification at the 
level of 0.5  × 0.5 degree grid cells. Each cell is considered to have either 
complete access to electricity or no access at all. Within a world region, 
grid cells are electrified over time, starting with those with the lowest 
levelized transmission and distribution costs. 
 17.4.2.1  Rural Populations with Access to Electricity 
 Figure 17.33 shows rates of access by region in the base year and pro-
jections to 2030 for both models in two separate cases: one with no 
additional new policies or resources for improving the rate of electrifica-
tion, and another with universal access. Differences are observed across 
the two models both in base-year rural access and in progress with elec-
trification across time for the two scenarios. Rural electrification levels 
differ in the base year across the two models in part because of differ-
ences in regional definitions in the IMAGE and MESSAGE models. For 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, differences in regional composition 
across the two models are minor, and thus rural electrification levels are 
fairly similar. However, the regional definition for the Pacific Asia region 
differs significantly across the two models, as does the base-year electri-
fication level. Differences in the sources of data used in the two models 
also account for part of the variation in base-year electrification levels. 
Thus, for instance, in the MESSAGE-Access model, base-year electrifi-
cation levels for Pacific Asia are based in large part on bottom-up esti-
mates of access levels across rural income quintile groups in Indonesia. 
In contrast, in the IMAGE model, electrification levels in Pacific Asia are 
determined by estimates of rural electrification levels published in IEA 
( 2006 ) and UNDP and WHO ( 2009 ). Progress with rural electrification in 
the two scenarios differs across the two models because of differences 
in base-year electrification levels and in methodology. 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, rural electrification in 2005 covers less than 10% 
of households in both models. Following a trend with increasing GDP per 
capita, in the no new policies scenario, this is projected to increase to 31% 
in 2030 according to the IMAGE model, but only to 15% according to the 
MESSAGE-Access model. In South Asia, the projected increase under the 
no new policies case is the largest, from 47% in 2005 to 77% in 2030 
according to the IMAGE projections, and from 51% to 82% according to 
the MESSAGE-Access model. Thus, the shortfall with respect to universal 
access in 2030 is largest in sub-Saharan Africa. In other developing regions 
such as Latin America, rural electrification levels are already relatively high 
and are expected to reach over 90% by 2030 under the no new policies 
projections. For this reason, rural electrification is not modeled here for 
regions other than South Asia, Pacific Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, which 
remain the regions where the gap between the no new policies scenario 
and the universal electrification scenario remains widest. 
 17.4.2.2  Investments for Improving Access to Electricity 
 The amount of investment required to increase electrification levels 
depends on the assumptions made about the costs of transmission and 
distribution, but also on population density. Costs rise as required cap-
acity expands to meet rural household electricity demand. For example, 
regions with relatively high population density, such as South Asia, have 
lower costs per unit of capacity than less densely populated regions such 
 Figure 17.33 |  Rural population with electricity in three developing regions in 2005 and 
in 2030 under business-as-usual and universal access scenarios. Numbers on the bars 
are percentages of the total rural population in the indicated region and year. Rural elec-
triﬁ cation level in the MESSAGE model refers to the 420 kW/household scenario. 
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as sub-Saharan Africa. Levelized transmission and distribution costs for 
electrification within both models are determined in the following way. 
Within the IMAGE model, costs are based on the required increase in 
capacity and the distance over which transmission is required. Thus, 
costs are determined by spatial factors such as population density and 
distance from an existing electricity network at the grid cell level. In the 
MESSAGE-Access model, a simple three-step, region-specific technol-
ogy cost curve differentiated by grid capacity is used to estimate costs. 
Given the least-cost optimization approach of the MESSAGE-Access 
model, the low-cost grid technology deploys first and the high-cost grid 
technology next as electricity demand increases. Both models estimate 
the costs of almost universal power supply in a given region through 
grid connection by estimating the total cost of extending transmission 
and distribution to all populated parts of the region. Decentralized tech-
nology alternatives such as mini-grids, off-grid, or stand-alone options 
might be more economic in some circumstances, but the present ana-
lysis does not include these. 
 Figure 17.34 shows, for each region, the additional connection capacity 
and total cumulative investment needed until 2030 to achieve rural elec-
trification and compares results across the two models. The largest invest-
ment needs, not surprisingly, are in sub-Saharan Africa, where cumulative 
investment to achieve universal access amounts to an additional US$230 
billion between 2010 and 2030. In the low demand scenario, where min-
imal access is assumed, the cost is significantly lower – about US$37 
billion in the case of sub-Saharan Africa. However, this may not be con-
sidered sufficient and sustainable electricity access in the longer term. In 
general, the range in estimates depicted in the figure reflects the diffe-
rence between the results from the two alternative models used. In Pacific 
Asia and South Asia, the majority of investment takes place in the no new 
policies case, so that the additional investment needed is relatively lower. 
This implies that additional investment for universal access in the three 
regions of sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Pacific Asia is estimated at 
about US$300 billion cumulatively between 2010 and 2030. 
 17.4.3  Impacts of Access Policies on Energy Demand 
and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 The impacts of alternative policies for improving access to electricity 
and clean fuels for cooking are relatively modest in comparison with 
changes in demand in other sectors. As seen in  Figure 17.35 , compared 
with the base year 2005, energy demand in 2030 is projected to almost 
double in the case where no new access policies are implemented, from 
17.7 EJ to 33.2 EJ, with most of this rise accounted for by additional LPG 
demand for cooking and kerosene and electricity for lighting and appli-
ances. In an access scenario with no fuel subsidy but easier access to 
credit through microfinance and minimal electricity access, total energy 
demand in the low electricity demand case in 2030 is lower than in 
the no new policies case, but LPG and electricity demand are higher. In 
this scenario, in addition to improved microfinance, if it is assumed that 
all households dependent on solid fuels are provided with improved 
biomass stoves that double the efficiency of combustion, then biomass 
demand in this scenario could be cut in half, from 10 EJ, as shown in 
 Figure 17.35 , to about 5 EJ. Finally, in the case where a 50% fuel subsidy 
is combined with improved microfinance and high electricity demand 
with universal access, total energy demand actually drops to 16.8 EJ. 
This is explained by a rapid shift away from biomass to more efficient 
LPG for cooking and a substitution away from kerosene to electricity 
for lighting. Total LPG demand in this scenario is projected to rise from 
1.1 EJ in the base year to 9.4 EJ in 2030; biomass demand declines from 
13.4 EJ to 1.7 EJ over the same period. This increase in LPG demand over 
the entire projection period for the three developing regions amounts to 
less than half of energy use in 2005 in the Western European transpor-
tation sector alone. Electricity demand rises in this scenario from 1.7 EJ 
in 2005 to 5.7 EJ by 2030, displacing about 6.6 EJ of kerosene. 
 The changes in final energy demand due to various access policies also 
have implications for GHG emissions.  Figure 17.35 presents the impacts 
of various access policies on total GHG emissions relative to the base 
year of 2005. The grey columns (scale on the right axis) depict total emis-
sions, assuming that all biomass consumption is sustainably harvested, 
and the error bars indicate emissions in the case where 20% of biomass 
consumption is assumed to be harvested unsustainably. Without any 
access policy, total GHG emissions increase by 65%, to 4.7 gigatonnes 
 Figure 17.34 |  Additional connection capacity and cumulative investment required to 
achieve almost universal rural electriﬁ cation in three developing regions. Additional 
connection capacity equates to additional generation capacity of approximately 2 
GW for the low case and 22 GW for the high case in the MESSAGE-Access model. 
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of carbon dioxide-equivalent (GtCO 2 -eq.) in 2030 compared with 2.9 
GtCO 2 -eq. in 2005. As a consequence of implementing access polices, 
GHG emissions decline marginally, having a negligible impact overall. 
 17.4.4  Summary of the Costs and Impacts of Access 
Policies 
 The previous subsections have highlighted the level of existing access to 
both clean cooking and electricity in developing countries, the policies 
and measures required to accelerate access, and the relative costs and 
effectiveness of these policies and measures in achieving access goals 
and targets. Detailed assessments and scenarios were constructed for the 
three major regions of the world where the lack of access is most acute, 
namely, South Asia, Pacific Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. These regions 
account for over 85% of the total global population without access to 
electricity and over 70% of the global population still dependent on solid 
fuels. Extrapolating the cost estimates for these three key regions to arrive 
at a global estimate of the costs of access policies suggests that between 
US$36 billion and US$41 billion will need to be spent annually until 2030 
to ensure that almost universal access to clean cooking and electricity 
is achieved. For the high end of the estimate, about half of this amount 
will need to be spent on improving access to electricity and the rest on 
improving access to clean cooking. The largest share of this spending 
(more than a third of the total cost to achieve clean cooking access and 
two-thirds of the electrification bill) will need to occur in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The wide range in estimated costs is a consequence of whether 
the cost of stoves (LPG and improved biomass stoves) is included in the 
estimates or assumed to be provided through microfinance instruments 
that recover these costs. However, even the high end of this estimate is 
less than 5% of global energy sector investment today. 
 Spending on policies and measures to achieve access goals by 2030 will 
improve the welfare of those benefiting in several ways. Health impacts 
from improved household air quality are quantified in Section 17.5.2.3. 
Access policies will result in averting between 0.6 million and 1.8 mil-
lion premature deaths, on average, every year until 2030, or a savings of 
over 24 million DALYs annually. Additional benefits that are likely to be 
substantial include time savings for women and children and the poten-
tial for improved livelihood opportunities. 
 17.5  Energy and the Environment 
 17.5.1  Climate Change 
 The ultimate goal of international climate change policy, as stated in Article 
2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, is to 
“avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” 
This goal has motivated a wide array of analyses of potentially dangerous 
climate change impacts and of mitigation strategies that might limit GHG 
concentrations or global average temperature increases. (For an overview 
see, for example, Smith et al.,  2009 , or the report by IPCC AR4 Working 
Group II, IPCC,  2007 ). Political attention has increasingly focused on limit-
ing global average warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels, as reflected 
most recently in the acknowledgment by the Copenhagen Accord of the 
scientific basis for such a limit (O’Neill et al,  2010b ). 
 The 2°C limit on warming has also been adopted by the GEA as one of 
the main sustainability objectives. This target is one of the fundamental 
drivers of the demand- and supply-side transformations portrayed in 
 Sections 17.3.2 and  17.3.3 , respectively. The sequel of this section will 
focus on the consequences of the transformation for the required reduc-
tions of GHG emissions, the pace at which the energy system will need 
to decarbonize, associated costs, and finally, some potential implica-
tions with respect to the regional equity of the solutions. 
 17.5.1.1  Probability of Staying below 2°C Temperature 
Change 
 The relationship among future GHG emissions, resulting changes in 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, and the ultimate effect in terms 
of temperature change is subject to large uncertainty. Major reasons for 
this uncertainty include the limited present understanding of important 
carbon cycle feedbacks and, in particular, the uncertainty surrounding 
the so-called climate sensitivity, defined as the increase in global mean 
temperature resulting from a doubling of the GHG concentration in the 
atmosphere. 
 Implications of this uncertainty are manifold. First, climate change needs 
to be seen within the context of an adaptive risk management problem. 
That is, the risks of exceeding future thresholds for specific impacts need 
to be viewed in the context of measures undertaken today and in the 
future to reduce those risks, and the costs of those measures. Second, 
targets such as the 2°C limit need to be studied in a probabilistic context. 
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In other words, one has to define the likelihood with which a certain 
temperature target can be achieved to properly define the objective. 
 The GEA pathways aim at an ambitious target that maximizes the 
chances of keeping the global temperature increase below 2°C, while 
at the same time providing sufficient flexibility in the system to allow 
for multiple pathways to reach the target. Setting an ambitious target 
is important for limiting the risk of dangerous interference with the 
 climate system with high likelihood. Flexibility of solutions is central for 
identifying decarbonization strategies that are robust against multiple 
uncertainties due, for example, to potential technological failure and 
the associated risks (see also the discussion about flexibility in  Section 
17.3.3 ). An extensive sensitivity analysis was therefore conducted to 
assess the “maximum” likelihoods under a range of assumptions for the 
stringency of emissions reductions. (For an illustration of likelihood esti-
mates of different emissions pathways, see, for example,  Figure 17.53 .) 
Probabilistic assessment of the relationship between GHG emissions 
and global temperature change has been studied by den Elzen and van 
Vuuren, ( 2007 ), Keppo et al. ( 2007 ), Meinshausen ( 2006 ), Meinshausen 
et al. ( 2009 ) and O’Neill et al. ( 2010a ). Like these earlier studies, the pre-
sent analysis finds that under very stringent emissions reductions, the 
2°C target can be achieved with a likelihood exceeding 50%  (maximum 
likelihoods found in the analysis were around 67%). 41 
 Exact numerical values for the likelihood of meeting the 2°C target 
 differ slightly across the individual GEA pathways. In principle, however, 
all GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply pathways stay below the 
2°C target with a probability between 50% and 67%. 
 17.5.1.2  GEA Emissions Pathways 
 The target of limiting temperature change to 2°C with a probability above 
50% translates into very stringent emissions reductions, comparable to 
the lowest emissions scenarios that have been developed so far with 
integrated assessment models. This section focuses on CO 2 emissions, 
as these make up the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions from 
energy and industry by far. For non-CO 2 emissions of the GEA pathways, 
see the online GEA database: www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb. 
 Figure 17.36 compares the total global CO 2 emissions pathways of the 
GEA with selected scenarios from the literature, including the most 
stringent climate change mitigation scenarios assessed by the IPCC 
AR4 (category I, Fisher et al.,  2007 ) as well as high-emissions scenarios 
assuming no interventions or climate policies in the future (Nakicenovic 
and Swart,  2000 ). As the figure illustrates, total CO 2 emissions (from 
land use, energy, and industry) in the GEA pathways follow a trajec-
tory comparable to those of the most stringent IPCC scenarios. In these 
 low-emissions pathways, emissions may continue to increase for a very 
short period but have to peak and decline rapidly thereafter to reach 
zero to negative emissions in the long term. 
 The low-emissions pathways of the GEA and the IPCC category I scenarios 
are compatible with long-term atmospheric CO 2 concentrations below 
400 parts per million (ppm). In fact, most of the GEA pathways reduce CO 2 
concentrations to around today’s concentration of about 390 ppm. 42 These 
low concentrations are the result of achieving globally negative emissions 
due to enhancements of the terrestrial sink potential (e.g., afforestation 
and reforestation) in combination with BioCCS in the late 21st century. 
Further details on emissions mitigation options are provided below. 
Accounting for the direct and indirect effects of non-CO 2 GHG emissions 
and other radiatively active substances results in long-term concentration 
levels under the GEA scenarios of 440–450 ppm CO 2 -equivalent. 
 The CO 2 emissions of the GEA pathways are driven by stringent GHG 
mitigation policies to reduce emissions intensities across all sectors and 
sources (see  Section 17.5.1.3 ). The magnitude of the challenge is huge, as 
 Figure 17.36 illustrates by comparing the GEA emissions pathways with 
scenarios without any future climate change mitigation policies. Although, 
again, emissions in the absence of climate policies are subject to relatively 
large uncertainties, the GEA pathways depict reductions of about 70–85% 
by 2050 compared with scenarios without any policy interference. 
 Arguably, a more informative indicator of the necessary emissions 
reductions is obtained by comparing future emissions with today’s lev-
els. For this purpose,  Figure 17.37 considers CO 2 emissions from energy 
and industrial sources only. The corresponding emissions profiles of the 
GEA pathways feature three major characteristics for the short, medium, 
and long term: 
 41  For the estimation of likelihoods of temperature outcomes, the probability distribu-
tion of the climate sensitivity of Forest et al. ( 2002 ) was used. The methodology is 
described in detail in O’Neill et al. ( 2010a ) and Keppo et al. ( 2007 ). 
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 42  As reported by the Mauna Loa observatory (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/
trends/#mlo). 
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 rapid introduction of climate change mitigation measures over the  •
next decade to stop emissions growth, resulting in a peaking of 
emissions by about 2020; 
 further strengthening of climate policies over the medium term to  •
achieve CO 2 emissions reductions of about 30–70% by 2050 com-
pared with 2000; and 
 net negative emissions by the end of the century in the majority of  •
pathways (particularly those that allow for BioCCS). 
 The relatively wide range of emissions reductions by 2050 reflects 
uncertainties with respect to emissions reduction potentials in the long 
and the short term. It is derived from the comprehensive sensitivity ana-
lysis across the transformation pathways and reflects choices as well as 
uncertainties with respect to policy implementation and technological 
development on both the demand and supply sides of the energy sys-
tem (see  Sections 17.3.2 and  17.3.3 ). Generally, pathways that have 
restricted supply-side portfolios (e.g., limited potential for renewables, 
or no CCS) require more rapid emissions reductions early in the cen-
tury, to compensate for the loss of mitigation potential in the long term. 
For example, in the absence of bioenergy and CCS, emissions from the 
energy sector cannot become negative in the long term and thus need 
to be reduced comparatively more early in the century. A later subsec-
tion revisits the issue of how technology assumptions may influence the 
emissions profile. 
 The stringency of the emissions reductions becomes apparent when 
reviewing the cumulative emissions budgets of the GEA pathways. 
Given the cumulative nature of climate change, aggregate emissions 
over the full century represent one of the central boundary conditions 
for staying below the 2°C target. In the GEA pathways, the allowable 
emissions budget is on average around 1180 GtCO 2 between 2010 and 
2100 (full range is 940–1460 GtCO 2 ). At today’s rate of emissions, this 
“headroom” would be spent on average in about 38 years (full range 
between 30–45 years). With continuing growth in emissions in the 
absence of any new climate policies, the headroom would shrink further 
to about 27 years (full range between 22–32 years) before the overall 
objective for the full century would become out of reach. 
 Table 17.16 summarizes the characteristics of the GEA pathways and 
compares them with the lowest emissions scenarios assessed by the 
IPCC (category I). In addition to the IPCC scenarios, this analysis consid-
ers the three main recent studies that have looked into the relationship 
between short- and medium-term emissions characteristics of a wide 
set of scenarios. Van Vuuren and Riahi ( 2011 ) have conducted a survey 
of recent scenarios and updated the IPCC assessment with a wider set 
of new scenarios published since that assessment (collated from dif-
ferent sources). In addition, the results of studies by den Elzen and van 
Vuuren ( 2007 ) and O’Neill et al. ( 2010b ) are shown, since they explicitly 
analyze short-term emissions reductions in the context of long-term 
temperature and GHG concentration targets. 
 The results across the studies are relatively similar, and all studies sug-
gest the need for very ambitious short-term emissions reductions if CO 2 
concentrations are to be kept below 400 ppm (corresponding to the 2°C 
target with a likelihood exceeding 50%). However, both the most recent 
studies and the GEA pathways indicate that there might be slightly 
greater flexibility for emissions reductions than indicated by the IPCC 
assessment. As noted by van Vuuren and Riahi ( 2011 ), a main reason for 
this difference is that a large number of new scenario studies have been 
published since the IPCC AR4 (IPCC,  2007 ), especially for very low long-
term concentration levels. For instance, global emissions peak around 
2020 in the GEA pathways as well as in the recent literature, which is 
around five years later than reported by the IPCC. Similarly, 2050 emis-
sion reductions in the least reduction scenarios are about 30% in the 
GEA pathways, compared to 50% at the time of the IPCC assessment. 
Studies that explicitly explored emissions thresholds that, if surpassed, 
would make the lowest long-term targets infeasible suggest even less 
stringent emissions reductions (O’Neill,  2010b ). This latter conclusion 
depends, among other things, on assumptions about the future avail-
ability of technology and the feasibility of negative emissions in the 
second half of the century, which is reviewed next. 
 Impact of Technology Assumptions on Required Short-Term 
Emissions Reductions 
 As indicated earlier, the trajectory of emissions in the GEA pathways 
depends strongly on assumptions about technologies, the portfolio of 
abatement options considered, and their potentials. Crucial technological 
options include energy efficiency-enhancing technologies, renewables, 
CCS, and nuclear energy, as well as technologies that would allow for 
negative emissions later in the century, such as carbon plantations and 
BioCCS. For a discussion of the deployment of these options and how 
they shape the energy transformation, see  Sections 17.3.2 and  17.3.3 . 
 The full set of GEA pathways explores alternative combinations of the 
above options, including pathways with restricted supply-side portfo-
lios ( Section 17.3.3.5 ). These restrictions have significant implications 
for the short-term emissions pathway. Generally, pathways that assume 
limits on the potential of individual options in the long term require 
stronger short-term emissions reductions in order to stay within the 
cumulative emissions budget (dictated by the stringent climate change 
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objective). Although this is the case for all restricted pathways and tech-
nology combinations that were analyzed,  Figure 17.38 shows the order 
of magnitude of this effect by using BioCCS as an illustrative example. 
The figure compares results of the scenario survey of van Vuuren and 
Riahi ( 2011 ) with the GEA pathways both for cases with BioCCS and for 
cases assuming that BioCCS does not become available in the future. 
 In general, pathways that include BioCCS allow for more mod-
est emissions reductions in 2020 and 2050. Despite the fact that 
BioCCS is rather a long-term option (see  Section 17.3.3.5 ), the dif-
ferences across pathways with respect to emissions are already rela-
tively large by 2020 ( Figure 17.38 ). From a systems perspective, the 
results thus also illustrate the path dependency of the energy system 
and the importance of long-term planning for short-term decisions. 
In addition, this finding highlights the importance of the branch-
ing point concept and the restricted portfolio analysis of the GEA 
for deriving robust policy conclusions for the short term (see next 
section). 
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 Table 17.16 |  Emissions trends in the GEA pathways and in the literature. 
Study
Year of peak 
emissions
 Emissions reduction 
 in 2050 from 2000 
level (%) 
No. of scenarios
Cumulative emissions (GtCO 2 ) 4 
2000–2050 2000–2100
Van Vuuren and Riahi 
(2011)
Before 2020 -85 to -40 27 807–1357 807–1522
IPCC (2007, category I) 1  2000 –2015 -85 to -50 6 n/a n/a
 O’Neill et al. ( 2010b )  2 Before 2030 -85 to -15 9 1393–1760 770–1503
Den Elzen and van Vuuren 
(2007)
Before 2020 -65 to -40 12 1144–1320 1364–1723
GEA (illustrative pathways) 3 Before 2020 -45 to -35 3 1290–1350 1490–1520
GEA (full set) Before 2020 -70 to -30 41 980–1400 1230–1540
 1  IPCC AR4 ranges refer to the 90th percentile of the scenario distribution. 
 2  Includes scenarios down to 415 ppm CO 2 -eq. by the end of the century. 
 3  Ranges across the three illustrative GEA pathways for GEA-Supply, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efﬁ ciency. 
 4  CO 2 emissions from fossil energy and industry. 
 n/a, not available. 
 Source: den Elzen and van Vuuren,  2007 ; van Vuuren and Riahi,  2011 ; IPCC,  2007 ; O’Neill et al.,  2010b . 
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 Comparison with Present Pledges 
 Having reviewed the emissions under the GEA pathways, this  section turns 
to how they compare with present plans for GHG emissions reductions. 
 Various countries have made commitments to mitigation actions in 
the context of the Copenhagen Accord. The compound effect of these 
pledges on global GHG emissions is subject to uncertainty. Estimates 
differ between studies that have collated individual country pledges and 
translated them into global emissions levels due to different assumptions 
about, for example, the business-as-usual scenario, national actions, the 
use of offsets included in other countries’ targets, particular emissions 
categories, and the role of land use change (UNEP,  2010 ). Rogelj et al. 
( 2010 ), for example, estimate that the present pledges are likely to lead 
to global emissions of 47.9–53.6 GtCO 2 -eq. by 2020, and UNEP ( 2010 ) 
estimates a range between 48.8–51.2 GtCO 2 -eq. by that year. 
 Figure 17.39 compares the range of emissions expected to result from the 
pledges by 2020 with the emissions reductions under the GEA pathways. 
As the figure illustrates, even the most optimistic assumptions about 
future implementation of pledges lead to emissions levels at around the 
upper bound of the GEA pathways. Present commitments are therefore 
not sufficient and thus inconsistent with the vast majority of the GEA 
pathways, which aim at limiting global temperature increase to 2°C com-
pared with preindustrial times (with a likelihood of above 50%). 
 The gap between the present pledges and the GEA pathways ranges 
between none (a slight overlap of around 2 GtCO 2 -eq.) to as large as 
11 GtCO 2 -eq. The pathways with no gap combine the most optimistic 
assumptions about the emissions reductions resulting from present 
pledges with the highest emissions estimate from all 41 feasible GEA 
pathways in 2020. However, as discussed earlier, the GEA pathways with 
the highest emissions in the short term coincide with those cases that 
employ the most optimistic assumptions about the future availability of 
technology, and in which the full portfolio of all mitigation options can 
expand pervasively and successfully. Any restriction to the portfolio of 
mitigation options requires greater emissions reductions over the short 
term in order to compensate for the loss of emissions reduction poten-
tial in the long term. The gap between present pledges and the GEA 
pathways is therefore small only if one combines both the most opti-
mistic assumptions about pledges with the most optimistic assumptions 
for the full portfolio of all mitigation options. The likelihood of the gap 
actually being small is thus rather low, especially if one considers the 
history of technology failure as well as the past performances of some 
countries in terms of emissions reductions. 
 The Price of CO 2 
 Figure 17.39 also shows, for each of several groups of GEA pathways, 
the CO 2 price that would need to be introduced globally to achieve 
the required reductions in emissions by 2020. According to this study’s 
estimates, CO 2 prices would need to be on the order of US$15–45 per 
tonne of CO 2 to keep emissions in 2020 between 2005 and 2010 levels. 
As discussed in  Section 17.3.5 , however, higher carbon prices will need 
to be complemented by regulation and technology standards to mobil-
ize the required investments and to act against, for example, rebound 
effects or barriers to implementation. In addition, the stringency of the 
mitigation policies needs to increase over time, leading to CO 2 prices 
increasing at about the pace of the discount rate (5%/year in the pre-
sent analysis). In the most stringent emissions pathways, emissions 
need to drop to below the level of 2000 by 2020. The global CO 2 price 
corresponding to such stringent reductions is above US$110/tonne 
of CO 2 , a value comparable with average gasoline taxes in Western 
Europe today. 
 17.5.1.3  Emissions Mitigation in the Energy Sector 
 As discussed earlier in this section, the objective to limit temperature cha-
nge to below 2 ˚ C with a likelihood greater than 50% translates into strin-
gent emissions reduction targets for virtually all GHG-emitting sectors. 
 The abatement of GHG emissions can be achieved through a wide port-
folio of measures in the energy, industry, agriculture, and forestry sectors, 
which are the principal sources of emissions and thus of global warm-
ing. Measures to reduce CO 2 emissions range from structural changes to 
the energy system and the replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels 
with cleaner alternatives on the supply side (such as a switch from coal 
power generation to the enhanced use of nuclear and renewable energy) 
to demand-side measures geared toward energy conservation and effi-
ciency improvements. In addition, CCS provides an “add-on” end-of-pipe 
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 Figure 17.39 |  Short-term GHG emissions in the GEA pathways compared with the 
range of emissions resulting from present pledges by 2020. The lower error bar gives 
the 90th percentile range of 2020 emissions from low-mitigation scenarios in the 
literature (van Vuuren and Riahi,  2011 ). The GEA pathways are grouped according to 
ranges of CO 2 prices by 2020. 
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approach for the decarbonization of hydrocarbon fuels. Other important 
options for GHG emissions reductions encompass the enhancement of 
forest sinks through afforestation and reforestation activities, as well as 
non-CO 2 emissions reductions in the agricultural sector. 
 Section 17.3.2.2 provides a comprehensive discussion of specific meas-
ures to improve efficiency on the demand side. In addition, structural 
changes on the energy supply side of the GEA pathways are illustrated 
in detail in  Section 17.3.3 . This section primarily explores the GHG 
emissions implications of those transformations, with a specific focus 
on the resultant pace of the decarbonization of energy supply as well 
as on the demand-side sectors (industry, residential and commercial, 
and transport). 
 At present, roughly 50% (14 GtCO 2 ) of global CO 2 emissions from 
energy are due to supply-side conversion processes, including electricity 
and heat generation and refining, but also losses during the transmis-
sion and distribution of fuels ( Figure 17.40 ). The other half of emissions 
come from the direct use of fossil fuels in the end-use sectors: industry 
(5.6 GtCO 2 ), transportation (6.1 GtCO 2 ), and residential and commercial 
(3.6 GtCO 2 ). 43 In addition, about 2.2 GtCO 2 are contained in industry 
feedstocks and about 2.7 GtCO 2 -eq. of non-CO 2 GHGs are emitted by the 
energy and industrial sectors (for example, methane from coal extrac-
tion and long-lived gases such as sulfur hexafluoride and hydrofluoro-
carbons in industrial processes). 
 The stringent climate objective of the GEA pathways requires cutting 
CO 2 emissions from energy and industrial sources by about half in 2050 
from 2000 levels (the full range across pathways is 30–70%). The bulk 
of these emissions reductions are achieved through decarbonization of 
supply, reducing its share of energy-related emissions from 50% today 
to between about 25–45% by 2050 (with exception of pathways assum-
ing limited intermittent renewables assessed in  Section 17.3 ). However, 
integration of supply and demand remains essential, since one of the 
main reasons for the comparatively rapid decarbonization of supply is 
the increasing quality and flexibility of fuels demanded by consumers 
(e.g., electricity). Higher fuel quality requires more elaborate conversion 
processes and thus permits decarbonization through both fuel switching 
(e.g., from coal power plants to renewable power) and end-of-pipe (CCS) 
solutions. The latter option is economic only in large centralized systems 
and is thus not applicable in the context of dispersed and heterogeneous 
demand-side sources (except for some industrial applications, such as 
CCS from cement production, which is considered in this analysis). 
 The enormous speed of supply-side decarbonization in the GEA path-
ways is also illustrated by the build-up rates of low-carbon power plants 
(nuclear, renewable, or fossil power plants with CCS), which reach 
a share of around 75–98% of global power generation by 2050. By 
comparison, the low-carbon share of primary energy increases to (still 
impressive but lower) shares of about 65–85% over the same period 
(see  Section 17.3.4.3 for further details). 
 The decarbonization of the demand side is equally ambitious, although 
by mid-century significant amounts of fossil fuels continue to play a 
role in the final energy mix in most of the GEA pathways. Emissions 
reductions on the demand side are primarily due to fuel switching away 
from direct use of fossil fuels, as well as increased efficiency of end-
use devices. 44 At the aggregate global level, emissions from the end-use 
sectors are reduced by about 45% in most of the GEA pathways by 
2050 compared with 2000 ( Figure 17.40 ). These reductions are achieved 
despite increases in energy services levels. The low-carbon share of 
final energy fuels for services thus needs to increase significantly, from 
about 30% today to 60–70% by 2050 (see  Section 17.3.4.3 for further 
details). The GEA-Efficiency pathways, which aim at limiting demand as 
one of the principal measures to attain the GEA sustainability targets, 
show more flexibility with respect to the rate of decarbonization and 
structural changes and are thus obviously at the lower bound of the 
ranges for low-carbon shares (for final and primary energy as well as 
electricity shares). Efforts to reduce emissions differ significantly across 
regions and are generally higher in today’s industrialized world than in 
the developing world (see  Figure 17.40 and the GEA web database, at 
www.globalenergyassessment.org, for further regional detail). 
 17.5.1.4  Regional Perspectives and Equity Issues 
 Achieving emissions reductions, especially such drastic ones as those 
depicted by the GEA pathways, is a formidable task, considering that 
developing countries require increases in energy services and other 
activities that result in GHG emissions. The salient questions are how 
such reductions might be achieved and by whom, and what the effects 
(economic, distributive, etc.) might be. In other words, how is the burden 
of global emissions reduction going to be shared, and what might be 
the criteria for such burden sharing? 
 Of crucial importance in this context is the large disparity between indus-
trialized and developing countries. The former are responsible for about 
40% of global energy-related emissions but account for only 20% of 
the world population. The more industrialized countries are also respon-
sible (some more than others) for the bulk of the historical increase in 
anthropogenic GHG concentrations. Conversely, developing countries 
will become more important contributors to GHG emissions in the future, 
almost independent of how high or low global GHG emissions actually 
turn out to be (Grubler and Nakicenovic,  1994 ; Riahi et al.,  2007 ). 
 Regional disparities with respect to today’s per capita emissions are 
illustrated in  Figure 17.41 . Differences between regions up to an order 
 43  Estimates from the industry sector include also process emissions (e.g., from cement 
production) and emissions related to nonenergy feedstocks (e.g., asphalt and 
lubricants). 
 44  The latter effect of reduced energy demand decreases emissions throughout the 
system and thus also contributes to the supply-side emissions reductions discussed 
above in this section. 
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of magnitude are seen: all the high-income regions of the industrialized 
world are significantly above the world average, whereas most develop-
ing regions are considerably below the average. 
 The results of the GEA transition pathways clearly indicate the need for 
emissions reductions across virtually all regions in order to halve global 
per capita emissions by 2050 ( Figure 17.41 ). Given the stringency of the 
GEA target and the implied magnitude of emissions reductions, today’s 
industrialized countries must contribute proportionally greater reductions 
in per capita emissions. In the aggregate, this results in more equitable per 
capita emissions distributions in 2050 than today. Nevertheless, as  Figure 
17.41 illustrates, some of today’s most emissions-intensive regions (e.g., 
North America and the former Soviet Union) continue to emit more than 
the world average in 2050, while the poorest regions (e.g., South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa) stay considerably below the world average. 
 It is important to emphasize that the vast majority of model-based mitiga-
tion analyses employ a cost-effectiveness approach. This means that emis-
sions reductions are implemented globally when and where they are most 
cost-effective. The GEA scenarios are no exception in this respect. The GEA 
pathways address the question of when and how to spatially allocate, for 
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example, scarce investments to meet the overall mitigation objective cost-
effectively, but they do not explicitly quantify who pays for those reduc-
tions. That will depend specifically on international agreements about 
regional emissions entitlements and agreed-upon equity principles. 
 The regional allocation of future emissions reductions following equity 
principles may differ significantly under the cost-effectiveness approach. 
Generally, it is argued that given their historical responsibility and greater 
affluence, today’s industrialized countries should take the lead in reducing 
emissions (Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change). Numerous studies have analyzed the regional emissions 
allocations or requirements for emissions reductions and time of partici-
pation in the international climate change regime. (For summaries see 
the IPCC AR4,  Chapter 13 , or Berk and den Elzen,  2001 ; Blanchard,  2002 ; 
Winkler et al.,  2002 ; Criqui et al.,  2003 ; Nakicenovic and Riahi,  2003 ;Bollen 
et al.,  2004 ; B ö hringer and Welsch,  2004 ; Groenenberg et al.,  2004 ; 
B ö hringer and L ö schel,  2005 ; den Elzen and Meinshausen,  2005 ; den Elzen 
and Lucas,  2005 ; den Elzen et al.,  2005 ;H ö hne et al.,  2005 ; Michaelowa 
et al.,  2005 ; H ö hne,  2006 ; and Persson et al.,  2006 ).  A large variety of 
system designs for allocating emissions allowances or permits has been 
analyzed, including contraction and convergence of per capita emissions, 
multistage approaches, and triptych (sectoral) and intensity targets. 
 A discussion of all the different proposals in the literature is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, this section addresses two central ques-
tions linked to the equity dimension of the GEA transition pathways. The 
first question is to what extent developing countries could delay their 
participation in emissions reduction, considering the stringency of the 
climate target of the GEA pathways. Here the analysis relies on findings 
from a recent modeling intercomparison project of the Energy Modeling 
Forum (EMF22), in which both modeling teams of the GEA (MESSAGE 
and IMAGE) were involved. The second question concerns the financial 
transfers that might be needed to create appropriate incentives in the 
developing world to join international climate agreements. 
 The Effect of Delayed Participation 
 A study by the Energy Modeling Forum (Clarke et al.,  2009 ) investigated 
the effect of delayed participation of key regions in the developing world 
on the attainability and costs of a range of climate stabilization tar-
gets. Eleven of the leading integrated assessment modeling teams par-
ticipated in the study. They jointly explored 10 alternative policy cases, 
assuming either full participation or a delay of the developing world and 
Russia in joining the international emissions mitigation regime. 
 Specifically, for the delayed participation scenarios, it was assumed that 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China do not start emissions reduction efforts 
until 2030, and other developing countries until 2050. The study also 
explored alternative emissions trajectories by differentiating between 
targets for CO 2 -equivalent concentrations that may temporarily “over-
shoot” and targets that do not allow for overshoot. The summary of the 
EMF22 attainability analysis is presented and compared with the results 
of the GEA pathways in  Figure 17.42 . 
 The EMF22 results clearly indicate that whether delayed participation 
has any implications for the attainability of the target depends strongly 
on the ambitiousness, and thus the stringency, of the objective. The 
majority of the modeling frameworks, for example, found that although 
delayed participation by the developing world has significant implica-
tions for overall costs, targets above 550 ppm CO 2 -eq. are still attain-
able. For more stringent target levels such as those adopted in the GEA 
(450 ppm CO 2 -eq.), however, 12 out of 14 scenarios were rejected, since 
they were found to be infeasible under the assumption of delayed par-
ticipation (see the category “Overshoot: Delay” in the right panel of 
 Figure 17.42 ). 
 Delays by the major emitting countries of the developing world in join-
ing a comprehensive international emissions mitigation regime would 
thus make attainment of the GEA objective, to limit temperature change 
to below 2°C with a probability greater than 50%, very unlikely. Full but 
differentiated participation in reduction efforts by the developing world, 
on the other hand, significantly increases the chance of success. 
 Transfers under Contraction-and-Convergence Assumptions 
 This section explores the implications of an illustrative burden-sharing 
scheme for the allocation of future emissions rights and applies it to the 
GEA pathways. This burden-sharing scheme is referred to in the litera-
ture as a “contraction and convergence” scheme (see, e.g., den Elzen 
and van Vuuren,  2007 ). In essence, under such a scheme, all regions 
need to converge to a common per capita emissions entitlement by a 
specified date (2050). For regions with per capita emissions above the 
world average, this implies reductions (hence the term “contraction”) 
until the convergence criterion is fulfilled, but starting from very differ-
ent initial conditions. For regions with per capita emissions below the 
world average, emissions can rise initially until they reach the world 
average. Thereafter, these regions also need to contract to the specified 
convergence level. The resulting emissions projections from the alloca-
tion scheme differ from the original GEA pathways, which assume that 
reductions take place where they are most cost-effective. 
 Figure 17.43 contrasts the difference between emissions entitlements 
and cost-effective emissions reductions of the original GEA pathways. 
In the aggregate, an equal allocation of per capita emissions by 2050 
results in comparatively higher reduction needs in industrialized regions. 
This entails higher mitigation costs for these regions and creates an 
incentive to buy emissions permits on, for example, a global market. 
In addition to reducing total mitigation cost, trading emissions entitle-
ments would have the co-benefit of generating revenue for developing 
regions. Developing countries with emissions below the world per cap-
ita average by 2050 therefore have an incentive to sell permits. 
 Figure 17.44 shows cumulative energy system expenditure for the ori-
ginal (cost-effectiveness based) GEA pathways, as well as the additional 
costs that would accrue for industrialized countries if the contraction-
and-convergence target were achieved domestically. For developing 
countries this translates, of course, into lower energy system costs, due 
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 Figure 17.42 |  Carbon emissions reductions from industrial and fossil sources in 2050 from 10 integrated assessment models. Dots outside the ﬁ gure range indicate scenarios 
that were found to be infeasible under the speciﬁ ed criteria. 
 Figure 17.43 |  Projected GHG emissions in the case of contraction-and-convergence allocation of emissions entitlements compared with cost-effective emissions reductions in 
the GEA-Mix illustrative pathway. Shaded areas in the left panel show the resulting demand for permit trade in North America and Western Europe. Shaded areas in the right 
panel show the resulting emissions surplus for permit sales in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
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to their targets being relaxed, than if industrialized countries were to 
achieve all reductions domestically. 
 The increase in costs to industrialized countries to achieve the add-
itional emissions reductions domestically approximates the region’s 
willingness to buy permits outside the region (and thus to invest else-
where to achieve the reductions at lower cost). This study estimates that 
this willingness to pay might be around US$2 trillion to US$8 trillion 
over the course of next 40 years, or about 3–12% of the total energy 
system costs of the developing world. This corresponds on average to 
between US$50 billion and US$210 billion/year. Although small in com-
parison with total energy system costs, this is a large sum compared, 
for example, with total official development assistance in 2000, which 
amounted to some US$53 billion (UNCTAD,  2003 ). 
 The estimates of financial transfers in this section are only illustrative, 
because they are derived from this particular contraction-and-conver-
gence allocation scheme. Other allocation rules may yield different 
results. Science cannot answer the question of what particular ethical 
model should be used to determine the amount of international burden 
sharing appropriate to the challenges of mitigation and adaptation to 
a changing climate. Rather, this is a task for international negotiation 
and political decision making. Considering, however, the urgent need 
for rapid and globally comprehensive emissions reductions, as the GEA 
pathways make clear, decisions need to be made sooner rather than 
later, so that the 2°C target does not become out of reach. 
 17.5.2  Air Pollution 
 Pollution control is an essential component of sustainable development, 
as good air quality is a fundamental aspect of quality of life. Local air 
quality is directly linked to health, as discussed in detail in  Chapter 3 . As 
discussed in  Section 17.4 , household air pollution due to lack of access 
to modern cooking has serious health consequences; hence, improving 
the quality of fuels through policies on energy access is essential. Both 
ambient air quality in cities and air quality within rural and urban homes 
are major contributors to local health. In addition, a number of air pol-
lutants have other environmental impacts, such as acidification and 
eutrophication as well as damage to vegetation, as discussed in  Chapter 
3 . In this section, the focus is on the health implications of various policy 
packages that include increasingly stringent air quality control policies. 
 17.5.2.1  Air Quality Policies 
 Varying levels of stringency of air quality legislation are examined here 
in combination with a selection of other policies sampled from the GEA 
scenario space described in the earlier sections on energy efficiency 
( Section 17.3.2 ), energy access ( Section 17.4 ), and climate change 
( Section 17.5.1 ). The objective is to cover a wide range of air pollution 
outcomes and to analyze in detail the implications of different policy 
packages in terms of their health benefits. This section thus explores 
both future pollutant levels in the absence of further improvements in 
air quality legislation and GEA pathways that address all challenges 
simultaneously. 
 The assessment builds upon the MESSAGE energy model as the primary 
tool for deriving detailed, sector-based estimates of various pollutant 
gases. In addition, MESSAGE is linked to the GAINS air quality model 
(Amann et al.,  2008 ) to represent different levels of air quality legis-
lation until 2030 45 (for further details see Rafaj et al.,  2010 , and Rao 
et al.,  forthcoming ). Regional emissions estimates for 2005 are based 
on historical and current inventories as described in Granier et al. ( 2010 ) 
and Lamarque et al. ( 2010 ). A number of air pollutants and GHGs have 
been downscaled to spatially explicit levels for 0.5-degree resolution 
(see Riahi et al.,  2011 for methodology). To estimate the impacts of 
the spatially explicit emissions, atmospheric concentrations of particu-
late matter, aerosols, and ozone were derived using the TM5 model 
(Dentener et al.,  2006 ; Stevenson,  2006 ; Kinne et al.,  2006 ; Textor 
et al.,  2007 ; Bergamaschi et al.,  2007 ). TM5 includes contributions from 
(i) primary PM2.5 (particulate matter <2.5  μ m in diameter) released 
from anthropogenic sources, (ii) secondary inorganic aerosols formed 
from anthropogenic emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
ammonia, and (iii) particulate matter from natural sources (soil dust, sea 
salt, biogenic sources).  Table 17.17 describes in detail the background of 
the chosen policy packages and the types of air pollutants, sectors, and 
spatial scales covered by them. 
 The policies driving each of these scenarios and their relevance for air 
pollution outcomes are discussed in more detail below:
 45  Although the focus of this section is on the shorter-term pollution estimates until 
2030, emissions pathways are represented until 2100 based on assumptions of 
future improvements in emissions factors as described in Rafaj et al. ( 2010 ) and Rao 
et al. ( 2012 ). 
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  • No sustainability policies (FLE) : This policy package assumes that no 
specific policies on sustainability are implemented. There is no change 
in future air pollution policies relative to 2005. Energy demand in 
this scenario is higher than in the GEA-Supply illustrative scenario, as 
no climate change policies are implemented, and therefore no feed-
back on energy demand from such policies is assumed. There is also 
no implementation of policies on improving energy access, although 
increasing economic growth leads to a slow decline in the use of 
solid fuels for cooking and heating in developing regions. As a result 
of the “frozen legislation” (FLE) assumptions, pollution levels in this 
scenario are the highest among the scenarios described. 
  • Moderate air pollution policies (CLE1) : This scenario is identical to 
the FLE case in terms of energy structure and lack of specific poli-
cies on climate change and energy access. However, it assumes full 
implementation of all current and planned air pollution legislation 
(CLE) worldwide until 2030. (See  Table 17.18 for details of the types 
of measures undertaken.) Thus, this scenario provides a measure 
of the impact of current and planned air pollution policies in the 
absence of any specific climate or energy access policy. 
  • Moderate air pollution, stringent climate, and moderate energy 
access policies (CLE2) : This scenario is based on the illustrative scen-
ario of the GEA-Efficiency pathways group described earlier in this 
chapter in terms of energy demand and use and the implementation 
of a stringent climate policy corresponding to a global temperature 
target of 2°C maximum warming. In addition, it assumes a moderate 
energy access policy, corresponding to availability of microfinance 
and a 20% fuel subsidy (as described in  Section 17.4.1.2 ), as well as 
full implementation of all current and planned air quality legislation 
until 2030 as in the previous scenario. Thus, this scenario explicitly 
provides an indication of the multiple benefits of combining moder-
ate policies on climate change, energy access, and air pollution. 
  • Stringent air pollution, stringent climate, and moderate energy access 
policies (SLE1) : This scenario differs from the previous one in that it 
assumes global implementation of extremely stringent pollution pol-
icies until 2030 (see  Table 17.18 for details). These policies are much 
more aggressive than the currently planned legislation assumed in 
the previous two cases, but are less aggressive than the so-called 
maximum feasible reduction (MFR) level, which describes the techno-
logical frontier in terms of possible air quality control strategies by 
2030 (for further details on CLE and MFR, see Amann et al.,  2004 ). 
  • Stringent air pollution, stringent climate, and universal energy access 
policies (SLE2) : This is a variant of the previous scenario that includes 
in addition the universal access policy described in  Section 17.4 , and 
investigates specifically how stringent policies on energy access in 
developing regions, combined with stringent air pollution legislation, 
can affect emissions levels and associated health impacts. 
 Table 17.18 describes in detail the types of air pollution control tech-
nologies and policies adopted in the CLE and SLE cases. The information 
is derived and summarized from a number of GAINS-related publica-
tions including Cofala et al. (2007) and Kupiainen and Klimont ( 2004 ). 
 Policy Impacts on Pollutant Emissions 
 Anthropogenic sources are major contributors to outdoor air pollution, 
with the energy system alone contributing around 60% of PM2.5 emis-
sions in 2005. A number of policies to control air pollution have been 
implemented, especially in the industrialized countries, in the past two 
decades: global air pollution control costs in 2005 are estimated at 
US$195 billion. However, more than 80% of the world’s population is 
estimated to be exposed to PM2.5 concentrations exceeding WHO air 
quality standards (annual mean) of 10  μ g/m 3 in 2005 (see Rao et al., 
 2012 , for details). Future air pollution levels will depend on the future 
development of the energy system and the types of policies that are 
 Table 17.17 |  Policy matrix and coverage. 
Policy package
Policies
Air pollution Climate change Energy efficiency Energy access
FLE No improvement in air quality 
legislations beyond 2005
No climate change policy Annual energy intensity reduction 
of 1.5% until 2050
No speciﬁ c energy access policy; slow 
improvement in quality of cooking fuels
CLE1 All current and planned air quality 
legislations until 2030
No climate change policy Annual energy intensity reduction 
of 1.5% until 2050
No energy access policy; medium 
improvement in quality of cooking fuels
CLE2 All current and planned air quality 
legislations until 2030
Limit on temperature change to 2°C 
in 2100
Annual energy intensity reduction 
of 2.6% until 2050
Moderate energy access policy
SLE1 Stringent air quality legislations 
globally
Limit on temperature change to 2°C 
in 2100
Annual energy intensity reduction 
of 2.6% until 2050
Moderate energy access policy
SLE2 Stringent air quality legislations 
globally
Limit on temperature change to 2°C 
in 2100
Annual energy intensity reduction 
of 2.6% until 2050
Policies to ensure global access to clean 
energy by 2030
 Note: Sectors included in all policy packages are power plants, industry (combustion and process), road transport, international shipping and aviation, agricultural waste burning, 
biomass burning (deforestation, savannah burning, and vegetation ﬁ res). GHGs and air pollutants gridded include methane, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,volatile 
organic compounds, black carbon, organic carbon, and PM2.5; gridding is based on spatial allocation maps (using the dataset described in Lamarque et al. ( 2010 ) and methods 
from Riahi et al. ( 2011 )). 
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 Table 17.18 |  Policies and measures for air pollution control. 
Transport Industry and power plants
International 
shipping
Other
 Current legislation (CLE) 
Sulfur dioxide (SO 2 )  OECD: Directives on the sulfur 
content in liquid fuels; 
 Non-OECD: National 
legislation on the sulfur 
content in liquid fuels 
 OECD: Emission standards for new plants from the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) (OJ 1988) 
 Non-OECD: increased use of low-sulfur coal, 
increasing penetration of ﬂ ue gas desulfurization 
(FGD) after 2005 in new and existing plants 
MARPOL Annex VI 
regulations
Reduction in gas ﬂ aring, reduction in agricultural 
waste burning
Nitrogen oxides 
(NO x )
 OECD: Emission 
 controls for vehicles and 
off-road sources up to the 
EURO-IV/ EURO-V standard 
 Non-OECD: National emission 
standards equivalent to 
approximately EURO III-IV 
standards (vary by region) 
 OECD: Emission standards for new plants and 
emission ceilings for existing plants from the LCPD 
(OJ 1988). 
 National emission standards on stationary sources– 
if stricter than in the LCPD 
 Non-OECD: Primary measures for controlling of NO x 
Revised MARPOL 
Annex VI 
regulations
Reduction in gas ﬂ aring, reduction in agricultural 
waste burning
Carbon monoxide 
(CO)
As above for NO x Reduction in gas ﬂ aring, reduction in agricultural 
waste burning
Volatile organic 
compounds (VOC)
End-of-pipe measures as 
described above for NO x 
Solvent Directive of the EU (COM(96)538, 1997); 
1999 UNECE Gothenburg Protocol to Abate 
Acidiﬁ cation, Eutrophication and Ground-level 
Ozone
Reduction in gas ﬂ aring, reduction in agricultural 
waste burning
Ammonia (NH 3 ) End-of-pipe controls in industry (fertilizer 
manufacturing)
Substitution of urea fertilizers
PM2.5 1 EU and national legislation on power plants and 
industrial sources limiting stack concentrations 
of PM
Reduction in gas ﬂ aring, reduction in agricultural 
waste burning
 Stringent legislation (SLE) 
SO 2 As in CLE  High-efﬁ ciency ﬂ ue gases desulfurization (FGD) on 
existing and new large boilers 
 Use of low-sulfur fuels and simple FGD techniques 
for smaller combustion sectors 
 High-efﬁ ciency controls on process emission sources 
Revised MARPOL 
Annex VI and NO x 
Technical Code 
2008
 Cessation of gas ﬂ aring, 
 reduction in agricultural waste burning 
NO x As in CLE  Selective catalytic reduction at large plants in 
industry and in the power sector 
 Combustion modiﬁ cations for smaller sources in 
industry and in the residential and commercial 
 sectors 
 High-efﬁ ciency controls on process emission sources 
Revised MARPOL 
Annex VI and NO x 
Technical Code 
2008
 Cessation of gas ﬂ aring, 
 reduction in agricultural waste burning 
CO As in CLE  Cessation of gas ﬂ aring, 
 reduction in agricultural waste burning 
VOC As in CLE  Regular monitoring, ﬂ aring, as well as control of the 
evaporative loses from storage 
 Solvent use: full use of potential for substitution 
with low-solvent products in both “do it yourself” 
and 
 industrial applications, modiﬁ cation of application 
methods and introduction of solvent management 
plans 
 Cessation of gas ﬂ aring, 
 reduction in agricultural waste burning 
NH 3 End-of-pipe controls in industry (fertilizer 
manufacturing)
Substitution of urea fertilizers, rapid incorporation 
of solid manure, low nitrogen feed and bioﬁ ltration
PM2.5 (including 
BC and OC)
High-efﬁ ciency electrostatic precipitators, fabric 
ﬁ lters, new boiler types, ﬁ lters, good practices
Revised MARPOL 
Annex VI 
regulations
Good practices in agriculture production, ban on 
agricultural waste burning
 1  Legislation is for PM2.5 only, but black carbon and organic carbon emissions can be expected also to decline as a result. 
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implemented. The impacts of specific policies described in  Table 17.17 
on pollutant emissions in 2030 are examined below. 
 The absence of significant future legislation on air quality, combined 
with a lack of policies on energy efficiency and energy access (the FLE 
scenario), is seen to lead to a significant increase in all categories of 
emissions to more than 30% above 2005 levels and added deterioration 
in air quality, with 90% of the world’s population exposed to PM2.5 
concentration levels above WHO air quality standards – an increase of 
10 percentage points compared with 2005. 
 Currently planned air quality legislation (the CLE1 scenario) is seen to 
curb the growth of emissions, especially in OECD countries. However, 
emissions continue to increase in non-OECD countries because of the 
overall high energy demand and very little or nonexistent air quality 
legislation in many countries (e.g., in Africa). Sulfur dioxide emissions 
decrease globally by only 2% in 2030 compared with 2005, in spite of 
a 30% decrease in OECD countries. Nitrogen oxide emissions increase 
globally to 115 Mt, a 15% increase over 2005 levels, again mainly due to 
increasing emissions – in particular, from the transportation and power 
sectors – in non-OECD countries, particularly in Asia. Globally, PM2.5 
emissions decrease by around 2–3%, mainly from shifts in cooking 
fuels in the residential sector, currently the largest source of emissions 
(around 50% of the total, almost 90% of which is in non-OECD coun-
tries), as well as assumed legislation that establishes stronger controls 
on power plants, industry, and road transport. More than 80% of the 
world’s population continues to be exposed to levels above the man-
dated WHO standards, the same as in 2005. This clearly indicates that, 
even if currently legislated air pollution control policies were globally 
implemented, only modest declines in pollutants would be expected. 
This occurs mainly because of increasing growth in emissions in devel-
oping countries in spite of the significant technological shifts that can 
be expected in many parts of the world in the next two decades. 46 
 Emissions decline when air pollution policies are combined with add-
itional policies on climate change, energy access, and energy effi-
ciency. The effects of such combined policies are determined by the 
stringency of the individual policies assumed. A policy package of 
currently legislated air quality controls, together with policies on cli-
mate change, energy access, and energy efficiency (the CLE2 scen-
ario), results in emissions reductions on the order of 50% for sulfur 
dioxide (SO 2 ), 35% for nitrogen oxides (NO x ), and 30% for PM2.5. 
Most of these reductions (up to 80%) occur in non-OECD countries, 
thus indicating that the co- benefits of combined policies are the high-
est there. Comparing the panels of  Figure 17.45 , transport and indus-
trial sectors in particular are seen to be the most important sources of 
reductions (a 28% reduction in NO x and a 35% reduction in PM2.5), 
as these sectors offer significant opportunities for combined policies 
that can tap the co-benefits of GHG mitigation and air pollution con-
trol. 47 In the residential sector, moderately stringent policies on access 
to modern energy forms in developing countries have a significant 
impact on pollutant emissions (a 60% reduction in SO 2 and 30–40% 
 46  Emissions from international shipping, however, show a signiﬁ cant decline (80% reduc-
tion in SO 2 and 20% reduction in NO x ) despite increasing fuel use in this sector. This is 
because of the stringent international policies that are expected to govern this sector. 
 47  NO X emissions from the power sector, although decreasing in the short term, may 
increase in the longer term because of the increase of overall electricity demand. 
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 Figure 17.45 |  Global energy-related pollutant emissions  by sector in 2005 and 
under alternative policy packages in 2030. 
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reductions in NOx and PM2.5). The pollution control costs of CLE2 are 
around 12% lower than those of CLE1. However, a CLE2 policy pack-
age still results in 70% of the world’s population at levels beyond 
WHO’s air quality guidelines in 2030, indicating that more stringent 
policies will be needed if further improvements are required. 
 Increasing the stringency of air quality legislation (the SLE1 scenario) 
leads to significant reductions across air pollutants by more than 50% 
(see  Table 17.18 for details on controls), especially in sectors such as 
transport, where stricter controls yield large benefits. The annual air pol-
lution control costs of such a scenario in 2030 are estimated at 50% 
lower than for the CLE1 policy package, thus implying significant co-
benefits of combined policies. Around 60% of the world’s population is 
still exposed to levels beyond WHO’s air quality guidelines in 2030, but 
fewer than 5% are above the WHO-mandated tier I levels of 35  μ g/m3 
PM2.5 concentrations ( Figure 17.47 ). Maximum benefits accrue when, in 
addition to stringent air quality controls, there is also a universal energy 
access policy that ensures clean energy globally by 2030 (the SLE2 scen-
ario). This highlights that compliance with stringent air quality standards 
in developing countries cannot be achieved with only increasing the 
stringency of outdoor air pollution controls but will require in addition, 
controlling for household air pollution through access to modern cooking. 
This results in an overall emissions reduction of 50% in 2030 compared 
with 2005 levels, 100% of the world’s population below WHO-mandated 
tier I levels, and more than 50% of the population at levels below WHO 
air quality guidelines of 10  μ g/m3 PM2.5 concentrations. In addition to 
PM2.5, there are also significant differences across the scenarios for SO 2 
and other pollutant emissions. The resulting spatial emissions patterns of 
PM2.5 across the different scenarios are illustrated in  Figure 17.46 . 
 17.5.2.2  Health-Related Impacts 
 Outdoor Air Pollution 
 This section presents estimates of global health impacts attributable to 
outdoor air pollution based on implementing the various policy packages 
discussed in earlier sub-sections. Results presented are based on combin-
ing estimated PM2.5 concentrations with WHO ( 2008 ) data on mortality 
and DALYs and risk rates (RRs) detailed in Cohen et al. ( 2004 ) 48 (see  Box 
17.4 and  Table 17.19 for comparison with alternative health impact meth-
odology used in this study). In 2005, outdoor air pollution is estimated 
to result in 2.75 million deaths or 23 million DALYs lost globally, which 
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 Figure 17.46 |  Geographic distribution of anthropogenic PM2.5 concentrations in 2005 and under alternative policy packages in 2030 in μg/m3. 
 48  Both urban and rural populations are considered here. 
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represents around 5% of all deaths, 2% of all DALYs and around 12% of 
the total burden that can be attributed to cardiovascular, respiratory, and 
lung cancer (for further discussion see Rao et al.,  2012 ). More than 70% 
of this burden is felt in Asia alone. 
 Failure to implement further air pollution control policies beyond 2005 
levels (the FLE scenario) is seen to result in a global increase of close 
to 50% in DALYs (and deaths) in 2030 as compared to 2005 (shown in 
 Table 17.19 ), indicating that the implementation of air pollution pol-
icies is an absolute must for controlling the health-related impacts of 
air pollution in the future. However, an air pollution control-only policy, 
as in the CLE1 scenario, still leads to an increase in health impacts by 
more than 30% between 2005 and 2030 49 with the share of the outdoor 
air pollution related in the total burden increasing slightly from 2005 
levels. This is mainly due to the large increases in emissions in many 
developing regions, particularly South Asia and Africa, where currently 
legislated policies do not lead to emissions declines in the future, as dis-
cussed earlier. In addition, a growing population in these regions means 
that the future population over 30 years of age at risk for air pollution 
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 Figure 17.47 |  Global population exposed to ﬁ ne particulate matter concentrations 
exceeding WHO air quality targets in 2005 and under alternative policy packages in 
2030. The rightmost bar indicates the compliance with WHO Tier 1 level of 35  μ g/m3 
PM2.5, representing the global target of the GEA pathways for the environmental 
and health objective by 2030. Bars to the left indicate a comparison to lower (more 
stringent) WHO Tier levels with the leftmost bar corresponding to the lowest WHO 
AQG of 10  μ g/m3. 
 Table 17.19 |  Health impacts of outdoor air pollution in millions of DALYs (millions of population integrated YOLLs).  
Region 2005
2030
FLE CLE1 CLE2 SLE1 SLE2
World 23 (3865) 40 (12292) 33.6 (7366) 23 (4891) 14.4 (2947) 13.4 (2375)
OECD and Reform Countries 4.3 (867) 5.3 (1525) 2.2 (717) 0.95 (456) 0.5 (322) 0.5 (322)
Middle East and Africa 1.5 (265) 4.3 (1043) 3.1 (744) 1.8 (560) 1.1 (443) 0.9 (232)
Latin America and Caribbean 0.3 (91) 0.6 (234) 0.3 (137) 0.2 (122) 0.1 (97) 0.1 (97)
Asia 17 (2643) 30 (9490) 28 (5768) 20.2 (3753) 12.7 (2085) 11.8 (1725)
Source:  Chapter 9 and 17.
 49  This is comparable to ﬁ ndings in the  World Energy Outlook 2009 of the IEA ( 2009a ), 
which estimates a 70% growth of emissions in selected regions for the baseline 
scenario in spite of current air quality legislation. 
 Box 17.4 |  Alternative Methodology for Calculating Health Impacts 
 In addition to the standard approach for calculating DALYs, an alternative methodology is also applied in the outdoor air pollution related 
health impact estimations. This methodology, which is based on Mechler et al. ( 2002 ) and used in World Energy Outlook 2009 (IEA,  2009a ), 
calculates absolute changes in life expectancy based on modiﬁ cation of survival functions for population over 30 years of age. The end point 
is the statistical years of life lost (YOLLs) over the remaining lifetime of the entire population. The main features in this approach include: 
 Risk rates are assumed to be linear from 5  μ g/m3 until 200  μ g/m3;  all cause risk rates are used as opposed to a cause speciﬁ c one (RR 
of 1.04 is used for developing countries and RR of 1.06 for developed countries); and  baseline mortality data are derived from UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA,  2009 ) and include all non-accidental mortality, i.e., not distinguished by cause of 
death. Country-speciﬁ c life tables were used to reﬂ ect different mortality levels. 
 The YOLLs calculated from this approach are available in  Table 17.19 (and  Table 17.25 in Section 7). 
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will also be larger than today’s, leading to increases in health impacts in 
most developing countries. 
 The combination of currently legislated air quality policies with other 
policies, as in the CLE2 scenario, helps to slow the health-related 
impacts, with 1.2 million avoided deaths in 2030 and a reduction of 
more than 7 million DALYs compared with the air pollution-only CLE1 
scenario. While more stringent air pollution policies (as in the SLE1 
scenario) yield further reductions in deaths and DALYs, including uni-
versal energy access policies for 2030 that directly affect outdoor air 
pollution through cleaner fuels, the SLE2 policy case yields maximum 
health benefits by 2030, corresponding to 2.6 million avoided deaths or 
a reduction of 20 million DALYs compared to the CLE1 policy case. The 
air pollution-related burden in 2030 (1.2 million deaths and 13 million 
DALYs) reduces to less than 2% of total deaths, 1% of total DALYs and 
around 5% of deaths and DALYs that can be attributed to cardiovas-
cular, respiratory, and lung cancer. Thus, maximum benefits in terms of 
meeting environmental aims and reducing the health-related impacts of 
outdoor air pollution will require not only an increase in the stringency 
of air quality controls globally, but also an integration of a wider spec-
trum of policy concerns. 
 Comparison with Household Air Pollution 
 This section compares the impacts of policies to control outdoor air pol-
lution that were explained earlier with specific policy scenarios, such 
as fuel subsidies and microfinance options, that facilitate access to 
cleaner cooking fuels (LPG) and thereby limit household air pollution 
(see  Section 17.4.1 ). 
 Estimates of the current health impacts of household pollution are 
based on the effects of solid fuel dependence today, whereas future 
estimates are based on the detailed access scenarios described in 
 Section 17.4.1.2 and account for forecasted demographic change and 
trends in background disease and mortality levels as estimated by the 
WHO. The methodology is described in detail in Rao et al., ( forthcom-
ing ). 50 In 2005, total deaths attributed to solid fuel combustion in trad-
itional stoves were about 2.2 million, 51 and more than 41.6 million 
DALYs were lost, with the impacts felt mainly by women and children. 
Although substantial uncertainty is associated with these estimates, 
policies that improve access to modern cooking have the potential to 
avert between 0.6 million and 1.8 million premature deaths, on aver-
age, every year until 2030, in the three regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, and Pacific Asia. These include between 0.4 million and 
0.6 million deaths per year of children below the age of five. Deaths 
attributable to acute lower respiratory infection (ALRI) among children 
under five are seen to decline between 2005 and 2030 even in the 
absence of any access policies, but deaths due to chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) and ischemic heart disease (IHD) in adults 
 50  In contrast to outdoor effects, which are quantiﬁ ed only for the population older 
than 30 years, estimates of health impacts from household pollution include the 
effects on children. The present study includes impacts due to acute lower respiratory 
infections (ALRI) in young children, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) in 
adults and ischemic heart disease (IHD) in adults. In addition, we also estimate the 
incidence of lung disease in adults due to the combustion of coal in homes. 
 51  About 1.6 million deaths were in South and Paciﬁ c Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
regions where the lack of access to modern energy carriers is the most acute and for 
which explicit energy access scenarios have been assessed in  Section 17.4 . 
 Table 17.20 |  Outdoor and household health impacts in 2005 and in 2030 for the CLE1 and SLE2 scenarios (in millions of DALYs). 
Region
2005
2030
CLE1 SLE2
Outdoor  (impacts 
from solid fuel use 
in households)* 
Household
 Outdoor  (impacts 
from solid fuel use 
in households)* 
Household Outdoor Household
World 22.6  (4.5–6) 41.6 33  (3–3.7) ~24 13.4 0
OECD 2.4 1.2 0.2 0
REFS 1.9 0.9 0.2
Middle East and N. Africa 0.6 1.4 0.5 0
South Asia 7.0 ( 2.1–2.7) 13.8 12.8  (1.8–1.9) 8 5.7 0
Paciﬁ c Asia 1.1 ( 0.2–0.3 ) 3.9 2  (0.1–0.2) 3.5 0.6 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9  (0.2–0.4) 18.6 1.9 (0.3–0.6) 10 0.5 0
Centrally Planned Asia 8.4 (2–2.6) 4.6 12.8 (0.8–1) <2.6 1 5.6 0
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
0.3  (0.02–0.05) 0.8 0.3 (0.01–0.03) <0.4 1 0.1 0
 *  Indicated in parenthesis are estimated outdoorhealth impacts attributable to use of solid fuels (biomass and coal)in households. Note that these estimates are based on interpo-
lations between scenarios and are only indicative. Range represents the inherent uncertainty in calculating these impacts. 
 1  Explicit energy access scenarios for these regions have not been constructed. The numbers of DALYs lost for these regions for the CLE1 scenario are therefore estimated by 
extrapolating trends from the other regions. 
Chapter 17 Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development
1283
are expected to increase during the same period. These trends are 
in line with those reported by Bailis et al. ( 2005 ), who find that the 
observed decline in childhood ALRI mortality over time is a result of 
additional factors, 52 whereas the upward trend in adult incidence of 
COPD is mainly due to population aging. Alternatively, in the absence 
of any new policies to enhance access to modern cooking fuels or 
devices, it is estimated that in 2030 there could still be over 24 million 
DALYs lost due to household air pollution. See Rao et al., ( forthcoming ) 
for details on disease-specific impacts. 
 Table 17.20 lists the health impacts in DALYs from outdoor and house-
hold air pollution for 2005 and for an air pollution-only policy (CLE1) 
compared with a combined policy (SLE2). There are significant health 
benefits from a combination of stringent outdoor air pollution policies 
and a policy that ensures universal access to clean cooking by 2030. 
These are especially effective in developing countries that face the dual 
problems of outdoor air pollution due to a growing motorized fleet 
combined with household pollution from poor quality cooking fuels and 
devices. Thus, such policies can have multiple benefits both for human 
well-being and for the environment (as highlighted in  Chapter 19 and 
 Section 17.4 ), including major health gains. 
 17.6  Energy Security 
 17.6.1  Introduction 
 Energy security has been a major concern for energy systems for dec-
ades, and therefore needs to be addressed in the transition pathways 
presented in this chapter. As reviewed in detail in  Chapter 5 , energy 
security has multiple dimensions, which are not easily combined into 
a holistic concept or single indicator. Therefore, the concept of energy 
security is not used as a quantitative target or a technical modeling 
constraint in the GEA pathway scenarios described here. Instead, this 
section draws on the conceptual and quantitative framework developed 
in  Chapter 5 to illustrate the implications of the GEA transition path-
ways for energy security.  Section 17.7 then extends the discussion to the 
multiple benefits of the transition pathways, considering especially the 
synergistic effects between other energy development objectives and 
energy trade. 53 
 Chapter 5 summarized the present main energy security concerns as 
follows:
  • Oil and transport: volatility in the global oil market coupled with 
the geographic concentration of oil production; rapidly increasing 
demand under potentially constrained production capacities; grow-
ing dependence of an increasing number of countries on imported 
oil from ever fewer producing countries, with low-income countries 
often facing unaffordable costs of imports; and the dominance of oil 
in the transportation sector, where easily-available substitutes are 
lacking. 
  • Natural gas: dependence of a number of countries on imported 
natural gas, often procured from a single supplier and delivered 
through a limited number of potentially vulnerable routes and 
infrastructure. 
  • Electricity: vulnerability of electricity systems associated with low 
diversity of power generation options, aging infrastructure, inad-
equate generation capacity, and rapid demand growth. 
  • Energy export revenue: volatility and uncertain sustainability of 
energy export revenue (“energy demand” security) in countries 
where energy is a vital economic sector. 
  • Total primary energy supply vulnerabilities: overall energy vulner-
ability of a number of individual countries that face several of the 
above concerns simultaneously. 
 Chapter 5 established a framework for analyzing the energy security-
related vulnerabilities of energy systems associated with fuels, end-use 
sectors (including electricity as a carrier), and individual countries. For 
each of these three subsystems, that chapter identified three dimen-
sions of energy security concerns: sovereignty (the degree of control 
that national governments have over energy systems), resilience (the 
ability of energy systems to respond to disruptions), and robustness (the 
risks related to the physical state of energy resources and infrastruc-
ture). This section adopts the same framework, but considers different 
energy subsystems to reflect game-changing developments in the tran-
sition pathways. The section analyzes not only the globally traded fuels 
that dominate today (oil, gas, and coal) but also those of the future 
(biofuels and hydrogen). The main energy end-use sectors (transporta-
tion, industry, residential and commercial) and electricity generation are 
also analyzed. Finally, since the modeling frameworks do not provide 
detail on individual countries, the analysis is applied at the world and 
regional level. 
 Table 17.21 summarizes the energy security perspectives and indicators 
analyzed in this section. The analysis relates to sovereignty and resili-
ence concerns. The robustness concerns could not be addressed at this 
aggregated level. 
 This analytical framework is applied to the three illustrative GEA transi-
tion pathways (GEA-Supply, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efficiency) but consid-
ers both of the transportation cases for each, because the transportation 
sector is a key policy concern, given the limited alternatives to the use 
 52  These include increased coverage and efﬁ cacy of pneumonia case management using 
antibiotics; increased awareness and practice of breastfeeding, which increases child 
immunity and survival; and other economic and technological factors. 
 53  The energy security analysis of the GEA pathways relies on the MESSAGE interpret-
ations of the GEA pahtways, including the alternative transportation sector setups 
and reduced supply-side portfolios. 
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of oil in internal combustion vehicles. The analysis focuses on changes 
between now and 2050, because this is the longest time horizon under 
which energy security concerns are considered in present policies. The 
analysis first considers the energy security concerns associated with 
fuels, then examines the future vulnerabilities of end-use sectors, and 
concludes with an examination of the energy security of individual GEA 
regions. 
 17.6.2  Fuels 
 Under the GEA transition pathways, the vulnerabilities of globally traded 
fuels in the aggregate as well as of individual fuels decrease over time in 
terms of both sovereignty and resilience. 
 A proxy measure of the sovereignty aspects of energy security is global 
trade in energy. Absolute volumes of traded energy and the share of 
traded energy in overall energy use (the latter referred to here as “trade 
intensity”) indicate the extent to which regions rely on fuels produced 
in other regions, raising sovereignty concerns. 
 Figure 17.48 shows both trade volumes and trade intensity under the six 
GEA pathways considered here. The global aggregate energy trade vol-
umes among the 11 GEA regions (estimated at some 104 EJ in 2005) peak 
in 2030 or 2040, and trade intensities peak in 2020 or 2030. Thereafter 
both indicators decline, so that by 2050 the intensity of trade is lower 
than at present but the absolute amount of trade remains higher than 
present values under the GEA-Supply scenarios. The decline in absolute 
trade volumes after 2030 is most pronounced in the Advanced Transport 
GEA-Mix and -Efficiency pathways and least pronounced in the high-
demand, supply-dominated GEA transition pathways. 
 Concerning individual fuels, the analysis shows the following trends. 
In all the GEA pathways considered, oil is phased out in the long term. 
It accounts for between 9% and 15% of global primary energy sup-
ply by 2050 and declines to less than 1% by the end of the century 
(Table 17.22). As a result, trade volumes of oil for all pathways peak 
at about 100 EJ (compared with approximately 83 EJ today 54 ) between 
2020 and 2030 and decline thereafter. 
 Present energy security concerns associated with oil drastically diminish 
in the GEA pathways because of their comparatively modest demand 
growth, which is due to efficiency improvements and a more diversified 
supply mix. No other fuel assumes a dominant role similar to that which 
oil plays today, accounting for 36% of primary energy supply world-
wide. 55 Moreover, no “new oil” emerges in the global energy arena. 
 Table 17.22 summarizes the characteristics of the globally traded fuels 
in 2050 as compared with oil today.  Figure 17.49 shows the shares of 
different fuels in global primary energy supply, indicating a more diver-
sified supply portfolio.  Figure 17.50 illustrates how trade volumes and 
the geographic concentration of production of oil, gas, and coal change 
across the GEA pathways. 56 Biofuels, hydrogen, and electricity are traded 
in much smaller volumes (a maximum of 50 EJ for hydrogen in the GEA-
Supply pathway with Advanced Transportation) and with greater geo-
graphic diversity of producers than is the case with oil today. 
 At the same time, by 2050 natural gas trade exhibits some of the 
characteristics of oil trade today under certain pathways. By 2050 gas 
accounts for about 20% of primary energy and 36–51 EJ of trade per 
year (compared with oil’s current 83 EJ). Additionally, gas production 
stays at its current level of geographic concentration until about 2050, 
which is comparable to the geographic concentration of oil production, 
and becomes even more concentrated than current oil production under 
most pathways thereafter, as shown by its decreasing Shannon-Wiener 
diversity index in  Figure 17.50 . Although natural gas is a potentially 
more risky fuel, the overall resilience of energy systems, as measured 
 54  BP ( 2009 ) estimates a total volume of country-to-country oil trade of some 110 EJ in 
2005. Thus, the GEA interregional model representation covers some 75% of actual 
oil trade ﬂ ows at the country level. 
 55  Although electricity comes to dominate ﬁ nal energy use, it is not, strictly speaking, a 
“fuel,” as it is produced from a variety of sources. Moreover, global trade in electricity is 
minimal in all pathways, never accounting for more than 2% of total electricity supply. 
 56  The geographic concentration of production is measured by the Shannon-Wiener 
Diversity Index (SWDI), described below. 
 Table 17.21 |  Indicators for analyzingenergy security across subsystems and 
security perspectives. 
Subsystems
Security perspectives
Sovereignty Resilience
 Upstream 
Fuels (total fuel supply 
and globally traded fuels)
Volume and intensity of 
trade (by fuel and total)
Global diversity of the primary 
energy system; dominance of a 
single fuel
 Downstream 
Carriers (electricity) and 
end uses (transport, 
residential and 
commercial, industry)
Reliance of carrier 
or end-use sector on 
insecure fuels
Diversity of fuels used in the 
carrier or end-use sector
 Regional Import dependency 
(and export ﬂ ows)
Diversity of primary energy 
supply in the region
 Table 17.22 |  Characteristics of globally traded fuels in 2050 compared with oil in 
2005. 
Characteristic
Oil, 
2005
Gas, 2050
Coal, 
2050
Biofuels, 
2050
Predominance (% of 
primary energy supply)
34 19–22 8–10 6–8
Trade volume (EJ/year) 83 35–54 10–20 7–14
Geographic concentration 
of production (diversity 
index) 1 
1.0 0.9–1.0 1.3–1.4 1.2–1.5
 1  See text for deﬁ nition of the diversity index. 
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by the diversity of primary energy supply, increases under all transition 
pathways. 
 The Shannon-Wiener diversity index (SWDI; see Shannon and Weaver, 
 1963 ) is frequently applied as a measure of energy security of supply 
(see, e.g., Jansen et al.,  2004 ; APERC, 2007) and electricity generation 
(Stirling,  1994 ). The index is calculated as follows: 
  SWDI = – ∑(pi ∗ ln(pi))
i
  (1) 
 where  p  i  is the share of primary energy  i in total primary energy  supply. 
In the GEA pathways, the global SWDI rises (supply diversification 
increases) from the current level of 1.6 to 2.0 by 2050, before falling to 
between 1.3 and 1.6 in the latter half of the century. 57 
 Measures of global energy trade (reflecting sovereignty concerns) and 
diversity (reflecting resilience concerns) can be aggregated into a single 
index called a compound SWDI. This compound indicator differs from the 
simple SWDI in that it does not count globally traded fuels as contribut-
ing to the overall diversity of primary energy supply. 58 It is calculated by 
excluding the imported energy in a nation’s or region’s diversity index: 
  Compound SWDI = – ∑(1 – mi) ∗ (pi ln (pi))
i
 (2) 
 where  p  i  is again the share of primary energy resource  i in total primary 
energy supply, and  m  i  is the share of primary energy resource  i that is 
supplied by net imports. 
 This indicator shows a trend similar to that of the simple SWDI 
( Figure 17.51 ), increasing from 1.4 in 2000 to about 1.7 in 2050 before 
falling slightly to about 1.5 in the second half of the century. 59 
 17.6.3  End-Use Sectors 
 The diversity of fuels used in a sector is generally considered an indi-
cator of the resilience of energy supply for the sector. Sectoral diver-
sity indexes are shown in  Figure 17.52 . The increase in diversity in the 
transportation sector is particularly pronounced in the GEA pathways, 
whereas the improvement is more gradual in the other end-use sectors 
and in electricity generation. 
 Although this pattern of increasing diversity of the energy mix in indi-
vidual end-use sectors is relatively homogeneous across regions, there 
is some regional variation. In some regions, the rise in diversity is more 
rapid and pronounced, whereas in others, individual fuels (particularly 
gas) come to dominate certain sectors in certain periods. These regional 
deviations are discussed in the next section. 
 57  It is important to note that the diversity index strongly depends on the primary 
energy accounting convention used. In GEA, a consistent substitution-equivalent 
accounting of primary energy is applied across all chapters to ensure comparability. 
Under this accounting convention, diversity indicators drop in the latter half of the 
century with the strong decarbonization of the energy system. Thus, it is also import-
ant to consider the sectoral or end-use diversity indices, discussed below. 
 58  This index was ﬁ rst used in Jansen et al. ( 2004 ) as a measure of long-term energy 
security. 
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 59  See also the electronic appendix to this chapter for further illustrative examples of 
diversity indicators for speciﬁ c regions. 
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 17.6.4  Regions 
 At present, energy security concerns vary across countries. In the GEA 
pathways, different regions also face different energy security trends 
and challenges. 
 17.6.4.1  Regional Import Dependency and Energy Export Volume 
 Different regions fare differently in terms of sovereignty concerns related 
to energy trade. Fewer regions are net energy importers under the GEA 
pathways than today; across all pathways, the number of regions with 
low import dependency rises from five in 2000 to between seven and 
eight in 2050 and between nine and 11 in 2100 ( Table 17.23 ). 
 The flip side of the decrease in energy imports is a fall in energy exports 
for certain regions. Energy exports provide vital revenue for a number 
of countries, and rapid and profound declines in such revenue could 
adversely affect energy-exporting regions. ( Chapter 5 conceptualizes 
energy exports as a “vital energy service.”) This drop in export volumes 
may be partly mitigated, however, by rising energy prices. 
 The most important energy-exporting region today is the Middle East 
and North Africa (MEA), with net energy exports of over 52 EJ in 2005, 
followed by the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which exported about 24 EJ 
in that year; Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and sub-Saharan 
Africa (AFR) each exported some 11–13 EJ. 
 Because of the declining share of oil in the global energy mix, MEA 
experiences the largest decline in energy export volumes. The region’s 
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exports peak at between 80 and 90 EJ/year in 2030 before falling to 
43–55 EJ/year in 2050 (slightly higher for the GEA-Efficiency pathways) 
and to less than 15 EJ/year in the second half of the century. Similarly, 
LAC’s exports approximately double to about 20 EJ/year between now 
and 2030 or 2040 before dropping to between 7 and 10 EJ/year by the 
end of the century. Exports from AFR also drop, although not as pro-
foundly, stabilizing in some pathways at approximately the present lev-
els in the second half of the century. 
 The major export “winner” under all the pathways is FSU, which experi-
ences a dramatic rise in its energy exports due to the increasing demand 
for gas. The region’s energy exports rise from the 2005 level of some 
24 EJ/year to between 47 and 52 EJ/year in 2050, and then experience 
a continued rise through 2070 or 2080 to between 50 and 65 EJ/year. 
Three other regions –Centrally Planned Asia (dominated by China), 
North America, and Pacific OECD – also see a rise in export volumes 
over all the GEA pathway analysed, although their increases are not as 
pronounced and differ across pathways and time horizons. 
 17.6.4.2  Regional Resilience and Diversity 
 As noted above, global energy supply becomes more diverse in the 
GEA pathways both as a whole and within individual end-use sec-
tors, especially the transport sector. This increase in diversity is also 
observed across all GEA regions ( Table 17.24 ), with a generally smaller 
rise in MEA (a consequence of the region’s exceptional oil and gas 
resource endowment). 
 The fuel diversity of electricity generation increases in all pathways in 
five out of the 11 GEA regions. In five other regions, diversity increases 
in at least some pathways. Only in Western Europe does electricity pro-
duction diversity decrease compared with the current (relatively high) 
level. 
 In general, the GEA regions may be divided into three broad groups. 
The first group includes such industrialized regions as the Pacific OECD, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, and Western Europe, 
which generally follow the global trends with respect to fuels and end-
use sectors. Transitions in their energy systems are primarily driven by 
global factors, including the switch away from fossil fuels, increases in 
efficiency, and the diversification of transport technologies. Since all 
these transitions generally improve energy security by increasing resili-
ence and sovereignty, energy security in these regions also improves 
significantly. 
 The second group includes Sub-Saharan Africa and Centrally Planned 
Asia, in which the global energy transitions provide a context for mas-
sive growth in regional energy systems. The expansion of energy systems 
in Sub-Saharan Africa to extend energy access to all, and in Centrally 
Planned Asia (dominated by China) to keep up with rapidly growing 
economies, results in dramatically altered configurations of energy sys-
tems, leapfrogging the inherited energy systems inertia of the industrial-
ized world. As a result, many energy security indicators in these regions 
improve much more rapidly and dramatically than in the rest of the 
world, as their energy systems become more diverse and more reliant 
on regional rather than global resources. 
 The third group includes those regions that, because of their geography 
and either fossil fuel resource endowments (the Former Soviet Union, 
the Middle East and North Africa) or resource scarcity (Eastern Europe 
and South Asia), have more limited options for radical systemic change. 
The diversity of energy supply, especially in specific sectors in these 
regions, may be below the global average. For example, their transpor-
tation and electricity sectors may become dominated by natural gas, a 
fuel of choice in the middle of the century. 
 17.6.5  Conclusions on Energy Security 
 Under the GEA pathways, energy security improves in the world as a 
whole and in the majority of regions. The diversity of energy sources 
increases, whereas the volume and the intensity of trade decline in most 
pathways. No individual fuel is likely to cause energy security concerns 
similar to those caused by oil at present. The one exception is natural gas, 
which, as a transition fuel, experiences growth to some 30% of global pri-
mary energy supply (compared with oil’s 36% share today) in 2050, with 
increasing trade flows and a decrease in the diversity of production. 
 Table 17.23 |  Import dependency of GEA regions in the GEA pathways. 
Imports 
as share 
of primary 
energy supply
No. of regions
2005 2050 2100
Low 1 (<16%)  5 
 (AFR, CPA, FSU, 
LAC, MEA) 
 7–8 
 (AFR, CPA, FSU, 
LAC, MEA, NAM, 
PAO, PAS 2 ) 
 9–11 
 (AFR, CPA, FSU, 
EEU, LAC, MEA, 
NAM, PAO, PAS, 3 
SAS, 4 WEU) 
Medium (16–34%)  3 
 (NAM, PAS, SAS) 
 1–3 
 (EEU, PAS, 2 , SAS, 
WEU 5 ) 
 0–2 
 (PAS, 3 SAS, 4 ) 
High (>34%)  3 
 (EEU, PAO, WEU) 
 0–1 
 (WEU 5 ) 
0
 Note: AFR (Africa); CPA (Centrally Planned Asia); FSU (Former Soviet Union); EEU 
(Eastern Europe); LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean); MEA (Middle East and North 
Africa); NAM (North America); PAO (Paciﬁ c OECD); PAS (Paciﬁ c Asia); SAS (South Asia); 
WEU (Western Europe). 
 1  Includes net energy exporters. 
 2 Has medium import dependency (~25%) under the GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways. 
 3 Has medium import dependency (~32%) under the GEA-Efﬁ ciency pathways. 
 4  Has medium import dependency (17–20%) under the GEA-Mix and GEA-Efﬁ ciency 
pathways with Conventional Transportation. 
 5  Has medium import dependency (17–30%) under the GEA-Mix pathways and GEA-
Supply pathways with Advanced Transportation. 
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 In the GEA pathways, individual end-use sectors generally use a more 
diverse mix of energy sources than today. The transportation sector, pres-
ently associated with major energy security concerns, achieves diversity 
similar to that in other end-use sectors. No end-use sector relies on a 
single fuel to the extent that transport relies on oil today. 
 Each of the 11 world regions generally follows the global trend toward 
improved energy security. Some experience a more rapid and pronounced 
increase in diversity and self-sufficiency of their energy systems. At the 
same time, some regions with more limited energy options may experience 
continued reliance on particular fuels (primarily natural gas) in specific sec-
tors (transportation and electricity generation) under certain pathways. 
 The next section examines, among other issues, the impact of the other 
energy objectives for energy security, including global energy trade and 
primary energy source diversity. 
 17.7  Synergies and Multiple Benefits of 
Achieving Different Energy Objectives 
Simultaneously 
 The previous sections have illustrated a variety of energy futures in 
which the objectives of climate change mitigation, air quality, health, 
access, and security could be achieved simultaneously. These pathways 
show that a dramatic transformation of the energy system is technically 
possible, and that if society truly values sustainability across all dimen-
sions, such a transformation is indeed necessary. Transitions of this kind 
would likely lead to enormous synergies between objectives –  synergies 
that are, at the moment, not fully understood by decisionmakers, or 
often overlooked, because the analysis is complex and requires an inte-
grated, holistic perspective. 
 This section builds upon the main findings of an analysis conducted at 
IIASA in support of the GEA (McCollum et al.,  2011 ), which attempts 
to illuminate the major synergies and, to a lesser extent, the trade-offs 
among the various energy objectives and the requisite policy choices and 
outcomes. In so doing, the analysis takes a slightly different approach 
from the core illustrative GEA pathways described so far in the chapter. 
Here the GEA-Mix scenario is used as a starting point for generating 
a wide array of scenarios that attempt to cover a large portion of the 
full scenario space across several different dimensions. Within this space, 
many of the scenarios are unsustainable by GEA standards, as each meets 
(or fails to meet) the different energy objectives to varying degrees. The 
analysis uses these less stringent scenarios as counterfactuals and for 
comparison purposes, in order to show how certain objectives and policy 
choices push in the same direction, while others are in conflict. 
 Table 17.24 |  Regional trends in diversity and import dependency, 2005 and 2050. 
Import Dependency*
Diversity
Compound diversity 
index
Electricity Transport Primay Energy Supply
Region 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050
AFR  −8%  −7% 1.01 1.64–1.89 0.07 1.24–1.73 1.40 1.66–1.83 1.4 1.51–1.73
CPA 4% 8%–14% 0.74 1.72–1.85 0.21 1.06–1.77 1.17 1.87–1.97 1.05 1.56–1.73
EEU 36% 28%–34% 1.2 1.43–1.60 0.16 1.38–1.76 1.53 1.86–1.94 0.99 1.32–1.50
FSU  −54%  −56% 1.4 1.34–1.51 0.42 1.36–1.70 1.37 1.68–1.97 1.37 1.68–1.97
LAM  −34%  −13% 1.26 1.38–1.68 0.31 1.41–1.73 1.44 1.71–1.94 1.44 1.71–1.94
MEA  −187%  −46% 1 1.12–1.47 0.03 1.09–1.23 0.95 1.22–1.56 0.87 1.17–1.49
NAM 21% 2%–8% 1.46 1.55–1.80 0.08 1.28–1.76 1.54 1.87–2.04 1.34 1.71–1.91
PAO 41%  −22% 1.55 1.64–1.95 0.09 1.46–1.79 1.48 1.87–2.07 0.99 1.70–1.81
PAS 28% 10%–28% 1.47 1.53–1.88 0.02 1.28–1.72 1.50 1.96–2.04 1.2 1.45–1.74
SAS 20% 29%–32% 1.22 1.68–1.82 0.11 0.92–1.55 1.46 1.69–1.84 1.16 1.03–1.25
WEU 40% 31%–36% 1.64 1.52–1.73 0.16 1.48–1.75 1.61 1.84–1.93 1.1 1.27–1.34
 World  20%  13%–16%  1.54  1.79–1.92  0.15 1.38–1.77  1.62  1.94–2.05  1.36  1.64–1.77 
 L E G E N D 
 Import Dependency*  Diversity  Compound diversity 
low (<16%) High (>1.5) High (>1.5)
medium (16–34%) Medium (1.0–1.5) Medium (1.0–1.5)
high (>34%) Low (<1.0) Low (<1.0)
 * Import dependency values are reported as negative if a region is a net energy exporter. World import dependency is the proportion of primary energy that is traded. 
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 17.7.1  Characterization of the Full Scenario Space 
 In this section, the feasible scenario space is represented by several hun-
dred distinct scenario pathways. These scenarios stretch the potential 
development of the energy system in several dimensions, each fulfilling 
the individual GEA objectives with respect to climate change, air pollu-
tion and health, and energy security to varying levels of satisfaction. For 
instance, some scenarios push climate change mitigation while ignor-
ing security and air pollution, whereas other scenarios prioritize security 
only while ignoring the climate objective. Notably, the access objective 
is taken as a given in this analysis, as all scenarios have been developed 
to meet the access targets of the GEA, including even the correspond-
ing counterfactual (baseline) scenario. 60 This simplification was made 
because energy access, compared with other objectives, has the lowest 
impact on energy use and GHG emissions (see  Section 17.4 ). For further 
methodological details on how the full scenario ensemble was devel-
oped, see the electronic appendix. 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, satisfaction of each of the individ-
ual GEA objectives can be measured in their own unique way: climate 
change in terms of the probability of limiting global temperature rise 
to 2°C ( Section 17.5.1 ), pollution and health impacts in terms of DALYs 
( Section 17.5.2 ), and energy security in terms of a compound diversity 
indicator ( Section 17.6 ). The use of such different metrics, although 
necessary given the far-ranging impacts of the energy system, tends 
to complicate the comparison of scenarios that meet certain objectives 
but not others. For this reason, this section adopts a simple framework 
to describe the scenario space across all three objectives; at the same 
time, it allows for ready comparison with the previous discussions in this 
chapter. The framework, summarized in  Table 17.25 , defines three levels 
of satisfaction – Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent – for each of the 
three energy objectives. Specific numerical ranges are given for what 
constitutes each of these levels in terms of the relevant indicators. (Note 
that health impacts are also presented in terms of YOLLs, the method-
ology for which is described in  Section 17.5.2 .) Importantly, within a 
given scenario, the fulfillment of each objective is independent of the 
fulfillment of another (except for some important synergies, discussed 
later in this section). Therefore, a given scenario could, for example, ful-
fill the climate objective at the Weak level while at the same time satisfy 
the pollution and health objective and the energy security objective at 
the Intermediate level. By sharp contrast, all of the core GEA pathways 
described up to this point in the chapter (GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and 
GEA-Supply, along with their variants) have been designed to fulfill all 
of the objectives simultaneously at the Stringent level. In fact, the min-
imum allowable indicator values corresponding to the Stringent level 
are derived from the originally stated targets of the GEA (see Cluster I 
of the report and  Section 17.2.3 ). 
 Figure 17.53 illustrates the full scenario space across all three dimen-
sions: climate, pollution and health, and energy security. The degree to 
which each scenario (or rather, class of scenarios) fulfills the individual 
objectives is indicated in the figure by the shaded Weak, Intermediate, 
and Stringent regions. For instance, the top panel illustrates ranges 
of GHG emissions trajectories for all scenarios in the large ensemble 
that correspond to probabilities of reaching the 2°C target. The base-
line scenario, which assumes no new climate, pollution and health, or 
energy security policies, sees the largest growth in emissions through-
out the century and is therefore at the upper bound of the Weak region. 
Annual emissions in the baseline scenario climb from 49 GtCO 2 -eq. in 
2010 to 84 GtCO 2 -eq. in 2050. 61 Emissions then peak near 100 Gt in the 
later part of the century. All other scenarios achieve emissions reduc-
tions compared with the baseline, and hence have comparatively higher 
probabilities of meeting the 2°C target. In the most stringent climate 
scenarios (lower bound on the Stringent region), emissions in 2050 are 
just 18.6 Gt. As discussed more fully in  Section 17.5.1 , reaching the 2°C 
target with greater than 50% probability (Stringent region) requires that 
emissions peak in 2020 at levels only marginally higher than today and 
then be reduced significantly in the decades that follow. If, however, 
the climate objective is of lower priority (i.e., if probabilities of meeting 
the 2°C target at less than 50% are acceptable), the permissible peak 
in emissions could certainly be greater and could even be delayed far 
beyond 2020. In the case of such weak and intermediate fulfillment of 
the climate objective, emissions reductions in the middle to late part of 
the century would not need to be nearly as drastic. For example, annual 
GHG emissions in 2050 for the Intermediate region (corresponding to a 
20–50% probability of meeting the target) range from levels approxi-
mately the same as today to levels up to 45% lower. Comparing the 
latter case with the former, the emissions peak must occur almost two 
 Table 17.25 |  Indicators for climate change, pollution and health, and energy 
security and levels of satisfaction within the weak-intermediate-stringent 
framework. 
Fulfillment
 Climate Change 
 [probability of 
staying within 
2ºC warming 
limit] 
 Pollution and 
Health 
 [million DALYs 
(YOLLs), 2030] 
 Energy security 
 [compound 
diversity 
indicator, 2030] 
Weak <20% >33 (7300) <1.40
Intermediate 20–50% 15–33 (2700 – 7300) 1.40–1.50
Stringent >50% <15 (2700) >1.50
 60  Importantly, the baseline scenario referred to here differs from that discussed else-
where in the chapter. Here, the baseline corresponds to a variation of the GEA-Mix 
pathway (thus including intermediate efﬁ ciency focus to limit energy demand), in 
which the policy constraints are relaxed to business-as-usual conditions. The coun-
terfactual referred to in other sections builds upon the GEA-Supply storyline, and a 
corresponding baseline depicting future developments in the absence of any of GEA 
sustainability policies at levels of relatively higher demand. 
 61  Note that these GHG estimates include all well-mixed Kyoto greenhouse gases (CO 2 , 
methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexaﬂ uoride, tetraﬂ uoromethane, and halocarbons). 
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decades earlier in order to preserve the feasibility of achieving the 2°C 
target with near 50% probability. 
 The middle panel of  Figure 17.53 illustrates the full space of the scenario 
ensemble in the combined air pollution and health dimension by show-
ing PM2.5 emissions trajectories and resulting DALYs. Particulate mat-
ter is chosen as a representative pollutant for this discussion because, 
as discussed in  Section 17.5.2 and  Chapter 4 , of all types of air pol-
lutant emissions, PM2.5 causes some of the most serious impacts on 
human health. 62 The emissions trajectories shown in the figure corres-
pond to multiple pathways for energy system development under dif-
ferent portfolios of air pollution control policies. These policy packages 
are described more fully in  Section 17.5.2 , where further details on the 
assumed types of controls are provided. Moreover, whereas that section 
focuses in detail on the impacts of the different air pollution policies 
in terms of health and other environmental benefits, this section spe-
cifically examines the economic implications of combined policies. In 
 Figure 17.53 , the shaded Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent regions cor-
respond to DALYs at the global level (the aggregate of all world regions) 
that would be expected in 2030 by following the ranges of PM2.5 emis-
sions trajectories shown. The important point here is that by making 
a more concerted effort to control air pollution throughout the world 
over the next two decades, especially in the densely populated urban 
centers of rapidly developing countries, the collective health of the glo-
bal population can be significantly improved and DALYs can be reduced 
quite substantially. And although these reductions might be achieved 
by more stringent pollution control policies and measures (i.e., end-of-
pipe technologies), they may also be achieved, to some extent, through 
decarbonization of the energy system in response to strong climate 
policy. The latter point touches upon an important synergy between 
the climate objective and the air pollution and health objective that, 
although not immediately evident in  Figure 17.53 , is discussed in more 
detail later in this section. In short, by driving the energy system toward 
zero-carbon, emissions-free technologies, stringent climate (and indeed 
energy security) policies can play an important role in reducing air pol-
lutant emissions, even under an otherwise weak pollution policy regime. 
In other words, fulfillment of the pollution and health objective at the 
Weak, Intermediate, or Stringent level depends on measures for both 
pollution and climate control. 
 The scenarios also cover a broad space in the energy security dimension, 
as illustrated by the bottom panel of  Figure 17.53 . This analysis meas-
ures energy security using the compound diversity indicator introduced 
in  Section 17.6 (see also  Chapter 5 ). This indicator takes into account 
the diversity of primary energy resources at the global level, as well as 
where those resources are sourced – that is, whether from imports or 
domestic production. The diversity indicator rises with increasing diver-
sity of the energy system but falls at higher levels of import depend-
ency (see further details in  Section 17.6 and the electronic appendix). 
In this sense, the higher the diversity indicator for a given country or 
region, the more secure its energy system.  Figure 17.53 shows how glo-
bal energy system diversity develops over time in all of the scenarios of 
the full ensemble, with the Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent regions 
grouping together scenarios that fulfill the security objective to a similar 
degree, as outlined in  Table 17.25 . The lower bound of the Weak region 
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 62  Note that in addition to PM 2.5, each scenario of the large ensemble possesses 
unique emissions trajectories for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic 
compounds, carbon monoxide, black carbon, organic carbon, and ammonia. 
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is represented by the baseline scenario, which is obviously one of the 
least desirable in terms of diversity. (Nor does the baseline meet any 
of the other sustainability targets of the GEA, lying within the Weak 
region in all cases.) Compared with the baseline, virtually every other 
scenario, whether motivated by security or by climate policy, achieves a 
greater diversification of the global energy mix over time. As discussed 
more fully in  Section 17.6 , fulfilling the GEA targets for near-term energy 
security (the Stringent region in the figure) necessitates a global energy 
system that transitions to a broader portfolio of energy sources over the 
coming decades, while at the same time individual countries and regions 
(e.g., North America) come to rely less on imported energy commodities 
and more on domestic supplies. However, given the combination of the 
dominance of fossil energy in today’s energy mix and the uneven distri-
bution of fossil resource deposits around the globe, increasing energy 
diversity, and thus security, essentially requires that countries and 
regions move away from fossil energy and instead toward renewable 
energy sources such as biomass, wind, solar, and geothermal. Indeed, 
this is what emerges from the illustrative GEA pathways described pre-
viously in this chapter, as well as from the scenarios represented by 
the Stringent and Intermediate regions in  Figure 17.53 .  Section 17.7.2.2 
discusses this point further. 
 Because the individual scenarios in the ensemble vary so greatly along the 
dimensions of climate change, pollution and health, and energy security, 
total energy system costs naturally span a fairly wide range as well. This 
is illustrated in  Figure 17.54 , where each bar represents the costs of a 
single scenario, and the scenarios are sorted in order of increasing costs. 
Included in these costs is the cumulative sum between 2010 and 2050 
(discounted at 5% annually) of energy system investments (including 
supply and demand as well as climate change mitigation, energy secur-
ity, and pollution control investments), operation and maintenance, fuel, 
and nonenergy mitigation costs. 63 Total system costs for each scenario are 
then related to the cumulative discounted sum of global GDP over the 
same time period. The least costly scenario in the ensemble is the base-
line, since it assumes no climate change mitigation, pollution control, or 
energy security policies other than what is already planned over the next 
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 63  For the investment intensity of GDP, see also  Section 17.3.5 . 
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few years. Fulfillment of the GEA objectives (to any level of satisfaction) 
then adds to energy system costs to a certain degree. If one thinks of 
the multiple objectives as societal targets that the energy system should 
attempt to satisfy (i.e., scenario inputs), then total costs are an embodi-
ment (i.e., scenario outputs) of the system-wide transformations that must 
take place in order to meet those objectives (e.g., increased utilization of 
advanced technologies and alternative fuels). The resulting total cost of 
a given scenario depends entirely on how far it goes toward satisfying 
each individual objective, as shown by the bars on the right side of  Figure 
17.54 , which illustrate the ranges of scenarios, from a cost perspective, 
that correspond to Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent fulfillment of the 
climate, pollution and health, and energy security objectives. The least 
costly scenarios – those yielding little or no improvement in the objectives, 
such as the baseline – lie within the Weak region, whereas scenarios that 
achieve one or all of the objectives at the Intermediate or the Stringent 
level obviously incur costs in the middle or the upper end of the range, 
respectively. Notably, total costs range from 3.1–4.2% of GDP for the 
class of scenarios that achieves stringent fulfillment of all three objectives 
simultaneously. By comparison, energy system costs in the counterfactual 
baseline are about 2.1% of GDP over the same time period. 
 An important caveat to the cost analysis shown here is that it performs 
only a partial economic accounting. The analysis attempts to capture mul-
tiple benefits in terms of avoided or reduced costs for climate change miti-
gation, energy security, and pollution control. However, given the inherent 
difficulties in valuing human life in the economic sense, and given the 
vast uncertainties with respect to the economic valuation of, for example, 
climate-related damages, the analysis does not attempt to value other 
benefits of pursuing these three objectives (for a discussion of other ben-
efits see  Chapters 3 ,  4 , and  5 ). For instance, the analysis does not consider 
the avoided costs of climate change (e.g., more frequent extreme wea-
ther events, impacts on global agriculture and food production), nor does it 
capture the avoided costs of adaptation to climate change (e.g., construc-
tion of sea walls, relocation of coastal populations). Similarly, the benefits 
accruing from reduced health expenditure and increased life expectancies 
have not been quantified here. Hence, the conclusions on multiple eco-
nomic benefits presented in this section relate to “mitigation” costs only; 
they would become larger if other benefits were assigned an economic 
value as well. 
 17.7.2  Synergies between Objectives 
 The discussions above have already begun to show the inherent syn-
ergies, and to a lesser extent the trade-offs, among the various energy 
objectives and how these complex interdependencies can be illumi-
nated through analysis of a large ensemble of possible energy futures. 
Among energy planners and decision makers, however, these relation-
ships are not well enough understood. Cost trade-offs are obviously the 
more familiar: the greater society’s aspiration for achieving the energy 
objectives, the larger the costs for the energy system. However, for 
such questions as, “How much extra might it cost to achieve each add-
itional objective?” and “How can costs be reduced by pursuing multiple 
objectives?” the answers are much less clear. The discussion that fol-
lows highlights the main findings of one of the few attempts in the 
scenario literature to explore the important relationships among climate 
change mitigation, energy security, and reduced air pollution and health 
impacts (for further reading, see van Vuuren et al.,  2006 ; Cofala et al., 
 2009 ; Cofala et al.,  2010 ; Bollen et al.,  2010 ; McCollum et al.,  2011 ). 64 
 17.7.2.1  Climate Change Mitigation and Pollution and Health 
 Section 17.5.1 discussed in detail how decarbonization of the global 
energy system, combined with energy and conservation efforts, may 
be instrumental in limiting climate change to safer levels. This section 
takes the analysis a step further, showing that climate change mitiga-
tion can also help to reduce air pollutant emissions and their corre-
sponding impacts on human health. Put more directly, climate change 
mitigation can be an important entry point for achieving society’s pollu-
tion- and health-related goals. This is illustrated clearly in  Figure 17.55 , 
which relates global PM2.5 emissions in the near term (to 2030) to the 
probability of staying below a 2°C maximum temperature rise over the 
course of the century. Each data point in the figure represents values for 
a single scenario in the ensemble. The specific combination of pollution 
and climate policy stringency is what distinguishes the scenarios from 
one another. In particular, the different levels of air pollution control 
policy, indicated by the varying shapes of the data points, correspond to 
the scenario assumptions discussed previously in the pollution section 
(FLE, CLE, and SLE; see  Section 17.5.2 ). 
 What one first notices in  Figure 17.55 is that as the energy system is 
decarbonized and increasing shares of zero-carbon, pollution-free tech-
nologies are utilized, the probability of meeting the 2°C target increases, 
and pollutant emissions are significantly reduced. Moreover, the spread 
between the pollution control levels narrows as climate change mitiga-
tion becomes more of a priority. (The shaded areas in the figure help to 
illuminate this effect.) This last point is important, as it shows how the 
impacts of pollution control policy are much less variable as zero-carbon 
technologies penetrate the market and fossil technologies are forced 
out. This result stems from pollution control being applicable to fewer 
technologies (e.g., power plants, factories, vehicles) when there is less 
fossil energy in the system. A final observation is that climate change 
mitigation measures alone can yield pollutant emissions reductions on 
the order of currently planned legislation for pollution control. 
 Figure 17.55 also illustrates the extent to which each scenario ful-
fills the climate and pollution and health objectives, utilizing the 
 Weak-Intermediate-Stringent framework discussed in  Section 17.7.1 . 
 64  As a supplement to the GEA, an interactive web-based scenario development tool 
has been developed at IIASA, which allows members of the public to improve their 
understanding of how different policy choices (i.e., prioritization of certain object-
ives above or below others) could potentially impact the development of the global 
energy system over the next several decades, in terms of resources, technologies, 
fuels, investments and the corresponding impacts on human health and the envir-
onment. To experiment with the Multi-criteria Analysis tool, see www.iiasa.ac.at/
web-apps/ene/GeaMCA. 
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Because the core illustrative GEA pathways are designed to simultan-
eously satisfy all objectives at the Stringent level, they would be found in 
the lower-right corner of  Figure 17.55 . All other scenarios shown in the 
figure are unsustainable from the perspective of the GEA, as they satisfy 
the climate objective and the pollution and health objective at some 
other combination of levels (e.g., Weak on climate, Intermediate on pol-
lution and health). Interestingly, the upper-right corner of the figure (cor-
responding to scenarios that would be Stringent on climate but Weak 
on pollution and health) contains not a single scenario, a result that 
again highlights how climate change mitigation can be an important 
entry point for achieving society’s pollution- and health-related goals. 
In other words, strong climate change mitigation measures alone can 
yield pollutant emissions reductions that are as great as, or even greater 
than, currently planned pollution control legislation would likely yield in 
the absence of climate policy (i.e., through end-of-pipe pollution control 
technologies only), thereby allowing the pollution and health objective 
to be satisfied at the Intermediate level at a minimum. The opposite 
case (i.e., Weak on climate, Stringent on pollution and health) does not 
necessarily lead to the same conclusion, however; pollution control on 
its own is not likely to lead to dramatic reductions in GHG emissions. 
That being said, reducing key air pollutant emissions, namely, those 
that cause warming (black carbon and the ozone precursors methane, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and volatile organic compounds), 
may be able to play a modest role in mitigating climate change. The 
climate feedbacks of air pollution are rather complex, and although the 
scenarios in the large ensemble shown here assume across-the-board 
reductions in all pollutants, one could certainly envision control strat-
egies in which some specific pollutants are reduced proportionally more 
than others (e.g., warming components are reduced more than cooling 
components, namely, sulfur dioxide and organic carbon), in an effort 
to preserve the overall cooling effect of aerosols and, thus, to produce 
a net gain for the climate, or to at least remain radiant energy-neutral 
(Cofala et al.,  2009 ; Ramanathan and Xu,  2010 ). 
 Reducing global air pollution levels, whether through pollution control 
or climate policy, or both, will necessarily lead to additional energy sys-
tem costs – an important trade-off that relates to policy choices and the 
resulting direction of the energy system. However, given the enormous 
co-benefits between pollution and climate policy, achieving society’s 
pollution and health objectives through climate change mitigation as an 
entry point has the potential to significantly reduce the added costs of 
pollution control. This is illustrated in  Figure 17.56 , which plots pollution 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 55.0% 60.0% 65.0% 70.0%
M
t P
M
2.
5 
in
 2
03
0
Probability of 2°C
St
ri
ng
en
t  
 
W
ea
k  
 
Stringent  Intermediate  Weak  
Fulﬁllment of Climate Objecve  
Fu
lﬁ
llm
en
t o
f P
ol
lu

on
/H
ea
lt
h 
O
bj
ec

ve
   
st
ri
ng
en
cy
 o
f  
po
llu

on
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
stringency of  
climate policies 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
   
 Figure 17.55 |  Synergies between climate change mitigation and near-term reduction of PM2.5 emissions. 
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control costs (relative to all other energy system costs) for each scenario 
in the ensemble. The data points toward the right side of the figure, par-
ticularly in the middle-right portion, are some of the most interesting, as 
these represent scenarios that fulfill both the climate objective and the 
pollution and health objective (see  Figure 17.55 ) at the Stringent level, 
yet their added costs of pollution control are not much higher than in 
the baseline scenario (lower-left corner of the figure). 
 A closer look at three select scenarios of the ensemble provides a 
more detailed understanding of the climate-pollution-cost relation-
ship. These three scenarios, shown in  Figure 17.57 , each fulfill the 
pollution and health objective at the Stringent level (consistent with 
the three illustrative sustainable GEA pathways); however, they do 
this by pursuing the climate objective to a greater or lesser degree 
(Weak, Intermediate, or Stringent fulfillment). The Weak Climate scen-
ario represents baseline energy system development under a more 
stringent air pollution policy framework than would likely be realized 
in a typical business-as-usual future. Such a policy adds a significant 
US$830 billion to total annual costs in 2030, compared with US$1630 
billion for all other energy system costs (including both investments 
and operation and maintenance) in the same year. 65 Then, as the strin-
gency of climate policy increases, the added costs of pollution control 
decrease substantially, especially in the Stringent Climate scenario, 
where control costs are US$470 billion less than in the Weak Climate 
scenario, a 57% reduction. 66 This striking result, which corroborates 
findings from other studies (e.g., Amann et al.,  2009 for Europe), 
shows that a significant portion of climate change mitigation costs 
 65  Note the uncertainties of pollution control costs in absence of climate policies. For 
instance, pollution control costs in the so-called CLE1 scenario in  Section 17.5.2 
amount to about US$600 billion in 2030. Differences are due to alternative base-
lines used in the two sections. 
 66  Generally, pollution control costs of scenarios reaching the Stringent fulﬁ llment level 
are on the order of US$200 billion to US$350 billion in 2030. 
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can be compensated for by reduced pollution control requirements, 
while at the same time still allowing for the stringent fulfillment of 
society’s pollution- and health-related targets. Furthermore, the mul-
tiple benefits of climate change mitigation also show up as avoided 
damage costs for the impacts of air pollutant emissions on human 
health, though it should be clearly stated that the synergies analysis 
described in this section has not attempted such an estimation. 
 Another noteworthy observation from  Figure 17.57 relates to which 
sectors contribute most to the added costs of pollution control. In the 
Weak Climate scenario, all sectors require significant amounts of invest-
ment, with the energy conversion sector and the residential and com-
mercial end-use sectors being responsible for the bulk of the costs. In 
the Stringent Climate scenario, however, end-of-pipe pollution control 
requirements decrease substantially in all sectors. 
 In sum, when viewed from a holistic and integrated perspective, the 
combined costs of climate change mitigation and pollution control 
come at a significantly reduced total energy bill if the benefits of 
pollution reduction are properly figured into the calculation of GHG 
abatement strategies (see also Nemet et al.,  2010 ). The design of cost-
effective future policies, therefore, would benefit by integrating hol-
istic portfolios of measures that address both pollution and climate 
objectives simultaneously. This is, of course, no simple task, given that 
in many countries air pollution and climate change are dealt with by 
separate policy institutions. For this reason the enormous co-benefits 
of the two objectives are often overlooked, and the costs of reach-
ing each objective individually are often overstated (Amann,  2009 ). 
In terms of the technology mix, a robust finding of the analyses sum-
marized in this chapter is that a key strategy for meeting both cli-
mate and pollution and health objectives is to increase the utilization 
of efficiency measures as well as zero-carbon, pollution-free energy 
technologies, such as nuclear and renewable energy. 
 17.7.2.2  Climate Change Mitigation and Energy Security 
 The previous discussion has shown that early deployment of zero-carbon 
technologies can help to achieve both near-term pollution and long-term 
climate targets. In addition, this analysis finds that there are important 
synergies between decarbonization and energy security, yet another key 
near-term objective. In short, as countries and regions invest more heav-
ily in renewables in an effort to decarbonize their economies, they will 
by extension reduce their need to import globally traded fossil energy 
commodities such as coal, oil, and natural gas. Because renewables (bio-
mass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal) can potentially be produced 
almost entirely domestically (or at least regionally within a cluster of 
like-minded countries), they are from a dependency perspective inher-
ently secure resources. Moreover, increased utilization of renewables 
and nuclear energy tends to diversify the energy resource mix away 
from one that relies so heavily on fossil energy. Thus, decarbonization of 
the energy system can simultaneously reduce import dependence and 
increase energy diversity, both of which are key indicators of a more 
secure energy supply (see  Chapter 5 on energy security). In fact, the 
results of this analysis indicate that the most “secure” scenario, from 
the perspective of both diversity and trade, is one in which all regions 
pursue very stringent policies that promote both climate change mitiga-
tion  and reduced import dependence. 
 Figure 17.58 illustrates the relationship between the climate and secur-
ity objectives by showing global primary energy diversity and depend-
ence in 2030 (measured in terms of the compound SWDI, introduced 
in  Section 17.6.2 ) as a function of the probability of staying below 
the 2°C warming target. The third dimension captures several alter-
native policy levels representing the varying stringency of efforts to 
limit import dependency by individual world regions; these levels are 
grouped together by the shaded areas. Note that all the scenarios are 
identical with respect to the stringency of air pollution legislation that 
is assumed.  Figure 17.59 focuses on costs, plotting the probability of 
meeting the 2°C target against cumulative total global policy costs as 
a share of global GDP between 2010 and 2030. Total policy costs, cal-
culated relative to the baseline scenario, attempt to capture the added 
costs of energy security, climate change mitigation, and air pollution 
control policies. 67 
 The double effects of decarbonization and reduced import dependence 
are quite clear from  Figures 17.58 and  17.59 . As regions pursue strat-
egies to mitigate climate change or enact policies and procurement 
strategies that prioritize domestic supplies over imports, the diversity of 
 67  Costs include energy system investments, pollution control investments,  operation 
and maintenance, fuel, nonenergy mitigation, and demand reduction (i.e., the 
 macroeconomic response). 
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their energy resource mix is likely to increase. Naturally, pushing both 
the climate and security objectives adds to total energy system costs; 
yet, as in the relationship between climate change mitigation and pollu-
tion control, at higher levels of decarbonization, the costs of security are 
significantly reduced, highlighting the synergies and multiple benefits 
of the two objectives. As  Figure 17.59 illustrates, when climate change 
is of relatively low priority (the Weak climate region), security costs 
can increase total system costs by as much as 0.2 percentage points. 
Conversely, under Stringent climate policies, the added costs of security 
approach zero. 
 Figure 17.60 takes a deeper look into the climate-security-cost  relationship 
by summarizing energy security costs for three alternative pairs of sce-
narios. 68 The scenarios in each pair fulfill the climate objective to the same 
degree (Weak, Intermediate, or Stringent). What distinguishes them is the 
level at which the two scenarios in a given pair satisfy the energy security 
objective; hence, the difference in their costs represents the added costs 
of security. For instance, under a Weak Climate regime, as envisioned 
in a business-as-usual future, this cost premium, in terms of globally 
aggregated annual energy system investments, is approximately US$160 
billion in 2030. By comparison, under an Intermediate or a Stringent 
Climate regime, the added costs of security decline significantly, to just 
US$64 billion and US$28 billion/year, respectively (reductions of 61% 
and 84% compared with the Weak Climate case). As evidenced by  Figure 
17.60 , security policy, applied at the level of individual countries and 
groups of countries, primarily spurs additional investments in end-use 
efficiency and electricity generation, while at the same time lower the 
global investment requirements for upstream energy extraction (coal 
mining and oil production). The security co-benefits that stem from cli-
mate change mitigation are then largely attributed to the reduced need 
for extra “security investments”, since climate policy promotes energy 
efficiency and conservation and the increased utilization of domestically 
produced, low-carbon energy sources. Of course, climate policy itself also 
adds to the total energy bill, as is shown separately in  Figure 17.60 for 
comparison. Climate change mitigation costs are clearly quite substantial, 
although it is important to note that the cost accounting for climate pol-
icy is more comprehensive than that shown for security, which captures 
 68  Each scenario incorporates the same assumptions for the stringency of air pollution 
legislation (CLE level). See the pollution section for more information. 
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only investments. In the figure, climate change mitigation costs refer to 
all costs beyond those motivated by security policy, including invest-
ments in low-carbon technologies and their associated variable costs, 
as well as the costs associated with demand reduction (energy efficiency 
investments and conservation efforts) and nonenergy GHG mitigation 
measures. The bottom line is that, as with the climate-pollution-cost rela-
tionship, when viewed from a holistic and integrated perspective, the 
combined costs of climate change mitigation and energy security come 
at a significantly reduced total energy bill when the benefits of security 
are properly figured into the calculation of GHG abatement strategies. 
 17.7.3  Conclusion 
 The energy system of the future could potentially develop in a number 
of different directions, depending on how society and its decision mak-
ers prioritize various worthwhile energy objectives, including, but not 
0.0% 
0.2% 
0.4% 
0.6% 
0.8% 
1.0% 
1.2% 
1.4% 
To
ta
l P
ol
ic
y 
Co
st
s 
(%
 o
f G
D
P)
 
Probability of 2°C
Stringent  Intermediate  Weak  
Fulﬁllment of Climate Objecve  
se
cu
ri
ty
   
co
st
s  
 
stringency of   
c limate policies  
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 55.0% 60.0% 65.0% 70.0%
 Figure 17.59 |  Total global policy costs of simultaneously achieving energy security and climate objectives to varying degrees. Cumulative discounted costs from 2010 to 2030, 
relative to baseline. 
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Weak Climate Intermediate Climate Stringent Climate
B
ill
io
n 
U
S$
Climate Migaon
End-Use Eﬃciency
Other Energy Conversion
Electricity Generaon
Upstream Resource Producon
All scenarios fulﬁll the energy security 
objecve at the Stringent level.
 Figure 17.60 |  Global annual energy security investment and climate change mitiga-
tion costs for Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent climate policy scenarios in 2030. 
Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development Chapter 17
1300
limited to, climate change mitigation, energy security, and air pollution 
and human health. These objectives are generally discussed in the con-
text of different time frames (security and pollution and health in the 
near term, climate in the medium to long term). For this reason, they fre-
quently compete for attention in the policy world. An added challenge 
is that in many countries, separate policy institutions are responsible for 
dealing with each of the multiple objectives. As a result, the important 
synergies between them are not well enough understood, or are simply 
overlooked, and the costs of reaching each objective individually are 
often overstated. 
 In short, by adopting a holistic and integrated perspective that addresses 
all of the objectives simultaneously, the analysis described in this section 
clearly indicates that cost-effective climate-pollution-security policies are 
likely to lead to substantial co-benefits, in terms of costs avoided and 
the achievement of societal objectives for sustainability . First, fulfillment 
of near-term pollution and health goals at the Stringent level is greatly 
furthered by climate change mitigation. Under stringent climate policy 
scenarios, for instance, globally aggregated DALYs can be reduced by up 
to 22 million in 2030. At the same time, stringent climate policy can help 
to further the energy security goals of individual countries and regions by 
promoting the increased utilization of domestically available renewable 
energy sources that are both more dependable and more resilient than 
imports of fossil energy commodities. Such a strategy would lead to the 
diversification of a given region’s supply mix, a widely acknowledged 
approach for achieving security. Both of these findings illustrate how 
climate change mitigation can be an important entry point for achiev-
ing society’s pollution- and health-related goals. Moreover, the combined 
costs of climate change mitigation, energy security, and air pollution con-
trol come at a significantly reduced total energy bill if the multiple ben-
efits of each are properly accounted for in the calculation of total energy 
system costs. For instance, the total added costs of pollution control at 
the global level are cut significantly (by up to US$500 billion annually 
in 2030 compared to a baseline scenario) as the stringency of climate 
policy increases and the utilization of zero-carbon, pollution-free (thus, 
pollution control-free) technologies rises. Similarly, security costs also 
decrease substantially under increasingly aggressive levels of decarbon-
ization, and in scenarios with very stringent climate policies, the added 
costs of security actually approach zero (translating to an annual cost 
savings of more than US$130 billion in 2030). Although steps taken to 
mitigate climate change will themselves add to total energy system costs 
compared with a baseline scenario (a key trade-off), these climate costs 
will be substantially compensated for by the corresponding cost reduc-
tions for pollution control and energy security (key synergies). 
 Other economic benefits of rapidly decarbonizing the energy system 
are the reduced need for subsidies into carbon-intensive petroleum 
products and coal. Following the IEA ( 2009b ) and Coady et al. ( 2010 ) 
subsidies from these fuels amount at present to about US$132 billion 
to US$240 billion/year. Just 15% of this total is spent directly for the 
poor who have limited access to clean energy. As noted in  Section 17.4 , 
subsidies for the poor must be increased in order to achieve universal 
access. GHG mitigation in the GEA pathways would, however, at the 
same time reduce consumption of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by the 
rest of the population, leading to a reduction in the need for subsidies 
for oil products and coal on the order of US$70 billion to US$130 billion/
year by 2050 compared with today. 
 Many other benefits of the energy transformation have not been 
assigned economic values in detail here but are important to account 
for as well. As illustrated in this section and earlier, in  Section 17.5.2 , 
the health benefits of the transformation can be significant. In add-
ition, pollution control reduces damages to vegetation and may result 
in significant benefits for land productivity by avoiding eutrophication 
and acidification (see  Chapter 3 ). As discussed in  Chapter 19 and in 
 Section 17.4 , universal access to electricity and clean cooking not only 
leads to significant health benefits, but also increases the productiv-
ity of the poorest, thus contributing to well-being and more equitable 
economic growth. In addition, limiting the global temperature rise to 
less than 2°C compared with preindustrial times reduces the risks for a 
number of different types of climate impacts, summarized by five main 
reasons for concern (Smith et al.,  2009 ; see also  Chapter 3 ): (i) the risk 
to unique or threatened systems; (ii) the risk of increases in extreme 
weather; (iii) the distribution of impacts (and the disparities of those 
impacts, given that some regions, countries, and populations may face 
greater harm from climate change); (iv) aggregate damages (assessing 
comprehensive measures of impacts through efforts to aggregate into 
a single metric, e.g., monetary damages); and (v) the risk of large-scale 
discontinuities (e.g., possible tipping points associated with very large 
impacts such as deglaciation of the West Antarctic or the Greenland 
ice sheet). Finally, rapid decarbonization, which leads to a stronger 
reliance on efficiency and zero-carbon energy (e.g., renewables), may 
create new job opportunities and thus provide additional economic 
benefits. 
 Realizing the multiple benefits of the energy transformation requires, 
however, a holistic and integrated approach that addresses a diverse set 
of objectives simultaneously. Although the GEA pathways have shown 
that such a transformation is in principle technically possible, the task 
remains extremely ambitious and will require rapid introduction of poli-
cies and fundamental political changes that lead to concerted and coor-
dinated efforts to integrate global concerns, such as climate change, 
into local and national policy priorities such as health and pollution, 
access to clean energy, and energy security. 
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